UN Security Council Resolution 540

UN Security Council Resolution 540 was adopted on October 31, 1983, following Iran’s military successes in operations Muharram, Valfajr Muqaddamati, Valfajr 1, Valfajr 2, and Valfajr 4, and after the intensification of the War of the Cities as well as the Tanker War.

In mid-1982, Iran pushed Iraqi troops out of its territory and pursued military operations into enemy territory. In response, Iraq sought to compel Iran to accept peace proposals by disrupting Iran’s oil exports via maritime routes. Iraqi forces targeted oil terminals, offshore platforms, and oil tankers carrying Iranian crude in air strikes. Iran reacted by increasing inspections of neutral ships to identify war contraband destined for Iraq. In addition, violations of neutrality by certain Persian Gulf states forced Iran, to some extent, to attack tankers either heading to or loading from those countries.⁠[1]

Artillery attacks on Iranian cities continued in 1983. For instance, during 183 firing missions, Abadan was hit 155 times. While cities deeper inside Iran were largely out of Iraqi artillery range, border cities—especially the industrial city of Abadan—remained primary targets. Conversely, as Iranian military ground units approached the border, artillery fire on Iraqi cities became possible. Following official warnings to civilians to seek shelter in safe areas, Iranian forces retaliated in February 1984 with strikes on Khanaqin and Basra. During these attacks, Iraq used chemical bombs for the first time, after receiving the green light from Western governments to deploy chemical weapons against Iran and a $600 million French loan to strengthen its military.⁠[2]

In response, Iran requested that the UN Secretary-General send special representatives to inspect affected residential areas. After the Secretary-General’s report on the investigative mission to Iran and Iraq was published on June 20, 1983,⁠[3] and following Iran’s success in operations Muharram (November 1, 1982), Valfajr Muqaddamati (February 7, 1983), Valfajr 1 (April 12, 1983), Valfajr 2 (July 20, 1983), and Valfajr 4 (October 20, 1983), the Security Council adopted Resolution 540 on October 31, 1983, with 12 votes in favor and 3 abstentions, to prevent further Iraqi setbacks.⁠[4]

The resolution, proposed by Guyana, Togo, and Zaire, stated:

“Having considered again the question entitled ‘The situation between Iran and Iraq’;

Recalling its relevant resolutions and statements which, inter alia, call for a comprehensive cease-fire and an end to all military operations between the parties; Recalling the report of the Secretary-General of June 20, 1983, (S/15834) on the mission appointed by him to inspect civilian areas in Iran and Iraq which have been subject to military attacks, and expressing its appreciation to the Secretary-General for presenting a factual, balanced, and objective account;

Also noting with appreciation and encouragement the assistance and co-operation given to the Secretary General’s mission by the Governments of Iran and Iraq;
Deploring once again the conflict between the two countries, resulting in heavy losses of civilian lives and extensive damage caused to cities, property, and economic infrastructures;

Affirming the desirability of an objective examination of the causes of the war;

1. Requests the Secretary-General to continue his mediation efforts with the parties concerned, with a view to achieving a comprehensive, just, and honorable settlement acceptable to both sides;
2. Condemns all violations of international humanitarian law, in particular, the provisions of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 in all their aspects, and calls for the immediate cessation of all military operations against civilian targets, including city and residential areas;
3. Affirms the right of free navigation and commerce in international waters, calls on all States to respect this right, and also calls upon the belligerents to cease all hostilities in the region of the (Persian) Gulf, including all sea-lanes, navigable waterways, harbor works, terminals, offshore installations, and all ports with direct or indirect access to the sea, and to respect the integrity of the other littoral States;
4. Requests the Secretary-General to consult with the parties concerning ways to sustain and verify the cessation of hostilities, including the possible dispatch of United Nations observers, and to submit a report to the Security Council on the results of these consultations;
5. Calls upon both parties to refrain from any action that may endanger peace and security as well as marine life in the region of the (Persian) Gulf;
6. Calls once more upon all other States to exercise the utmost restraint and to refrain from any act which may lead to a further escalation and widening of the conflict and, thus, to facilitate the implementation of the present resolution;
7. Requests the Secretary-General to consult with the parties regarding immediate and effective implementation of the present resolution”.⁠[5]

Resolution 540 still titles the issue as “the situation between Iran and Iraq”, despite explicitly acknowledging the heavy human and material losses resulting from the conflict.⁠[6]

Another notable aspect is the timing. There was a gap of one year and twenty-seven days between this resolution and the prior ones. If we accept that the resolution primarily responds to the Secretary-General’s inspection report on the attacked non-military areas—as indicated both in its introduction and in the operative section—the delay between the submission of the inspection report and the adoption of the resolution is unjustifiable. In other words, the condemnation of human rights violations, which forms a central part of this resolution, was issued with such a delay that it diminishes both its significance within the resolution and the impact of the inspection team’s report, which was postponed by over five months.⁠[7]

The resolution also highlights the need for a realistic assessment of the war’s causes. Due to Iran’s successive victories, the UN Council emphasized a factual review of the conflict, even though it had not officially recognized the war’s outbreak. Nevertheless, the examination of the factual causes of the war represented a step toward addressing Iran’s concerns in this resolution. However, this examination had three major shortcomings:

1-It appeared only in the introduction part, with no procedural measures in the operative section;

2-While acknowledging the war, the Council did not identify an aggressor, even though wars usually result from one side’s attack;

3-The reference to such an important issue was vague and brief.⁠[8]

Consequently, the UN Security Council avoided naming the party violating human rights and attacking non-military targets, calling merely for the cessation of all such operations without introducing enforcement mechanisms.⁠[9]

Another criticism is that when the Council emphasizes the right to free navigation in international waters and calls on the parties to immediately end the war in the Persian Gulf region and halt attacks on shipping lanes, navigable waterways, ports, terminals, and coastal and port facilities, its primary aim is to ensure the export of cheap oil to powerful industrial countries—nothing more; for the Security Council had remained silent on this issue for years and had even sided with the aggressor. Furthermore, due to the involvement of Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz in drafting and negotiating Resolution 540, the Council avoided using the historic name “Persian Gulf”, opting simply for the “Gulf” to appease Iraq and its allies.⁠[10]

One day before the Security Council vote, Iran’s Prime Minister Mir-Hussain Mousavi stated that “Iran would not accept the decisions made by the Security Council”. Simultaneously, Sultan Qaboos of Oman implicitly acknowledged Iraq’s intent to internationalize the conflict.⁠[11]

The Prime Minister of Iran also met with Imam Khomeini (ra) on the morning of October 30, 1983, to discuss the draft of a new resolution by the United Nations Security Council. Mousavi described the Council as a body dominated by major powers, where the final word belongs to them, and as being in conflict with the beliefs and intellectual foundations of the Iranian people. He added that as long as the voices of bullies prevail over those of the oppressed in the Council, and as long as the nature of the Islamic Republic is defined by opposition to injustice and arrogance, the Iranian government would accept no obligations arising from the Council’s decisions.⁠[12] These statements were reported by Israeli media, with Radio Israel interpreting them as Iran’s early opposition to Resolution 540.⁠[13]

After adoption, Iran’s UN representative condemned the Security Council as biased, stating that it had lost its last opportunity to end the war.⁠[14]

Ultimately, despite some improvements over prior resolutions, Iran rejected Resolution 540 because the aggressor had not been identified and the Council implicitly supported superpower positions favoring Iraq, while Iraq accepted it after raising minor objections.⁠[15]

 

 

 


References:

  • [1] Momtaz, Jamshid va Hussain Sharifi Tarazkouhi, Hoquq-e Jang-e Darya-yi va Amalkard-e Jomhuri-ye Eslami-ye Iran dar Tool-e Jang-e Iran va Araq (Maritime Law and the Performance of the Islamic Republic of Iran during the Iran-Iraq War), Faslname-ye Daneshkade-ye Hoquq va Olum-e Siyasi-ye Daneshgah-e Tehran, No. 32, Khordad 1372, p. 4.
  • [2] Rashid, Mohsen, Atlas-e Amari-ye Jang-e Shahrha – Salname-ye Jang-e Shahrha dar Doran-e Defa Muqaddas 1359–1367 (Statistical Atlas of the War Cities – War Yearbook during the Sacred Defense 1980-1988), Tehran, Markaz-e Asnad va Tahqiqate Defa Muqaddas, 1397, p. 67.
  • [3] Khorrami, Muhammad-Ali, Jang-e Iran va Araq dar Asnad-e Sazman-e Melal (The Iran-Iraq War in UN Documents), Vol. 2, Tehran, Markaz-e Motaleat va Tahqiqat-e Jang-e Sepah-e Pasdaran-e Enqelab-e Eslami, 1387, p. 63.
  • [4] Sodagar, Ahmad, Jang va Qatnameha-ye Sazman-e Melal-e Mottahed (War and UN Resolutions), Qom, Ensharat-e Velaa-ye Montazer, 1391, Pp. 151–152.
  • [5] Khorrami, Muhammad-Ali, Ibid., Pp. 133–134.
  • [6] Sodagar, Ahmad, Ibid., p. 153.
  • [7] Ibid., Pp. 153–154.
  • [8] Ibid., p. 154.
  • [9] Ibid.
  • [10] Ibid., Pp. 154–155.
  • [11] Lotfollahzadegan, Ali-Reza va Iraj Hemmati, Roozshomar-e Jang-e Iran va Araq – Nokhostin Amaliyat-e Bozorg dar Shomal-e Gharb (Chronology of the Iran-Iraq War- The First Major Operation in Northwest Iran), Vol. 28, Tehran, Markaz-e Asnad va Tahqiqate Defa Muqaddas-e Sepah-e Pasdaran-e Enqelab-e Eslami, 1396, p. 427.
  • [12] Ibid., Pp. 427–428.
  • [13] Ibid., p. 428.
  • [14] Ibid., p. 446.
  • [15] Sodagar, Ahmad, Ibid., p. 155; Khorrami, Muhammad-Ali, Ibid., p. 137.

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