Iran Air Flight 655

On July 3, 1988, the U.S. Navy guided missile cruiser shot down Iran Air Flight 655 over the Persian Gulf, resulting in the martyrdom of all passengers and crew on board.

Following the outbreak of Iraq’s imposed war against Iran in 1980, Iraq began attacking Iranian commercial vessels and laying naval mines in the Persian Gulf from 1981 onward. By 1983, air attacks had expanded significantly, reaching their peak in 1986. Iranian officials raised complaints against Iraq in international forums, but these were largely ignored by the international community.⁠[1] The expansion of the war into the Persian Gulf not only imposed high costs on Iran but also threatened the country’s main source of revenue—oil. These factors led Iran to revise its policy in 1987 and start carrying out retaliatory attacks.⁠[2]

This situation prompted Kuwait to seek assistance from the United States. This led to the establishment of a military presence by the U.S. and several European countries in the Persian Gulf.⁠[3]

For the first time, on July 2, 1988, the U.S. naval fleet engaged Iranian gunboats while escorting a Danish tanker carrying Saudi oil.⁠[4]

At 10:17 AM (Tehran time) on Sunday, July 3, 1988, Iran Air Flight 655 departed Bandar Abbas Airport en route to Dubai. Seven minutes later, the USS Vincennes fired two surface-to-air missiles at the civilian aircraft, while it was flying its usual route over Iran’s territorial waters in the Persian Gulf. The aircraft was destroyed, and all 275 passengers and 15 crew members were killed, including 66 children and 46 foreign nationals.⁠[5]

Initially, the U.S. officials justified the action, claiming the aircraft was military and posed a threat to the warship.⁠[6]

On July 5th, the Islamic Republic of Iran submitted a formal request to the President of the United Nations Security Council and referred the matter to the Council of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), demanding a full investigation of the incident. Iran’s requests included:

1. Condemnation of the attack and destruction of Iran Air Flight 655 by U.S. military forces in the Persian Gulf;

2. An explicit declaration that the incident constituted an international crime based on violations of international law and the legal obligations of the United States as a member of ICAO;

3. Formal acknowledgment of U.S. liability and compensation for both material and moral damages;

4. An immediate end to restrictions, threats, and military actions against civilian aircraft in the region, and the withdrawal of foreign military forces from the Persian Gulf.⁠[7]

On July 16th, ICAO held a session attended by Iran’s Foreign Minister, Ali-Akbar Velayati, and U.S. Vice President George Herbert Walker Bush. Velayati described the U.S. military presence in the Persian Gulf as the root cause of regional insecurity and called the attack on unarmed civilians unjustifiable.⁠[8] The United States, however, claimed that Iran was not blameless, arguing that Iran’s civilian aircraft had been flying at low altitude near the Vincennes, and that the warship’s action was taken in self-defense against a potential attack.⁠[9]

During Security Council sessions attended by Velayati, representatives of member states called for an end to the Iran–Iraq War and stronger guarantees for flight safety. The Security Council urged Iran to accept Resolution 598 to end the war. Although initially rejected by Iran’s representative,⁠[10] Iran ultimately accepted Resolution 598 officially on July 18, 1988.⁠[11]

On July 30, the Security Council adopted Resolution 616 in response to Iran’s complaint. The resolution expressed regret and condolences over the downing of Iran’s civilian aircraft but did not condemn the United States.⁠[12] Similarly, ICAO refrained from conducting a technical investigation and limited its response to expressions of regret and sympathy for the victims’ families.⁠[13]

Following the failure to obtain a satisfactory outcome from ICAO and the Security Council, Iran filed a complaint with the International Court of Justice.⁠[14] The formal application was submitted in May 1989.⁠[15] Although September 12, 1994, was set as the hearing date, the case was ultimately not examined by the Court. Instead, both Iran and the United States agreed that the matter would be settled out of the Court. The U.S. agreed to pay compensation for damages to the aircraft and the victims’ families without accepting legal responsibility.⁠[16] This decision was taken largely because Iranian officials had lost hope that, given U.S. influence in political and judicial arenas, a ruling condemning the United States would be issued.⁠[17] Compensation was paid to Iran in 1995.⁠[18] Some Iranian legal scholars and experts criticized the settlement and the withdrawal of the case from the International Court of Justice as ill-considered and contrary to national interests.⁠[19]

After the incident, none of the Vincennes crew members were prosecuted. The ship’s commander, William Rogers, later received the Legion of Merit from the U.S. government upon completing his service.⁠[20]

In Iran, a memorial ceremony is held every year on July 3rd at the crash site near Hengam Island to commemorate the martyrs.⁠[21]

In 1998, Habib Ahmadzadeh, an author and cultural activist, wrote a letter to William Rogers regarding the shooting down of the Iranian passenger aircraft; the letter was published in Iranian media. In 2008, he emailed the letter to Rogers and approximately 900 other individuals.⁠[22]

 

 


References:

  • [1] Tolouei, Mahmoud, Bazi-ye Qodrat – Jang-e Naft dar Khavar-e Miyaneh (The Game of Power – The Oil War in the Middle East), Tehran: Elmi, 1371, Pp. 311–318.
  • [2] Faslnameh-ye Negin-e Iran (Negin-e Iran Quarterly), No. 2, Paeez 1381, p. 13.
  • [3] Faslnameh-ye Rahbord (Rahbord Quarterly), No. 71, Tabestan 1393, Pp. 13–14.
  • [4] Tolouei, Mahmoud, Bazi-ye Qodrat – Jang-e Naft dar Khavar-e Miyaneh (The Game of Power – The Oil War in the Middle East), p. 318.
  • [5] Amirkhani, Khadijeh, Shelik Kon va Faramosh Kon (Shoot and Forget), Tehran: Markaz-e Asnad-e Enqelab-e Eslami, 1393, Pp. 119, 120, 132.
  • [6] Faslnameh-ye Negin-e Iran (Negin-e Iran Quarterly), No. 5, Tabestan 1382, p. 7.
  • [7] Faslnameh-ye Gozaresh (Gozaresh Quarterly), No. 64, Khordad 1375, p. 19.
  • [8] Amirkhani, Khadijeh, Shelik Kon va Faramosh Kon (Shoot and Forget), Pp. 153, 160–161.
  • [9] Pajouheshnameh-ye Ravabet-e Beynolmelal (International Relations Research Journal), No. 22, Tabestan 1392, p. 9.
  • [10] Faslnameh-ye Negin-e Iran (Negin-e Iran Quarterly), No. 2, Paeez 1381, p. 5; Dorudian, Muhammad, Seiri dar Jang-e Iran va Araq: Payane Jang (A Review of the Iran-Iraq War: The End of the War), Vol. 5, Tehran: Markaz-e Motaleat va Tahqiqat-e Jang-e Sepah, p. 143.
  • [11] Dorudian, Mohammad, Seiri dar Jang-e Iran va Araq (A Review of the Iran-Iraq War), Vol. 5, p. 147.
  • [12] Amirkhani, Khadijeh, Shelik Kon va Faramosh Kon (Shoot and Forget), p. 156.
  • [13] Ibid., p. 14.
  • [14] Ibid., p. 160.
  • [15] Rouznamey-e Jomhouri-ye Eslami (Jomhouri-ye Eslami Newspaper), No. 2894, 31 Ordibehesht 1368, p. 12.
  • [16] Amirkhani, Khadijeh, Shelik Kon va Faramosh Kon (Shoot and Forget), Pp. 160–164.
  • [17] Ibid., p. 160.
  • [18] Ibid., p. 165.
  • [19] Faslnameh-ye Negin-e Iran (Negin-e Iran Quarterly), No. 5, Tabestan 1382, p. 7.
  • [20] Amirkhani, Khadijeh, Shelik Kon va Faramosh Kon (Shoot and Forget), p. 168.
  • [21] Ibid., p. 219.
  • [22] Mahnameh-ye Sureh (Sureh Monthly), No. 37, Farvardin & Ordibehesht 1387, Pp. 6–7.

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