The armored units of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) played an active role during the Iran–Iraq War.

The formation of armored units in Iran dates back to 1934, when two armored battalions—each consisting of a tank, motorcycle, and armored cavalry unit—were established in the 1st and 2nd divisions.

In 1949, the U.S. government transferred 20 armored vehicles and 50 tanks to Iran. Subsequently, in 1952 and 1953, one tank battalion was formed within the 1st Infantry Division at Bagh‑e Shah (Tehran), and another battalion was established within the 2nd Division at Eshratabad (Tehran). Over time, armored divisions were organized into three armored brigades, divisional support units, artillery, and armored and mechanized battalions.⁠[1]

At the outbreak of the Iran–Iraq War, Iran had 1,985 tanks, including 400 American M-47s, M-48s, and 460 M-60s, as well as 875 Chieftens and 250 Scorpions (British-made).⁠[2] The Iraqi army was equipped with tanks manufactured by the former Soviet Union.⁠[3] At the outset of the war, Iraq possessed 2,750 tanks, including 50 T‑72s; 2,500 T‑54, T‑55, and T‑62; as well as 100 T‑34s and 100 AMX‑30s.⁠[4]

During the war, the Iraqi army’s main strength lay in its armored units. Iraq’s 1st Mechanized Division and its 3rd, 5th, 6th, 9th, 10th, and 12th armored divisions formed the core of its military power, most of which were deployed on the southern front.⁠[5]

Because Iraq’s greatest advantage was its armored units, the IRGC, during the limited operations it carried out in the early months of the war, sought to undermine this superiority by destroying Iraqi tanks with RPG‑7s whenever possible.⁠[6] After Operation Thamen al-Aemmah (as) (September 27, 1981), equipment from two Iraqi armored brigades—about 130 to 140 tanks and 60 armored personnel carriers (APCs)—fell into IRGC hands.⁠[7] Ten days later, these captured vehicles were reorganized, and with 120 personnel, the IRGC formed its first armored unit,⁠[8] with Fathollah Jafari appointed as its commander.⁠[9]

In Operation Tariq al‑Quds (December 1981), the armored units of the IRGC managed to cut off the enemy’s supply lines. Once the Iraqi rear was sealed, an entire armored brigade—three tank battalions and one mechanized battalion—was encircled, and all of its equipment was captured. After this operation, the IRGC’s tank battalion was upgraded to a tank brigade,⁠[10] eventually becoming the independent 30th Armored Brigade.⁠[11]

While the armored battalions of the Iranian Army followed a traditional administrative‑tactical structure, the IRGC adopted a brigade‑based organization built around tactical battalions.⁠[12] An armored battalion of the IRGC consisted of thirty tanks and three companies, each with three platoons, and each platoon with three tanks.⁠[13] Every platoon had twelve personnel, including the platoon commander and tank commanders.⁠[14]

The IRGC’s armored inventory was built almost entirely from captured Iraqi equipment, mainly T‑55 and T‑62 tanks and BMP‑1s.⁠[15] To operate and maintain these vehicles, the IRGC relied on Iraqi defectors and volunteer prisoners of war with technical expertise.⁠[16]

The 30th Armored Brigade of the IRGC took part in Operation Fath al‑Mubin (March 1982),⁠[17] with three of its battalions engaging the enemy under the Fath Headquarters.⁠[18] In this operation, 400 Iraqi tanks and APCs were captured. At the time, the armored unit of the IRGC had about 250 tanks and APCs, a number that rose to 400—all captured—by the time of Operation Beit al‑Muqaddas (April–June 1982).⁠[19] From the start of the war until the end of Operation Beit al‑Muqaddas, roughly 1,000 Iraqi tanks and APCs were captured. From this point on, because Iraq pulled its tanks farther back, access to Iraqi tanks became more difficult. The IRGC also lost two tank battalions in Operation Ramazan due to deep‑penetration maneuvers.⁠[20]

One strategy IRGC commanders emphasized—especially after Operation Ramazan—was using armored vehicles to move troops quickly to the enemy’s second and third defensive lines after the first line was breached. If the IRGC had possessed enough APCs, it could have moved its infantry forward without exhausting them in long marches under fire.⁠[21]

In 1983, the IRGC expanded its armored organization, establishing a training center in Shiraz and a repair center in Ahvaz.⁠[22] Over time, new armored brigades such as the 20th Ramazan, 72nd Muharram, and 28th Safar were formed.⁠[23]

In amphibious operations, armored units of the IRGC could not participate in the first assault wave, since early movement of tanks would compromise the element of surprise.⁠[24] In Operation Kheibar (February 1984), the only vehicle capable of carrying and connecting floating bridge sections was the amphibious “Khashayar” APC.⁠[25]

armored units of the IRGC played an important role in Operation Valfajr 8 (February 1986) and the capture of Al-Faw. In the first phase, they provided fire support for infantry forces breaking through Iraqi defensive lines and crossing the river. In the second phase, after the enemy line was breached, they supported infantry on the far side of the Arvand River.⁠[26] The Khashayar APCs, thanks to their ability to move through water and marshland, were ferried across the river and proved extremely effective in troop transport and logistics in the swampy terrain.⁠[27]

These APCs became a major advantage for the IRGC in such environments. Their mobility and amphibious capability made them invaluable in the marshes around Al-Faw.⁠[28] In Operation Valfajr 8, thirty Iraqi tanks and APCs were captured.⁠[29]

By Operation Karbala 5 (January 1987),⁠[30] the IRGC’s armored capability had grown to about 1,700 tanks and APCs, most of which were captured equipment.⁠[31] In this operation, the 19th Fajr and 14th Imam Hussain (as) divisions used Khashayar amphibious APCs to move infantry across flooded areas on the southern and eastern sides of the battlefield during the night assault. This allowed the forces to reach their objectives without exhaustion or casualties under enemy fire.⁠[32]

Over the eight years of the war, the IRGC captured around 200 T‑62 tanks, 600 T‑55 tanks, 250 BMP‑1s, and 29 T‑72 tanks.⁠[33]

After the war, the IRGC began developing domestic armored equipment. One example is the “Karrar” tank, unveiled in March 2017 as Iran’s most advanced tank, produced at the Bani‑Hashem Armored Industries complex in Doroud. The Karrar is based on the Russian T‑90 platform, and is intended as an upgrade to Iran’s existing T-72 fleet.⁠[34]

Today, the Shahid Zein al‑Din Institute in Isfahan is responsible for repairing, overhauling, and upgrading various tanks and APCs used by the IRGC, including the T‑55, T‑72, and BMP series.⁠[35]