UN Security Council Resolution 552

United Nations Security Council resolution 552 was adopted on June 1, 1984, after hearing complaints from the Persian Gulf states regarding the Iranian attack on the ships belonging to Saudi Arabi and Kuwait. The Council condemned the attack with 13 votes in favor and 2 abstentions (Zimbabwe and Nicaragua).

Since early 1984, alongside efforts to overcome its economic constraints and pressure Iran to end the war, Iraq, with the tacit support of the United States, planned to undermine Iran’s oil export capabilities using Exocet missiles and Super Étendard aircraft. Therefore, it initiated the Tanker War and sought to target Iran’s oil export hub on Kharg Island.⁠[1]

The Baathist regime enjoyed diplomatic backing from the U.S., and international media and organizations. Richard Murphy, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State, who visited West Asia and Baghdad shortly before Operation Kheibar in March 1984, openly supported Iraq’s plan, stating that the U.S. did not consider a major attack on Kharg impossible. According to Foreign Report analysis, escalating pressure on Iran was the natural consequence of Iraq’s planned attack on Kharg. The New York Times also noted that the strike aimed to break the war’s deadlock.⁠[2]

Later, at a meeting of seven major industrial countries (Group of Seven) on June 7, 1984, an analysis of the war’s impact on global oil flow confirmed that Iraq’s attacks were controlled and primarily designed to pressure Iran. Moreover, with Saudi Arabia having increased oil production in advance, an alternative supply for the global market had been secured. Consequently, as Iraq intensified attacks on Iranian oil terminals and tankers, global oil prices gradually declined.

Supported by the U.S. and Western countries, Iraq, for the first time on April 23, 1984, attacked Kharg Island and Iranian tankers using French Super Étendard aircraft.⁠[3] Tariq Aziz argued in a meeting with U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz that the attack would end the war, believing that without oil revenue, Iran could not purchase the weapons it needed on the black market.⁠[4]

Before Iraq’s attacks, Iran had officially warned that any disruption of its oil shipments would prompt it to close the Strait of Hormuz at the Persian Gulf entrance.⁠[5] In response to Iraqi attacks, Iran adopted a policy of “limited retaliation”, which provoked complaints from the Persian Gulf Cooperation Council states, repeated meetings, and letters to the UN Security Council.⁠[6]

After the June 1, 1984, session, the Security Council condemned Iran for attacking Kuwaiti and Saudi vessels with 13 votes in favor and 2 abstentions (Zimbabwe and Nicaragua). The UN, which had previously responded to Iraqi chemical attacks with statements that avoided naming Iraq, made its partiality toward Baghdad even more evident in this case by issuing a resolution that explicitly named Iran.⁠[7]

The resolution text states:

“The Security Council,
Having considered the letter dated May 21, 1984, from the representatives of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates complaining against Iranian attacks on commercial ships en route to and from the ports of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, (S/16574)
Noting that Member States pledged to live together in peace with one another as good neighbors in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations,
Reaffirming the obligations of Member States with respect to the principles and purposes of the Charter,
Reaffirming also that all Member States are obliged to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State,
Taking into consideration the importance of the (Persian) Gulf region to international peace and security and its vital role in the stability of the world economy,
Deeply concerned over the recent attacks on commercial ships en route to and from the ports of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia,
Convinced that these attacks constitute a threat to the safety and stability of the area and have serious implications for international peace and security,

1. Calls upon all States to respect, in accordance with international law, the right of free navigation;
2. Reaffirms the right of free navigation in international waters and sea lanes for shipping en route to and from all ports and installations of the littoral States that are not parties to the hostilities;
3. Calls upon all States to respect the territorial integrity of the States that are not parties to the hostilities and to exercise the utmost restraint and to refrain from any act which may lead to a further escalation and widening of the conflict;
4. Condemns the recent attacks on commercial ships en route to and from the ports of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia;
5. Demands that such attacks should cease forthwith and that there should be no interference with ships en route to and from States that are not parties to the hostilities;
6. Decides, in the event of non-compliance with the present resolution, to meet again to consider effective measures that are commensurate with the gravity of the situation in order to ensure the freedom of navigation in the area;
7. Requests the Secretary-General to report on the progress of the implementation of the present resolution;
8. Decides to remain seized of the matter”.⁠[8]

Five days before the resolution, Iran’s Permanent Mission to the UN sent a letter to the Secretary-General stating that, since the beginning of the war, Iran had dedicated substantial resources and personnel to securing the Persian Gulf. It emphasized that Iran was the only state in the region calling for an end to foreign interference in order to safeguard the sovereignty and independence of regional countries and to ensure the security of the Persian Gulf, thereby fulfilling its responsibilities for maintaining peace and international security.⁠[9]

The letter further criticized the international community’s selective response: while Iraq attacked 71 civilian vessels, only Iran was condemned for targeting two ships, which reflects a discriminatory policy.

From Iran’s perspective, the security of the Persian Gulf is indivisible; either there is security for all, or security exists for none. Iran would not allow the Persian Gulf—which stretches over a thousand kilometers of its coastline—to be used against it, nor permit any power to exploit it to undermine the Islamic Revolution.⁠[10]

Iran also asked the UN member states to consider how they would respond under similar circumstances and to recognize the extent to which Iran had exercised restraint. Given Iraq and its allies’ efforts to internationalize the conflict, Iran’s position was clear: any violation of the security of the Persian Gulf would affect all states.⁠[11]

Finally, Iran stated that the political maneuver at the Security Council was a cover for Iraq’s attempt to internationalize the conflict and divert global attention from Iraq’s destructive role in threatening peace and security in the Persian Gulf. The Iranian government warned the Security Council of the growing conspiracy and emphasized its serious responsibility in safeguarding international peace and security.⁠[12]

 

 


References:

  • [1] Doroudian, Muhammad, Aghaz ta Payan (From the Beginning to End), 7th ed., Tehran, Markaz-e Motaleat va Tahqiqat-e Jang-e Sepah-e Pasdaran-e Enqelab-e Eslami, 1383, Pp. 77–78.
  • [2] Ibid., p. 88.
  • [3] Ibid., Pp. 88–89.
  • [4] Ibid., p. 89.
  • [5] Ibid.
  • [6] Ibid.
  • [7] Ibid.
  • [8] Khorrami, Muhammad-Ali, Jang-e Iran va Araq dar Asnad-e Sazman-e Melal (The Iran-Iraq War in the Documents of the United Nations), Vol. 3, Tehran, Markaz-e Motaleat va Tahqiqat-e Jang-e Sepah-e Pasdaran-e Enqelab-e Eslami, 1387, Pp. 131–132.
  • [9] Ibid., p. 127.
  • [10] Ibid., Pp. 127–128.
  • [11] Ibid., p. 128.
  • [12] Ibid.

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