USS Vincennes
Written by: Sajjad Naderipour
Translated by: Hadi Qorbanyar
20 بازدید
On July 3, 1988, the USS Vincennes, a U.S. Navy guided missile cruiser, shot down Iran Air Flight 655 over the Persian Gulf, resulting in the martyrdom of all 290 passengers and crew on board, including 66 children under the age of twelve.
In 1984, the United States began patrolling the international waters in the Persian Gulf to protect commercial shipping against potential threats posed by both sides in the Iran–Iraq War. Three years later, on May 17, 1987, the USS Stark was struck by two Iraqi missiles while operating in the Persian Gulf. In response, the U.S. increased its military presence in the region and granted expanded authority to naval commanders, allowing them to take any necessary defensive measures if hostile intent was evident. According to the revised rules of the engagement, any aircraft approaching within five nautical miles of a U.S. warship without identifying itself would be subject to “defensive counteraction”.[1]
The USS Vincennes entered the Persian Gulf on May 20, 1988. About two months later, on July 3, 1988, Iran Air Flight 655 departed Bandar Abbas Airport en route to Dubai with a 20-minute delay. At 9:54 AM, the Vincennes fired two surface-to-air missiles at the civilian aircraft, while it was flying its usual route over Iran’s territorial waters in the Persian Gulf.[2] The aircraft was destroyed and all 290 people on board were killed, including 254 Iranian nationals, 13 from the United Arab Emirates, 10 Indians, 6 Pakistanis, 6 Yugoslavs, and one Italian.
Initially, the U.S. officials justified the action, claiming the aircraft was military and posed a threat to the warship. Even after it was confirmed that the aircraft was a civilian passenger jet, American authorities continued to defend the attack. The Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff said that the Vincennes had acted in self-defense.[3]
Some analysts believe that the USS Vincennes’ attack on Iran’s civilian airliner was part of a broader strategic policy pursued by the United States and its allies in the final years of the Imposed War, aimed at preventing Iraq’s defeat. In early 1987, with Iranian forces advancing and the possibility of Iraq’s collapse becoming more likely, the U.S. and other powers sought to prevent a shift in the regional balance of power in favor of Iran—by any means necessary.[4]
In response to the incident, the Iranian government stated that the United States would face consequences for its unlawful action. Iran formally requested that the UN Secretary-General dispatch a delegation to investigate the incident.[5]
In response to a letter of condolence from Ayatollah Hussain-Ali Montazeri regarding the incident, Imam Khomeini (ra), while addressing growing calls to end the war, emphasized that all must be prepared for an all-out confrontation with the United States. He warned that neglecting wartime duties would be seen as betraying the Prophet Muhammad (pbuh). He also expressed his willingness to sacrifice his “humble life” for the Iranian forces.[6]
Other institutions also reacted strongly, including the Supreme Defense Council, specialized committees of the Islamic Consultative Assembly, and the Civil Aviation Organization.[7] Following the tragedy, a National Day of Mourning was declared across Iran, with three days of mourning observed in Hormozgan Province.[8] Public mourning ceremonies were held in cities throughout the country.[9]
Hours after the incident, Admiral William Crowe, Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, outlined six justifications for the Vincennes’ action:
1. A narrow four-minute window to identify the aircraft;
2. Misidentification of the aircraft as a fighter jet;
3. The aircraft’s deviation from the expected international air corridor;
4. High speed and low altitude of the plane;
5. The combat conditions in the region which heightened risks for civilian aircraft;
6. Presence of Iranian fighter jets nearby, contributing to confusion and threat perception.
In response, Brigadier General Mansour Sattari, then Commander of the Iranian Air Force, addressed the technical aspects of the tragedy in an interview with Keyhan newspaper the following day. He refuted the American claims in six key points:
- A 14-minute window was available for identification, from the aircraft’s authorized takeoff at 10:10 AM to the moment of impact at 10:24 AM;
- The plane was equipped with a civilian C-Charlie radar system, making misidentification by the Vincennes implausible;
- The shootdown occurred directly beneath a registered international air corridor used daily by commercial flights;
- The aircraft was ascending at a standard rate toward 14,000 feet, consistent with normal civilian flight behavior;
5. The Persian Gulf was not classified as a combat zone, as confirmed by international insurance companies;
6. No Iranian fighter jets were present in the area at the time of the incident.
The Iranian Air Force Commander pointed to the USS Vincennes’ prior escort of 16 Iraqi fighter jets as proof that the shootdown of Iran Air Flight 655 was a deliberate act.[10]
Following the incident, the Iranian government brought the matter before the Council of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). Although ICAO had previously condemned similar actions by other states involving the downing of civilian aircraft, it took no position on this case until formally approached by Iran. In its subsequent report, ICAO declined to assess whether the Vincennes’ action was reasonable or to characterize the nature of the error. The Council did not classify the U.S. action as a violation of the Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation.[11]
Two days after the incident, the Islamic Republic of Iran submitted a formal request to the President of the United Nations Security Council for an emergency session. After hearing statements from both Iranian and American representatives, the Council issued a resolution that merely expressed regret over the incident.[12]
The United States government declined to pay compensation to Iran Air or accept legal responsibility. Instead, it offered to compensate the victims’ families directly. Iran rejected this proposal and, on May 17, 1989, filed a complaint with the International Court of Justice.[13] Ultimately, on February 9, 1996, while the case remained open, both parties reached a settlement. Iran agreed to withdraw its complaint in exchange for $131.8 million in compensation, of which $61 million was given to the families of Iranian victims. The case was closed without a formal ruling.[14]
The incident received widespread international coverage. Media outlets in the United Kingdom, Germany, the Soviet Union, and Sweden expressed skepticism regarding U.S. official statements.[15] Within the United States, several members of Congress, presidential candidates, and military officials called for further clarification and an official apology.[16] Also, governments, officials, and citizens of Syria, Libya, the Soviet Union, China, Turkey, Japan, France, Poland, Greece, Switzerland, West Germany, and Nicaragua issued statements expressing sorrow and holding the United States responsible.[17] In contrast, Italy, the Netherlands, and Egypt refrained from condemning the U.S., stating that further investigation was needed.[18]
After the Vincennes completed its mission in the Persian Gulf, the U.S. officials awarded a medal to Captain William Rogers, the ship’s commander, in recognition of his service to the U.S. government.[19]
Several books have been published that cover the USS Vincennes’ attack on Iran Air Flight 655. They include Parvaz 655: Nemaad-e Hoqooq-e Bashar-e Amrikaei (Flight 655: A Symbol of American Human Rights) by authors from the Borhan Think Tank (2019); Aroos-e Vincennes (The Bride of Vincennes) by Javad Alizadeh (2016); Aadamkhar (The Cannibal) by Bijan Kia (2015); Maks Rooye Rishter-e Haftom (Pause on the Seventh Richter) by Muhammad-Reza Arianfar (2015); Shelik Kon va Faramoosh Kon (Shoot and Forget) by Khadijeh Amirkhani (2014); Chelchele-ye Kaghazi (Paper Swallow) by Majid Pourvali Keleshtari (2011); Bist Saal Pas az Fajee-ye Soqoot-e Airbus (Twenty Years After the Airbus Tragedy) by Habib Ahmadzadeh (2008); Airbus-300 by Manaf Yahyapour (2006); Aqabneshini (Retreat) by Faezeh Amirkhani (2015); and Pas az Parvaz (After the Flight) by Mansour Naeemi (2018). In addition, the book Storm Center: A Personal Account of Tragedy & Terrorism by William Rogers, commander of the USS Vincennes, was published in 1992.[20] Also, the film Mowj-e Mordeh (Dead Wave), directed by Ebrahim Hatamikia in 2000, centers on the USS Vincennes incident.
[1] Aqaei, Seyyed Davood, Chaleshhaye Hoqouqi Fararuy-e Iran va Amrika bar Sar Parvandei-e Airbus (Legal Challenges between Iran and the U.S. over the Airbus Case), Nashriye-e Motaleat Ravabete Beynolmelal, 1382, No. 22, p. 11.
[2] Ibid., Pp. 12–13.
[3] Rezaei Pish-Robat, Saleh, Hadeseye Airbus az Aghaz ta Payan (The Airbus Incident from Beginning to End), Faslnamey-e Negin-e Iran, 1382, No. 5, p. 7.
Ibid., p. 8.
[4] Ruznamey-e Jomhuri Eslami (Jomhuri Eslami Newspaper), 14 Tir 1367, No. 2637, p. 9.
[5] Moassese-ye Tanzim va Nashr Aasar-e Imam Khomeini, Sahife-ye Imam (An Anthology of Imam Khomeini’s Speeches, Messages, Interviews, Decrees, Religious Permissions, and Letters), Vol. 21, 5th ed., Tehran, Paeiz 1378, Pp. 68–70.
[6] Ruznamey-e Jomhuri Eslami (Jomhuri Eslami Newspaper), 14 Tir 1367, No. 2637, p. 10.
[7] Ibid., Pp. 1, 10.
[8] Ibid., Pp. 9, 11–12.
[9] Bazkhani-ye Goftogouye Shahid Sattari Darbarei-e Jenayate 12 Tir (Revisiting Martyr Sattari’s Interview on the July 3rd Incident), Ruznamey-e Vatan Emruz, 12 Tir 1402, No. 3798, p. 5.
[10] Aqaei, Seyyed Davood, Ibid., p. 13.
[11] Rezaei Pish-Robat, Saleh, Hadeseye Airbus az Aghaz ta Payan (The Airbus Incident from Beginning to End), Faslnamey-e Negin-e Iran, 1382, No. 5, p. 11.
[12] Aqaei, Seyyed Davood, Ibid., Pp. 13–14.
[13] Ibid., Pp. 30–31.
[14] Ruznamey-e Jomhuri Eslami (Jomhuri Eslami Newspaper), 14 Tir 1367, No. 2637, p. 3.
[15] Ibid.
[16] Ibid., p. 11.
[17] Ibid.
[18] https://www.mizanonline.ir/001oeh
[19] https://www.ibna.ir/vdceex8x7jh8wni.b9bj.html
[20] http://www.sourehcinema.com/title/title.aspx?id=138109262114
