Operation Kaman 99
Operation Kaman 99 was a major air strike carried out by the Islamic Republic of Iranian Army Air Force on September 23, 1980, just one day after Iraq’ s full-scale invasion began.
Following scattered Iraqi army attacks along Iran’ s western borders[1] after the Islamic Revolution and before the official start of the Iran-Iraq War, the Iranian Army Air Force prepared an intelligence assessment of Iraq’ s political-military objectives toward Iran and sent it to the Army Headquarters.[2] In response, and to counter Iraq’ s actions and retaliate against its aggressions, the Iranian Army Air Force developed the Alborz operational plan.[3] Since the newly established Islamic Republic of Iran had no doctrine for preemptive strikes, the plan was prepared on the basis of a retaliatory response.[4] The core objective was to undermine the offensive capability of the Iraqi Air Force by targeting its air bases, to be carried out if and when necessary.[5]
On September 22, 1980, Iraq launched air attacks on fifteen Iranian Air Force bases and airports.[6] Brigadier General Valiollah Fallahi, deputy chief of the Army General Staff, sent a message to the Air Force ordering a counterattack and the bombing of all pre-planned targets. Colonel Mashallah Omrani, deputy commander of the Iranian Army Air Force, relayed the same order to all air bases and, by giving the code “ Kaman 99” (the signal to launch the Alborz plan), authorized air strikes against the enemy’ s air force.[7]
The word “ Kaman” (bow) draws from the epic Iranian legend of Arash the Archer, who shot an arrow from his bow toward the Turan border to define the frontier between Iran and Turan. The number 99 refers to the number of pages in the “ Alborz Battle Operational Directive”.[8]
Only two hours after Iraq’ s air strikes,[9] F-4 Phantom aircraft took off in two groups of four from Shahid Nojeh Air Base in Hamedan and Bushehr, bombing the Iraqi air bases at Kut and Shuaibiya.[10] Due to sunset, the operation was paused and resumed the next morning.[11] From the afternoon of September 22, all Air Force personnel went on full alert, and operations staff at the bases worked through the night to prepare the execution plan of the Alborz.[12] Overnight, technical crews prepared and armed fighter aircraft with bombs, and by 04:20 AM, pilots at five air bases were ready to strike the enemy.[13]
The timing of the attack coincided with sunrise and the start of daylight in Iraq, specifically at 07:15 AM on September 23 in the target areas. This was deliberately chosen based on the sun’ s position and the east-to-west flight path of Iranian aircraft toward the targets. It made aiming difficult for Iraqi anti-aircraft gunners as they looked into the rising sun. On the return leg, as Iranian fighters headed back east, enemy interceptors struggled to spot them due to sun glare, and the accuracy of heat-seeking missiles was significantly reduced as the sun rose.[14]
With the Kaman 99 code given, 12 F-4 Phantoms from Mehrabad Air Base struck Al-Rashid Air Base in Baghdad.[15] Tanker aircraft from that base, dispatched to Isfahan and Shiraz, refueling both combat air patrols and the F-4s penetrating Iraqi airspace in multiple outbound and return legs.[16]
39 F-5s took off from the Second Tactical Fighter Base of Tabriz to bombard Mosul Air Base, and later that afternoon, another 20 F-5s hit Kirkuk Air Base.[17]
16 F-4s from the Third Tactical Fighter Base of Hamedan (Shahid Nojeh) attacked Kut Air Base. Later that day, 12 cross-border sorties targeted Iraqi air defense systems, and 18 combat air patrols were flown from the same base.[18]
The Fourth Tactical Fighter Base of Vahdati, in its first wave, sent 21 F-5s to target Nasiriyah Air Base. In total, 42 combat sorties (including cross-border and air patrol missions) were flown from Vahdati on September 23.[19]
30 F-4s were dispatched from the Sixth Tactical Fighter Base of Bushehr to strike Shuaibiya Air Base, military facilities at Al-Faw Port, and enemy forces in the Shalamcheh area.[20]
From the Seventh Tactical Fighter Base of Shiraz, F-14 Tomcats flew 12 sorties to support Iranian fighter jets and counter enemy air attacks.[21] Also, F-14s from the Eighth Tactical Fighter Base flew 28 sorties for the same purpose and succeeded in downing two Iraqi aircraft.[22]
In the second wave of attacks around 3:00 PM, the Second Tactical Fighter Base of Tabriz sent 20 F-5s against Kirkuk;[23] the Third Tactical Fighter Base of Hamedan dispatched 28 F-4s to strike Kut, Al-Amarah, and Al-Rashid air bases; and the Sixth Tactical Fighter Base of Bushehr deployed 9 F-4s to hit Umm al-Qasr Port and Al-Faw.[24]
Operation Kaman 99 came with losses. Three F-5s from Tabriz, six F-5s from Vahdati,[25] one F-4 from Mehrabad,[26] and one F-4 from Shahid Nojeh[27] crashed, resulting in the martyrdom of eight pilots: Khodabakhsh Eshqipour, Abbas Eslami-Nia,[28] Mansour Nazeriyan, Gholamhussain Orouji, Touraj Yousef,[29] Ali-Morad Jahanshahloo, Muhammad Hojjati, and Gholamhussain Afshin-Azar.[30] Also, Parviz Hatamiyan was captured.[31]
The Alborz operation destroyed or took out of service a significant portion of the Iraqi Air Force’ s combat capability for a long time. Iraq was unable to use more than 56 percent of its air combat strength for an extended period. For example, Al-Rashid Air Base in Baghdad remained non-operational until November 30, 1980.[32]
The psychological and political impact of the attack by 140 Iranian fighter jets on Iraqi facilities far outweighed its purely military effect. The first-day strikes boosted morale among the Iranian people, officials, and frontline forces. The Air Force’ s efforts increased confidence among the country’ s leaders and military commanders in confronting the enemy.[33] On the other hand, Iranian attacks deep inside Iraqi territory shook the morale of Iraq’ s top military leadership.[34]
Throughout the Iran-Iraq War, the Iranian Air Force never again conducted operations on the same massive scale as those early days. Meanwhile, Iraqi air defenses improved, making Iranian fighter jet operations more restricted.[35]
Ayatollah Khamenei, then Tehran’ s representative in the Islamic Consultative Assembly, spoke about the Air Force operation during the September 23 parliamentary session, as the aircraft were in flight: “ Right now, 140 fighter jets of the Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force are flying toward their targets deep inside Iraqi territory”. This operation is also known as the “ 140-aircraft operation”.[36]
References
- [1]. Namaki Araqi, Ali-Reza va Hamkaran, Tarikh-e Nabardha-ye Havaei - Amaliyat-e Kaman 99 Mosoom be 140 Farvandi va Enhedam-e Nirooye Havaei Doshman (History of Air Battles - Operation Kaman 99 Known as the 140-Aircraft Operation and the Destruction of the Enemy Air Force), Vol. 3, Tehran: Markaz-e Entesharat-e Rahbordi-ye NAHAJA, 1396, p. 19.
- [2]. Namaki Araqi, Ali-Reza va Hamkaran, Tarikh-e Nabardha-ye Havai - Ta Aghaz-e Tohajom-e Sarasari-ye Araq (History of Air Battles - Until the Beginning of Iraq’ s Full-Scale Invasion), Vol. 1, Tehran: Markaz-e Entesharat-e Rahbordi-ye NAHAJA, 2nd ed., 1395, Pp. 341, 351 and 352.
- [3]. Ibid., Pp. 351-352.
- [4]. Ibid., p. 356.
- [5]. Namaki Araqi, Ali-Reza va Hamkaran, Ibid., Vol. 3, Pp. 20-21.
- [6]. Namaki, Ali-Reza, Nirooye Havaei dar Defa Muqaddas (The Iranian Army During the Sacred Defense), Tehran: Iran Sabz, 1389, p. 116.
- [7]. Khalili, Hussain, Nabardha-ye Havaei Iran (Air Battles of Iran), Tehran: Iran Sabz, 1398, p. 52.
- [8]. Namaki Araqi, Ali-Reza va Hamkaran, Ibid., Vol. 3, p. 31.
- [9]. Namaki, Ali-Reza, Nirooye Havaei dar Defa Muqaddas (The Iranian Army During the Sacred Defense), Ibid., p. 116.
- [10]. Shirmuhammad, Mohsen, Cheshman-e Oqab - Hamase-ye Gordan Yazdah-e Shenasaee-ye Taktiki-ye Nirooye Havaei va Amaliyat-e Aksbardari-ye Havaei dar Defa Muqaddas (Eyes of the Eagle - The Epic of the 11th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron of the Air Force and Aerial Photography Operations in the Sacred Defense), Tehran: Markaz-e Entesharat-e Rahbordi-ye NAHAJA, 1396, p. 135.
- [11]. Ibid.
- [12]. Ibid.
- [13]. Khalili, Hussain, Ibid., p. 62.
- [14]. Namaki Araqi, Ali-Reza va Hamkaran, Ibid., Vol. 3, Pp. 30, 40.
- [15]. Namaki, Ali-Reza, Nirooye Havaei dar Defa Muqaddas (The Iranian Army During the Sacred Defense), Ibid., p. 133.
- [16]. Namaki Araqi, Ali-Reza va Hamkaran, Ibid., Vol. 3, p. 105.
- [17]. Razazadeh, Milad, Yeksad va Yek Shahin - Sargozasht-e Paygah-e Dovvom-e Shekari-ye Tabriz az Aghaz ta Konun (One Hundred and One Falcons - The History of the Second Tactical Fighter Base of Tabriz from the Beginning to the Present (, Tehran: Markaz-e Entesharat-e Rahbordi-ye NAHAJA, 1399, Pp. 127, 129.
- [18]. Namaki Araqi, Ali-Reza va Hamkaran, Ibid., Vol. 3, Pp. 74, 77.
- [19]. Shirmuhammad, Mohsen, Paydari-ye Vahdati - Tarikh-e Paygah-e Chaharom-e Shekari-ye Dezful az 1336 ta Aban 1359 (Readiness of Vahdati - History of the Fourth Tactical Fighter Base of Dezful from November 1980 to 1987), Vol. 1, Tehran: Markaz-e Entesharat-e Rahbordi-ye NAHAJA, 1401, Pp. 130, 135.
- [20]. Namaki Araqi, Ali-Reza va Hamkaran, Ibid., Vol. 3, p. 90.
- [21]. Ibid., p. 98.
- [22]. Heyat-e Tadvin-e Tarikh-e Defa Muqaddas, Taqvim-e Mostanad-e Amalkard-e Nirooye Elahi-ye Havaei Artesh-e Jomhuri-ye Eslami-ye Iran - Mehr 1359 (Documented Calendar of the Performance of the Divine Islamic Republic of Iran Army Air Force – September-October 1980), Vol. 3, Tehran: Markaz-e Entesharat-e Rahbordi-ye NAHAJA, 1397, Pp. 63, 81.
- [23]. Razazadeh, Milad, Ibid., p. 129.
- [24]. Goruh-e Nevisandegan, Daerat al-Maaref-e Defa Muqaddas-e Artesh-e Jomhuri-ye Eslami-ye Iran (Encyclopedia of the Sacred Defense of the Islamic Republic of Iran Army), Vol. 7, Tehran: Entesharat-e Atashbar, 1403, Pp. 136-137.
- [25]. Namaki Araqi, Ali-Reza va Hamkaran, Ibid., Vol. 3, Pp. 86– 88.
- [26]. Ibid., p. 94.
- [27]. Ibid., p. 75.
- [28]. Ibid.
- [29]. Shirmuhammad, Mohsen, Paydari-ye Vahdati … (The Readiness of Vahadati), Ibid., Pp. 131– 134.
- [30]. Razazadeh, Milad, Ibid., p. 126.
- [31]. Namaki Araqi, Ali-Reza va Hamkaran, Ibid., Vol. 3, p. 88.
- [32]. Khalili, Hussain, Ibid., p. 65.
- [33]. Alaei, Hussain, Ravand-e Jang-e Iran va Araq (The Course of the Iran-Iraq War, Vol. 1, Tehran: Marz-o Boom, 1391, p. 245.
- [34]. Ibid., p. 245.
- [35]. Ibid.
- [36]. Khalili, Hussain, Ibid., p. 62.
