Operation Wal-Fajr (Preparatory)
Leila Heydari Bateni
71 بازدید
The preparatory operation for Operation Fajr began on February 7, 1983, between Fakkeh and Chezabah. It aimed at capturing the Ghazilah Bridge and the al-Amara City in Iraq. In this operation, which was carried out jointly by the Islamic Republic of Iran Army and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, was unsuccessful. despite the first line of the Iraqi forces being broken. Some of the reasons of its failure was due to the lack of complete clearing of the area and the large extent of minefields.
After the execution of operations Muslim bin Aqeel and Muharram in the fall of 1982, meetings were held between the commanders of the army and the IRGC for the implementation of the preparatory operation for Operation Fajr . The operational area was located from the north-west to south-west in Hur al-Huwayzah and on the Iran-Iraq border, between Fakkeh and Chezabeh. The capture of the Ghazilah Bridge, which was the main objective of the operation, was important because it was the communication route between the al-Amara-Basra[1] Road and the deployment base of two divisions of the Iraqi army.[2] The operation was carried out in two stages with the aim of capturing three border checkpoints and the city of Al-Amara, as well as cutting the road from Basra to Baghdad.[3] Additionally, victory in this operation could have had influence on the process of the non-aligned conference and the end of the war. The name Fajr, which means dawn, was chosen because the operation was carried out during the Fajr ten-days.[4]
On February 9, 1983, Hasan Bagheri (Gholamhossein Afshardi), the intelligence officer of the IRGC operations and the deputy commander of the IRGC ground forces, Majid Baqaei, the commander of the Karbala Base, and several others went to the area for reconnaissance. However, they were martyred when a cannonball hit their trench.[5]
On the eve of the operation, decisions such as coordination between the units, declaration of 100% readiness, implementation of the plan to distribute a thousand dump trucks, coordination with the Air Force and inviting some officials to attend the operation command room were prioritized.[6] Mir Hossein Mousavi, the then Prime Minister of Iran, Ayatollah Sayyid Abdul Karim Mousavi Ardabili, head of the judiciary, and Ayatollah Muslim Malakouti, Tabriz Friday Prayer Leader, were also invited to the announcement of the start of the operation at the Khatam al-Anbiya Base.[7]
Iran's combat organization was carried out in the central base of Khatam al-Anbiya (the headquarters of the joint command of the IRGC and the army), and the operations were carried out by the two bases of Karbala and Najaf and a part of the army.[8]
The 3rd Sahib al-Zaman Division included the 14th Imam Hussein Brigade, 25th Karbala Brigade, 17th Ali bin Abi Talib Brigade, 44th Bani Hashim Brigade, while the Hadid Division included the 7th Vali Asr Brigade, 8th Najaf Brigade, 41st Tharullah Brigade, 19th Fajr Brigade and 15th Imams of Karbala Brigade.
The Qadr Corps included the 27th Muhammad Rasulullah Brigade, 31st Ashura Brigade, 10th Sayyid al-Shuhadah and 5th Nasr Brigade. While the Jawad al-Aimmah, Imam Reza and Imam Sadiq units were under the command of the Najaf Base. The 16th Armored Division and the 84th Khorramabad Brigade of the army were also present in this operation.[9]
From the Iraqi army, which had increased its forces after several Iranian victories, its 4th Corps, with a combination of four divisions, was at the head of its forces.[10]
A few days before the start of the operation, the mobility of Iraq’s forces increased and it seemed that the operation was leaked; but it was not possible to cancel the operation based on speculation. However, Sayyid Ali Khamenei, the then president, was going to the non-aligned conference, and the commanders wanted him to participate in the conference with sufficient content.[11]
The preparatory operation for Operation Fajr began with the codename "Ya Allah" at 21:30 on the February 7, 1983. The attack on the positions of the Iraqi army started from the five axes north and south of Rashideh to the Tawusiyah Checkpoint. Despite the movement of the Iranian forces in the operational axes a few hours before the codename announcement, they failed to cross the lines at the same time This was. because the Iraqi defense lines in these axes had three parallel channels full of barbed wire and mines.. Some of them stayed in ambushes, some got involved and some did not reach the conflict area.[12] These obstacles were so many and wide that this operation was also called the “war of obstacles”.[13] Five brigades from the bases of Najaf and Karbala, in order to clear the minefields and break the defense lines of the Iraqi army, advanced slowly and crossed the first parallel channel.[14] By the morning, it became clear that the operation had failed and it was not possible to continue.[15]
On the second day of the operation, the 15th Imam Hasan Brigade and the 8th Najaf Division captured the Wahb and Fakkeh checkpoints and destroyed the enemy's 704th Brigade.[16] But they faced strong resistance from the Iraqi forces. But they moved, concentrated their forces, completed the formation and created obstacles. In fact, based on tactics, the Iraqi army avoided engaging its frontline forces. Also, during the night, IRGC forces engaged with Iraqi ambushes in the northern axis of the operation and the axis of the deep forest. In some places, they destroyed the security forces of Iraq or forced them to retreat They advanced in some axes, but they failed to cross the obstacles in some axes.[17] Some of the forces of the units that had advanced to the second channel could not be in full coordination with the other forces. Therefore, they faced heavy pressure from the Iraqi forces and suffered heavy casualties. Some were forced to retreat, while a group remained under siege.[18]
The width and depth of the obstacles, as well as the large number of channels that were before the Iraqi defense line, slowed the action of the fighters. Furthermore, other factors, such as the failure to clear the area, the extent of the minefields, and Iraq's knowledge of conducting operations through the spy network of the People's Mojahedin Khalq Organization (MKO) and its forces being at the disposal of the Iraqi army,[19] the limited capacity of the two operational axes, the deceptiveness of the sandy lands, and the intensity of resistance from the Iraqi forces also played a part in the general objectives of the operation not being achieved and played a fundamental role in changing the conditions in favor of the Iraqi forces.[20]
Due to the knowledge of the Iraqi army about the operation and the limitation of the access roads, the continuation of the operation was postponed for one night. On the night of February 9, 1982, the units opened the roads of their respective axis.[21]
On February 10, the second phase of the operation began at 21:00. It intended to destroy the forces and equipment of the Iraqi army.[22] With the start of the attack, the command of the Iraqi army, like three nights before, refused to engage the frontline forces and ordered a retreat.[23]
However, the IRGC's frontline forces clashed with many Iraqi ambushes. This occurred to such an extent that the fighters thought they were fighting with a continuous line of Iraqi forces. The troops faced many obstacles, such that some guides were lost, while some troops tripped over landmines. The firing activity of the Iraqi army and their vigilance, coupled with the inconsistency of the troops in reaching the canals, resulted in a loss of time and lack of advance.[24] This was exacerbated by the heavy fire of Iraq and their encirclement of the Iranian forces.Therefore, at 05:00 on February 21, the Iranian forces were ordered to withdraw from the positions of the first night of the operation and, to prevent the increase of casualties, the continuation of the operation was abandoned.[25] One of the important reasons for the failure of this operation was that the area east of al-Amara was the location of Iraq's military maneuvers before the war, and the commanders of the Iraqi army had a lot of knowledge and control over the area.[26]
In the preparatory operation for Operation Fajr, the number of Iranian martyrs, prisoners, missing, and wounded totaled 11172, while the number of Iraqi army members killed, prisoners, and wounded was 1163. Also, forty tanks and personnel carriers and five planes of the Iraqi army were destroyed in this operation.[27]
In the preparatory operation for Operation Fajr, a battalion from the 27th Muhammad Rasulullah Division was surrounded by Iraqi forces and all the fighters of the battalion were martyred. Rasool Malaqlipour directed the film “Flight in the Night” in 1986 based on this operation.[28]
The preparatory operation for Operation Fajr, which was originally named Fajr, was renamed "preparatory Fajr" due to its unsuccessful results.[29] After that, a series of operations called Fajr took place, which continued until Fajr 10.[30]
[1] Shiralinia, J., Zahedi, S., Ravi Book 8: Thirsty Kettles, Tehran: New Idea, 2018, pp. 65 and 75; Lotfollahzadegan, A., Iran-Iraq War Chronicle, Book Twenty-Twenty, Tehran: Holy Defense Records and Research Center, 2013, p. 17.
[2]Lotfollahzadegan, A., Chronicle of the Iran-Iraq War, book twenty-second, p. 17.
[3] The Iran-Iraq war from the perspective of the world press, Volume 10: The development of the combat organization, Tehran: Research Institute of Sciences and Education of the Holy Defense, Foundation for the Preservation of the Works and Values of the Holy Defense, 2008, p. 296.
[4] Drodian, M., A Review of the Iran-Iraq War, Volume 6: Beginning to End, Center for War Studies and Research, 1997, p. 77; Lotfollahzadegan, Alireza, Chronicle of the Iran-Iraq War, book twenty-second, p. 22.
[5] Jafari, M., Atlas of Enduring Battles, Tehran: Sore Sabz, Ch 35, 2013, p. 86; Rashid, Mohsen, Iran-Iraq War Atlas, Tehran: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps War Studies and Research Center, 1980, p.70; Lotfollahzadegan, A., Chronicle of the Iran-Iraq War, book twenty-second, p. 487.
[6] Lotfollahzadegan, A., Chronicle of the Iran-Iraq War, book twenty-second, p. 22.
[7] Pourdarab, S., Holy Defense History Calendar, Volume 30, Hard Conditions in the Battle, Tehran, Islamic Revolution Records Center, 2013, p. 308.
[8] Habibi, A., Atlas of Khuzestan in the Iran-Iraq War, Tehran: The Holy Defense Records and Research Center, 2013, p. 190.
[9] Ibid
[10] Shiralinia, J., Zahedi, S., Kitab Ravi, vol. 8, pp. 75 and 76
[11] Shiralinia, J., illustrated encyclopedia of Iran-Iraq war history, Tehran: Sayan, Ch 5, 2015, p. 245.
[12] Ardestani, H., Analysis of the Iran-Iraq War, Volume 3: Punishment of the Aggressor, Tehran: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps War Studies and Research Center, 1980, p. 44; Lotfollahzadegan, Alireza, Chronicle of the Iran-Iraq War, book twenty-second, p. 22.
[13] Pourdarab, S., Calendar of Holy Defense History, vol. 30, p. 338
[14] Lotfollahzadegan, A., Chronicle of the Iran-Iraq War, book twenty-second, p. 22.
[15] Dehghan, A., The Unsaid of War: The Memoirs of Lieutenant-General Martyr Ali Sayadshirazi, Tehran: Literature and Art of Resistance Office, Art Gallery, 6th year, 1999, p. 343.
[16] Pourdarab, S., Calendar of Holy Defense History, Vol. 30, pp. 305 and 306.
[17]Lotfollahzadegan, A., Chronicle of the Iran-Iraq War, book twenty-second, pp. 22-23
[18] Ibid, p. 23.
[19] Dari, H., Guide Atlas 5: Record of Land Battles, Tehran: Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps War Studies and Research Center, 2011, p.92.
[20] Pourdarab, S., Calendar of Holy Defense History, vol. 30, p. 311.
[21] Lotfollahzadegan, A., Journal of the Iran-Iraq War, book twenty-third, pp. 24 and 23
[22]Ibid
[23] Ibid
[24] Ibid, p. 615.
[25]Ibid, pp. 24 and 25; Ardestani, H., Analysis of the Iran-Iraq War, vol.3, p.46.
[26] Electronic archive of holy defense encyclopedia, document number 6-98-1988
[27] Habibi, A., Atlas of Khuzestan in the Iran-Iraq War, p. 191.
[28] Electronic archive of holy defense encyclopedia, document number 7-98-1988.
[29] Lotfollahzadegan, A., Chronicle of the Iran-Iraq War, book twenty-second, p. 614.
[30] Dari, H., Guide Atlas 5, p. 148
