Declaration of war

On September 22, 1980, Saddam Hussein launched a large-scale and nationwide attack on Iran, marking the beginning of the eight-year war against Iran. Starting in July 1979, when Saddam Hussein took power as President of Iraq, the country initiated a series of overt hostile actions against the newly established Islamic Republic of Iran. These measures were aimed at preparing the ground and creating the necessary conditions for a full-scale invasion of Iran. On April 7, 1980, Iraq announced that Iran must withdraw from the three islands of Greater Tunb, Lesser Tunb, and Abu Musa.⁠[1] Subsequently, Iraqi military movements along the border intensified,⁠[2] and the organization and combat capabilities of the Iraqi army were significantly expanded.⁠[3]

Through cooperation with Western and Eastern intelligence services—including those of the Soviet Union, France, Yugoslavia, Italy, and West Germany—⁠[4] Iraq obtained extensive intelligence on the status of Iran’s armed forces. Iraqi officials concluded that Iran lacked the capability to enter a large-scale war and that internal political conflicts—stemming from the newly established political system—would prevent unified popular participation. They believed Iran would be unable to withstand Iraqi military power.⁠[5] Saddam Hussein assumed that Iran could be occupied within a few days. Based on this expectation of a swift victory, he divided the Iran–Iraq border into three fronts—southern, central, and northern—while concentrating his main effort on the southern one.⁠[6] At the same time, the newly established Islamic Republic of Iran was facing major political, economic, and military crises.

The confrontation between the Islamic Revolution and the Western world had intensified following the takeover of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran. The freezing of Iranian assets in the United States and Europe, a reduction in oil exports, and the suspension of military equipment, spare parts, and ammunition supplies from both Eastern and Western blocs were among the consequences. In addition, internal crises—including economic and political challenges and, in particular, separatist armed conflicts in regions such as Kurdistan, Gonbad, and Khuzestan—had weakened Iran.⁠[7]

The organizational structure and military capacity of the Iranian Army were also weakened following the severance of dependence on the West, especially the United States. Early post-revolutionary measures—such as sending military personnel back to their hometowns or places of choice and shortening the duration of compulsory military service—had further reduced combat readiness.

Taken together, these factors convinced the Baathist rulers of Iraq that they could occupy Iran’s Khuzestan Province within a few days and bring the war to a swift conclusion.⁠[8] Based on this assessment, Saddam Hussein declared the 1975 Algiers Agreement null and void on September 17, 1980, citing alleged damage to Iraq’s interests. Five days later, he launched the imposed war against Iran.⁠[9]

Iraq pursued three main objectives in imposing war on Iran: achieving full sovereignty over the Arvand Rud and settling border disputes in its favor; separating Khuzestan Province from Iran; and weakening Iran to overthrow the Islamic Republic.⁠[10]

To attack Iran, Iraqi military advisers adopted a strategy of rapid war. Under this doctrine, any factor that could slow military momentum was considered unacceptable, as prolonging the war would lead to failure.⁠[11]

At 11:00 AM on 22nd of September 1980, following the symbolic firing of a T-72 tank round by Saddam Hussein from the Baqubah military base towards the Iranian border, the imposed war officially began. Military positions and civilian infrastructure along approximately 1,200 kilometers of Iran’s border—from Haj Omran in the north to Khorramshahr and Arvandkenar in the south—came under heavy Baathist fire, and aerial attacks also started.⁠[12]

According to the plan, air operations were launched from six air bases and conducted at midday so that Iraqi pilots, flying at low altitude through mountainous terrain, could evade radar detection. Iraqi pilots had not been trained for night operations, and coordinated dawn attacks would have required nighttime flights, which were not feasible due to the lack of ground-based navigation systems on Soviet-made aircraft.⁠[13] In addition, because of long distances, Iraqi aircraft carried more fuel instead of heavier bomb loads.⁠[14]

Under this plan, at exactly 12:00 noon on September 22, 192 MiG and Sukhoi fighter aircraft and Tupolev bombers, flying in formations of four and six,⁠[15] launched attacks on ten Iranian air bases and airports. Simultaneously, the Iraqi Armed Forces High Command issued a statement describing the assault as a comprehensive response.⁠[16]

From 1:30 PM until nightfall on September 22, the Iraqi Air Force carried out heavy bombardments against both military and civilian targets in Iran. These included Mehrabad Airport and the 1st Tactical Fighter Base of Tehran; the Shiraz airport and air base; Bushehr Airport; Hamedan Airport; Isfahan Airport; Ahvaz Airport; Omidiyeh Airport; the Shahrekord sugar factory; the Isfahan cement factory; Tabriz Air Base; Urmia Airport; Kermanshah Airport; areas of Saqqez, Baneh, and Marivan; the Dehloran oil facilities; the Dezful ammunition depot and air base; Khorramshahr, Abadan, and Dezful cities; and Sanandaj Airport.⁠[17] In the evening of the same day, the Tabriz, Shahid Nojeh (Hamedan), Vahdati (Dezful), and Bushehr air bases were targeted again.⁠[18] In total, the Iraqi Air Force conducted approximately 250 bombing sorties.⁠[19] During these attacks, one MiG-23, one Tupolev-16, one Tupolev-22, and two Su-22 Iraqi aircraft were shot down.⁠[20]

The air strikes of September 22—modeled after Israel’s 1967 attack on Arab air forces—ultimately failed to achieve their objectives. Despite dozens of transport and tanker aircraft, including C-130s, Fokker F-27s, Boeing 707s, and 747s, being parked in open areas at Mehrabad Airport,⁠[21] only two Boeing 707 aircraft and one C-130 were destroyed by fire.⁠[22] At Vahdati Air Base in Dezful, one F-5 fighter jet and two Bell-212 helicopters were severely damaged due to bombardment.⁠[23] At other bases, such as the 6th Tactical Fighter Base of Bushehr⁠[24] and the 2nd Tactical Fighter Base of Tabriz, only runways were damaged, which were immediately repaired.⁠[25]

Following the extensive Iraqi air attacks on the afternoon of September 22, 1980, and the continuation of earlier border violations, all Iranian border posts in the western and southern regions once again came under heavy Iraqi assault, after which enemy ground advances into Iranian territory began.⁠[26]

Along the Shalamcheh–Khorramshahr axis, Iraq’s 3rd Armored Division—supported by a mechanized brigade from the 5th Mechanized Division and the 33rd Special Forces Brigade—launched operations to occupy Khorramshahr and Abadan, with artillery and air support.⁠[27] On the same day, along the Talaieh axis, Iraq’s 5th Mechanized Division exerted intense pressure in the Koushk and Talaieh areas where Iranian units suffered heavy losses, and the Talaieh border post fell into enemy hands.

Along the Bostan–Susangerd axis, an Iraqi armored division and a mechanized division, consisting of twelve tank battalions, twelve mechanized battalions, and two reconnaissance battalions, entered the fray.⁠[28]

In the western Dezful sector, Iraqi forces advanced with the 10th Armored Division along the Hamrin Heights, Ein-e Khosh, and the Karkheh bridgehead, while the 1st Mechanized Division moved forward along the Fakkeh, Chenaneh, Abu Salibi Khat, and Shush axes.⁠[29]

In western Iran’s border regions, gendarmerie posts and Hedayat village near Qasr-e Shirin, as well as border posts in the Meimak and Soumar areas and the Giskeh post and heights, were occupied by Iraqi troops, and advances along multiple axes began.⁠[30]

In response to Iraq’s nationwide attack, on September 22, 1980, the Iranian Army Headquarters declared the waters near Iran’s coastline a war zone, banning commercial vessels from transporting goods to Iraqi ports.⁠[31] Due to the possibility of Iraq using airports and ports in the United Arab Emirates and certain Persian Gulf sheikhdoms, these states were also warned that allowing Iraq to use their territory would provoke a severe Iranian response.⁠[32]

Following the outbreak of the imposed war, officials of the Islamic Republic of Iran—led by Imam Khomeini (ra)—sought to maintain public calm.

After Imam Khomeini’s reassuring address broadcast on radio and television on the evening of the first day of Saddam’s attack, other national officials also delivered messages of reassurance. The country entered a state of war, and the people stepped up to defend their country. Through unity, sacrifice, and faith in divine assistance, they stood firm against the enemy and defended Iran’s territorial integrity and the Islamic Republic. During the Sacred Defense, countless inspiring scenes were created by the people and the armed forces—especially the Basij volunteers—which will remain forever in the nation’s memory.

 


References:

  • [1] Ruzname-ye Ettelaat (Ettelaat Newspaper), No.16111, 18 Farvardin 1359, Pp. 1–2; Khabargozari-e Fars, Araq Elaam Kard Khakeman ra az Iran Bazpas Migirim (Iraq Announced We Will Reclaim Our Land from Iran), 3/6/1388.
  • [2] Ansari, Mahdi, et al., Ruzshomar-e Jang-e Iran va Araq; Ketab-e Chaharom: Hojum-e Sarasari (Chronology of the Iran–Iraq War; Chapter 4: The All-Out Invasion), Tehran: Markaz-e Motaleat va Tahqiqat-e Jang, Sepah-e Pasdaran, 1372, p. 18.
  • [3] Ibid., p. 19.
  • [4] Al-Samarraie, Wafiq, Virani-ye Darvazeh-ye Sharqi (The Destruction of the Eastern Gate), trans. Adnan Qaruni, Tehran: Moavenat-e Entesharat-e Markaz-e Farhangi-ye Sepah-e Pasdaran, 1377, Pp. 141–143.
  • [5] Ansari, Mahdi, et al., Ibid., Pp. 22–23.
  • [6] Ibid., p. 23.
  • [7] Ibid., p. 28.
  • [8] Ibid., p. 29.
  • [9] Shirmuhammad, Mohsen, Cheshman-e Oqab – Hamaseh-ye Gordan 11 Shenasai-ye Taktiki-ye Nirou-ye Havaei va Amaliyyat-e Aksbardari-ye Havaei dar Defa Muqaddas (Eagle’s Eyes: The Epic of the 11th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron of the Air Force and Aerial Photography Operations in the Sacred Defense), Tehran: Markaz-e Entesharat-e Rahbordi-ye NAHAJA, 1396, p. 133.
  • [10] Ibid., p. 20.
  • [11] Ansari, Mahdi, et al., Ibid., Pp. 22–23.
  • [12] Pourdarab, Saeed, Taqvim-e Tarikh-e Defa Muqaddas – Ghorresh-e Toopha (Chronology of the Sacred Defense – The Roar of Cannons), Vol. 2, Tehran: Markaz-e Asnad-e Enqelab-e Eslami, 1384, p. 15.
  • [13] Razou, Peer, Jang-e Iran va Araq (The Iran–Iraq War), trans. Abdolmajid Heydari & Ali Ahmadi, Tehran: Marz-o-Boom, 1397, p. 71.
  • [14] Razou, Peer, Ibid., p. 72.
  • [15] Ibid., Pp. 71–72.
  • [16] Shirmuhammad, Mohsen, Ibid., p. 133.
  • [17] Pourdarab, Saeed, Ibid., Pp. 15–16.
  • [18] Razou, Peer, Ibid., p. 76.
  • [19] Ibid.
  • [20] Ibid., Pp. 76–77.
  • [21] Shirmuhammad, Mohsen, Ibid., p. 134.
  • [22] Mousavi, Seyyed Esmaeil, et al., Taqvim-e Mostanad-e Amalkard-e Nirou-ye Havaei-ye Artesh-e Jomhuri-ye Eslami-ye Iran – Mehrmah 1359 (Documented Chronology of the Performance of the Air Force of the Islamic Republic of Iran – October 1980), Vol. 3, Tehran: Markaz-e Entesharat-e Rahbordi-ye NAHAJA, 1397, p. 12.
  • [23] Shirmuhammad, Mohsen, Paydari-ye Vahdati – Tarikh-e Paygah-e Chaharom-e Shekari-ye Dezful az 1336 ta Aban 1359 (Vahdati Endurance: History of the 4th Tactical Fighter Base of Dezful from 1957 to November 1980), Vol. 1, Tehran: Markaz-e Entesharat-e Rahbordi-ye NAHAJA, 1401, p. 112.
  • [24] Mousavi, Seyyed Esmaeil, et al., Ibid., p. 15.
  • [25] Ibid., p. 14.
  • [26] Pourdarab, Saeed, Ibid., p. 16.
  • [27] Ibid., Pp. 16–17.
  • [28] Ibid., p. 19.
  • [29] Ibid., p. 20.
  • [30] Ibid., p. 22.
  • [31] Edareh-ye Tablighat va Entesharat-e Aqidati Siyasi-ye Artesh, Ettelaieh-ha-ye Artesh-e Jomhuri-ye Eslami-ye Iran dar Hasht Sal-e Defa Muqaddas (Official Statements of the Islamic Republic of Iran Army during the Eight Years of Sacred Defense), Vol. 1, Tehran: Entesharat-e Aqidati Siyasi-ye AJA, 1394, p. 30.
  • [32] Ibid., Pp. 32–33.

Send Feedback & Corrections