Operation Beit al‑Muqaddas 4 began on March 25, 1988, by the code of “ Ya Aba Abdillah (as) ”, unfolding across the Shakh‑Shemiran Heights and the Halabja region in Iraq. The operation was designed as a continuation of Valfajr 10, aiming to secure the high ground overlooking the Darbandikhan Dam and complete the goals left unfinished in the earlier offensive.

Operation Valfajr 10, launched on March 13, 1988, had already brought significant gains, including the liberation of Halabja and the capture of several key heights. These advances pushed Iranian forces close to the Iraqi installations around the Darbandikhan Dam. Therefore, Iranian military commanders started planning a follow‑up operation to seize the commanding heights south of the Lake Darbandikhan.⁠[1] Iraqi troops still held these elevations, giving them a clear view and firing advantage over the southern approaches to Halabja — a major vulnerability on the left flank of Valfajr 10 operational area.⁠[2] Thus, control of the southern shore became essential to closing this gap.⁠[3]

Planning for Operation Beit al‑Muqaddas 4 began on March 18, when the commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Ground Forces identified the main objectives: the Shakh‑Surmer, Shakh‑Shemiran, Bardadkan, and Zimnan‑Kuh heights, as well as the Toulabi Plain (Shemiran). The attack was to begin from the Tamurzhenan Heights, moving north to south — the opposite direction of Iraq’ s defensive layout. The forward units were expected to cross the southeastern parts of Lake Darbandikhan by boat and attack Iraqi positions.⁠[4] Among all objectives, Shakh‑Shemiran was considered the most critical, as controlling it meant dominating both the Toulabi Plain and Shakh‑Surmer Height.⁠[5]

Although the operation was initially scheduled for March 22, incomplete reconnaissance forced a delay. Ahmad Gholampour, commander of Karbala Headquarters, arrived in the area to oversee the operation, with Ahmad Kazemi — who had commanded Fath Headquarters in Operation Valfajr 10 — appointed as his deputy.⁠[6]

Several IRGC units took part in the operation, including the 10th Seyyed al‑Shuhada (as) Division (9 battalions), the 27th Muhammad Rasulullah (pbuh) Division (6 battalions), the 155th Vizhe-ye Shuhada Brigade (5 battalions), the 57th Hazrat Abalfazl (as) Division (5 battalions), and the 18th Al‑Ghadir Brigade (3 battalions).⁠[7]

The 11th Val‑Adiyat Brigade was tasked with countering Iraq’ s chemical attacks, while artillery support came from the 63rd Khatam al‑Anbya (pbuh) Brigade. Air‑defense units from the 3rd Shaban and 10th Muharram brigades of the IRGC were also deployed. The Army Aviation from Isfahan was placed under Fath Headquarters to provide medical evacuation, transport troops and ammunition, and deploy a Cobra fire team for air support.⁠[8]

The operation began on March 25, 1988, by the code of “ Ya Aba Abdillah (as) ”. The main goal for the first night was the capture of Shakh‑Shemiran, which had been assigned to the 27th Division. That afternoon, as the division’ s units were spread out along the ridges and gullies of Tamurzhenan, Iraqi aircraft hit them hard, leaving more than seventy Iranian forces martyred or wounded and disrupting one battalion’ s formation.⁠[9] Despite the losses, the division’ s divers crossed the Darbandikhan Lake at 11 PM and reached the enemy shore, but follow‑on units attempting to pass through the Shakh‑Surmer pass were halted by intense Iraqi fire. By 4 AM, fighting intensified, and Iranian forces began gaining ground. Then, the 10th Seyyed al‑Shuhada (as) and 57th Abalfazl (as) divisions encircled Shakh‑Shemiran, the main goal of the operation, and prepared to capture it. Meanwhile, the 27th Division advanced across the Toulabi Plain, destroying three Iraqi tanks and taking three more, forcing Iraqi armor to retreat. By mid‑morning, units of the 57th Abalfazl (as) Division reached the summit of Shakh‑Shemiran, engaged in close‑quarters combat, cleared the bunkers, and secured the height. Subsequently, the Iraqi troops on the left‑flank ridges of Shakh Shemiran and Shakh Surmer gave way under pressure and pulled back, which caused Shakh Surmer to fall as well. From that point on, Iraq focused all efforts on retaking Shakh‑Shemiran.

On the second night, while the 27th Muhammad Rasulullah (pbuh) Division was positioned in the Toulabi Plain, preparing to attack the Bardadkan Heights, Iraqi forces launched a counterattack at 12:30 AM. Supported by heavy artillery fire, the counterattack cut off the reinforcement routes to the 57th Hazrat Abalfazl (as) Division. Iraq also briefly seized several positions, but the 57th Hazrat Abalfazl (as) Division counterattacked, inflicted heavy casualties, and drove the Iraqis back once again.⁠[10]

By March 30, Iraqi forces had laid mines and installed barbed wire in front of their lines — a clear sign that they would no longer want to retake the heights. Consequently, the Fath Headquarters ordered all units to fortify and consolidate their defensive positions.⁠[11] After five days of fighting, Operation Beit al‑Muqaddas 4 concluded on April 8, 1988, with the capture and securing of the Shakh‑Shemiran and Shakh‑Surmer heights.⁠[12] Taking those heights closed the gap on the left flank of the Valfajr 10 front and allowed the operation to meet its goals.⁠[13]

Several factors contributed to the operation’ s success. The maneuver plan — unlike earlier operations in the area — relied on striking Iraqi forces from behind. Iranian control of Tamurzhenan, gained in Operation Valfajr 10, made it possible to approach Shakh‑Shemiran and Shakh‑Surmer through the enemy’ s rear access routes. The Operation Beit al-Muqaddas 4 also took place only ten days after Operation Valfajr 10, leaving Iraq little time to build obstacles or reinforce the southern shore of Lake Darbandikhan.⁠[14]

Iraqi losses in Operation Beit al-Muqaddas 4 include 5,000 killed or wounded, 498 captured, 15 tanks and armored personnel carriers and 50 vehicles seized, and 11 tanks, 54 mortars, 5 air‑defense guns, one engineering vehicle, 14 machine guns, and one vehicle carrying a 106‑mm recoilless rifle were destroyed.⁠[15] Moreover, four infantry brigades, the 68th Special Forces Brigade, two infantry battalions, and one armored battalion lost 70-100 percent of its combat power. A total of 105 Iranian forces were martyred, 375 were wounded, and 50 were reported missing from the 18th Al Ghadir Brigade.⁠[16]