Operation Wal-Fajr-5
Laila Heydari Bateni
54 بازدید
Operation Fajr-5 was carried out on January 25, 1984, in Chengole axis, in Ilam Province under the command of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. The operation aimed to capture the sensitive heights of the region and the surrounding towns, and to block the strategic road of Badra Tayyeb in Iraqi territory. This operation was successful in achieving these goals.
In 1984, the enemy intensified its attack on residential areas to compensate for its weakness in the mountain battle. The military commanders of the Islamic Republic of Iran also decided to change their military organization from the south to the west of the country and prevent the gathering of Iraqi forces in the south. A day after the start of Operation Fajr-4, Operation Fajr-5 was supposed to be implemented on April 15, 1983. However, due to certain problems, such as the lack of roads, the lack of power supply and the blocking of some roads, the implementation of Operation Fajr-5 was canceled. In January 1984, to draw focus of the Iraqi army from the southern region and draw attention to the western side of the country, Operation Fajr-5 was implemented.[1]
Its operational area, the Changuleh axis located in Mehran, was the boundary between the axes of Operation Fajr-3 (south of Dehlran, Chezabe and Chilat operational area) and al-Amara and Kut Provinces of Iraq, which had not been operated in until then.
One of the main objectives of this operation was to capture the sensitive heights of Pizoli, Azad Khan Kallu, Taghimardeh, Tunel Mountain, Chaghaaskar, Abbas Azim, and Heights 230. The implementation of operations in these areas was important because the Iraqi army was in a superior position, due to their control of very high positions which they protected with a small force. These positions gave the Iraqi’s better visibility over the area. Similarly, the important and strategic road of Badra Tayyeb (the road towards Al-Amara), which was the enemy's supply road from the west to the south, was being guarded. If this road was closed, Iraq would have to use roads further away from the operational area to transport its forces. Therefore, in case of a successful operation, the enemy would have a fundamental problem in transferring equipment.[2] Also, the execution of this operation took the attention and focus of the enemy away from the main Operation Khyber, which was carried out six days later. It further ensured that the Iraqi commanders would not notice the gathering of Iranian forces in the south of the country.[3] Responding to Iraqi attacks on residential areas was one of the other objectives of this operation.[4]
The operational area was south of Mehran and north of Dehlran, which was under the control and command of the 2nd Corps of the Iraqi Army. The mission of identifying the operation area was assigned to the intelligence forces of the 11th Amir al-Muminin Brigades of Ilam and Ansar al-Hussein Brigades of Hamedan, under the command of Major General Ali Chitsaziyan.[5]
This operation was designed in three axes and each axis was assigned to a unit. In the first axis and the right wing, the mission of the 29th Nabi Akram Brigade of Kermanshah was to capture the heights of Chaghaaskar. On the second axis, the 32nd Ansar al-Hussein Brigade had to join the Nabi Akram Brigade and capture the Tunel Mountains, Pizoli, and Taghi Morda. On the left wing and the third axis, the 11th Amir al-Muminin Brigade had the mission of capturing the heights of Zafaranieh with one battalion. Also, the operation was directed from the Najaf Base, under the command of Abbas Taghi.[6]
Operation Fajr started on January 18, under the command of the central base of Khatam l-Anbiya, with the codename "Ya Zahra.”.[7]
The first stage of the operation was carried out in two axes. On the right flank of the operation, the forces of the 29th Nabi Akram Brigade were initially forced to retreat after failing to capture the heights of Chaghaaskar. On the left wing of the operation, because most of the forces of the 11th Amir al-Muminin Brigade were locals to the area, they had more operational skill to capture their targets by accurately identifying the area.[8] Therefore, in the early hours, the fighters were able to liberate the heights of Pizoli, Azad Khan Kallu, Changule Strait and tens of kilometers of Iranian soil. They also gained control of the Badra-Tayyeb Road by crossing mines, offensive obstacles and with the support of artillery fire. In this battle, the 4th Brigade of the Iraqi Border Guard was destroyed and significant equipment was obtained.[9] Tunel Mountain was also captured by the 156th Battalion.[10]
In the following hours of the operation, with the continuous attacks of the Iranian forces, in addition to the destruction of a commando company from the artillery headquarters and the 47th battalion of the Iraqi army, Taghimarde Heights, Tunel Mountain and Shahabi Outpost were also liberated. At the beginning of the day, the Iraqi army countered with six patrols. But they were forced to retreat every time, leaving behind heavy casualties. Iranian forces destroyed the enemy's mortar and observation positions and captured some Iraqi forces. At the beginning of the night, Iranian forces crossed the Bani Khan and Sarkhar Rivers and liberated ten other positions. They controlled the outposts of Ain Abd, Tariq Ben Ziyad, al-Baghi, and the settlements of One Shadow, al-Yassin, and the village of Sheikh Ahmar. By reaching the set goals, the first stage of the operation concluded.
The second stage of the operation began at 03:40 on the second night with the codename "Ya Zahra". Iranian forces were stationed 35 kilometers from the Baghdad-Basra Highway and, by putting it under fire, they gained control this strategic road. After that, they stabilized their position by repelling the enemy's trenches and disrupting the movement and mobility of the Iraqi army with heavy artillery fire. At this stage, 1100 Iraqis were killed and wounded.[11] With the establishment of Iranian forces on the sensitive heights of the region and complete control over them, several areas, communication roads and supplies inside Iraqi territory were captured. Iranian forces were able to achieve new positions in Iraqi territory by destroying the 4th Iraqi Mountain Infantry Brigade and more than 50% of the 50th Armored Brigade of the 12th Iraqi Division.[12] Finally, the fighters succeeded in engaging some Iraqi army units in this area and prevented them from being sent to the southern region and participating in Operation Khyber.[13]
In this operation, the planning and operations commander of the 29th Nabi Akram Brigade, was martyred.[14]
The extent of the liberated areas in Operation Fajr-5 was 110 square kilometers. Also, the capture of the important heights of Chaghaaskar, Abbas Azim, Pir Ali Dam, Changule Strait, and the northern outposts of the region and its surrounding towns, control of the Badra-Tayyeb Road. The destruction of the enemy's positions and fortifications were among the achievements of this operation. In Iraqi army, 170 soldiers were taken as prisoners and more than 3600 were killed and wounded. Two helicopters, more than forty tanks and personnel carriers, ten ammunition depots, and some cars were also destroyed.[15]
From the series of Fajr operations, Operation Fajr-6, a short time after Operation Fajr-5, was carried out on February 23, 1984, a few hours before Operation Khyber. It was conducted in the south of Dehlran. The main goal of this operation was to destroy a part of the enemy's fighting forces and blind them from Operation Khyber.[16]
[1] Nemati, Y., Karimi, H., Akbarpour, M.J., Chronicle of the Iran-Iraq War, book twenty-seventh: preparation for Dawn operation 4, Tehran: Holy Defense Document and Research Center, 2015, pp. 21-27, 30 and 31; Samii, Ali, Descriptive record of the operations of eight years of holy defense, Tehran: Vice-Chancellor of Propaganda and Publications of Vali-Faqih Agency of the Army, 1997, pp. 163 and 164.
[2] Passage on the saga of Dawn 5, Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps of the North-West region, 1984, pp. 13 and 14.
[3] Mirzaei, R., The Sagas of the Unknown Names, Tehran: The Foundation for the Preservation of the Works and Publication of the Values of Holy Defence, 2015, pp. 655, 657, and 658; Abu Ghazaleh, Abdul Halim, Iraq and Iran War, vol.2, translator: Nader Nowrozshad, Tehran: War Studies and Research Center, 2001, p. 158.
[4] Samii, A., Descriptive record of operations of eight years of holy defense, p. 163.
[5] Mirzaei, R., the epics of anonymous names, pp. 655, 658, and 659.
[6] Ibid, pp. 659 and 660.
[7] A passage on the saga of Dawn 5, p. 27.
[8] Samii, A., Descriptive record of operations of eight years of holy defense, p. 163.
[9] Samii, A., Descriptive record of operations of eight years of holy defense, p. 163.
[10]Mirzaei, R., the saga of anonymous names, p. 660.
[11] Samii, A., Descriptive record of operations of eight years of holy defense, ibid., pp. 163 and 164.
[12]A passage on the saga of Dawn 5, pp. 48 and 49; Samii, A., Descriptive record of eight years of holy defense operations, pp. 164 and 165.
[13] Mirzaei, R., the epics of anonymous names, p. 664.
[14] Ibid, p. 661.
[15] A passage on the saga of Dawn 5, pp. 48 and 49; Samii, A., Descriptive record of eight years of holy defense operations, pp. 164 and 165.
[16] Samii, A., Descriptive record of holy defense operations, p. 165.
