Operation Mirsaad

Zainab Ahmadi
79 بازدید

In 1988, the Revolutionary Guards, together with the Army of the Islamic Republic of Iran, carried out Operation Mirsaad to repel the attack of the People's Mujahedin Khalq Organization (MKO) and recapture the areas occupied by this organization in the Islamabad-Karand axis.

After Iran accepted Resolution 598, the MKO,  with the use of 25 infantry brigades and the support of the Iraqi army, on Monday, July 24, 1988, at 14:30, crossed the Khosravi border, thus initiating Operation Forugh Javidan.[1]

Iraqi artillery fired heavily on the border areas, allowing for the cities of Islamabad West and Sarpul Zahab to be captured by the MKO.[2] After entering the city of Karand at 18:30 and capturing it, the MKO advanced towards Islamabad and, by cutting off electricity and telecommunication lines, captured it at 21:20. In doing so, several citizens and Iranian soldiers were martyred.[3]

On their way to Kermanshah, the MKO settled in the Hassanabad area, some 20 kilometers from Islamabad, behind the Chaharzabar Gorge. They kept their men and equipment in a very long column, in the form of a spring gathered behind this gorge. This gorge is located 25 kilometers west of Kermanshah and on the main road from Kermanshah to Islamabad West, known as Karbala Road.[4]

When they heard about the attack, the Iranian commanders considered it to be MKO propaganda. However,  the seriousness of the attack became apparent when Iraq announced the capture of Iranian cities and MKO Radio began inviting people from the captured cities to join them. In response, the operational headquarters of the IRGC General Command left for Kermanshah from the southern front, while IRGC brigades in the western region of the country were prepared to confront the MKO. The 12th Qaim Brigade, which was already stationed 10 kilometers from the Chahar-Zobar Strait, was the first regular unit that confronted them and prevented them from crossing the strait. This occurred on the morning of July 25, 1988.[5]

Hujjat al-Islam Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, the commander of the war, ordered Sadegh Tahavi, the commander of the Guards Special Brigade, to send troops. Asadullah Naseh, the commander of the Nabi Akramsali Brigade, was assigned to form a defensive line with the forces in the area. With the order of the war commander, Ali Shamkhani was also assigned to gather three battalions of troops and bring them to the Pol-e-Dokhtar - Islamabad Road in order to surround the MKO's hideout on the gasoline pump road at the beginning of Islamabad.[6]

The formation of a double-walled embankment on the width of the Islamabad-Kermanshah road, on the highest part of the Chahar-Zobar Gorge, was an important plan devised by the 12th Qaim Brigade and played a crucial role in preventing the MKO attack.[7]

The gathering of tanks, vehicles, and personnel carriers behind the Chahar-Zobar Gorge allowed the Iranian forces to destroy a large amount of the MKO’s equipment in the early hours of the operation.[8]

After pinning down the MKO in the Chahar-Zobar Gorge and surrounding them, the final stage of this operation, which became known as Mirsaad, began at 22:00 on August, 5 with the codeword of Ali ibn Abi Talib.[9] Mirsaad means ambush and since the Iranian forces were waiting in ambush for the MKO in the Chahar-Zobar Gorge, this name was chosen. Later, the name of this gorge was also changed to “Mirsaad”.[10]

From the morning of August 5, Iraqi fighter jets bombed the Hamedan Air Defense Center, located 36 km from the Shaheed Nojeh base in Hamedan, on several occasions, killing 6 Iranian officers and non-commissioned officers. With the support of Iraqi fighters, the MKO tried to cross the Chahar-Zobar Gorge but, except for three Toyota cars that were destroyed by Iranian forces on the way to Kermanshah, the majority of the MKO forces were unable to cross.[11]

The Air Force destroyed the positions of the MKO with 123 sorties. Immediately after the liberation of Islamabad, the IRGC units started advancing towards Karand. Before the Iranian forces arrived to this city, three transport helicopters landed in Karand and evacuated a number of MKO leadership.[12]

At the same time, Havaniroz helicopters, under the command of Colonel Ali Sayyaad Shirazi, bombarded the column of the MKO at the mouth of the Chahar-Zobar Gorge and opened fire on their troops and trucks carrying ammunition. This scattered the MKO and they were forced to flee and retreat to the surrounding mountains and roads. Ali Sayyaad Shirazi was assigned to block the retreat path and finish off the MKO. His strategies in this operation, resulted in the MKO sustaining great losses in a short time.[13]

About 2,000 of them were killed while fleeing to Iraq. Some committed suicide with cyanide pills and some were arrested, including prominent leaders of the MKO, such as Farhad Elfat and Saeed Shahsundi.[14] Thus, the MKO officially declared defeat on Friday, July 28, 1988, and retreated.[15]

The joint attack by Iraq and the MKO, while Iran was negotiating with the Secretary General of the United Nations, strengthened Iran's position within public opinion and increased their internal cohesion. This operation of the MKO caused severe differences amongst their leadership and the remaining members of the MKO and was a strategic defeat for them.[16]

Masoud Rajavi, the leader of the MKO, justified the failure of the Forough Javidan Operation in a meeting called Ashura as follows, "We did not get stuck in the Chahar-Zobar Gorge, but we got stuck in the Tawheed Gorge, and ideological weakness caused us to get stuck in the Strait of Desires!" To break the heavy atmosphere after this operation, he began accepting new troops from Europe.[17]

In 1996, on the eastern side of the Chahar-Zobar Gorge, which is considered the final limit of the enemy's advance in the Kermanshah Province, a monument was built and inaugurated by Ali Sayyaad Shirazi to commemorate the epic creators of Operation Mirsaad.[18]

 

 

 

[1] Drodian, M., A Review of the Iran-Iraq War, Volume 5: The End of the War, Tehran: Islamic Revolution Guards Corps, Holy Defense Records, and Research Center, 1999, pp. 185-183; Alaei, Hossein, Iran-Iraq War Process, Volume 2, Tehran: Merz and Bom, 2011, p. 481.

[2] Alaei, H., Iran-Iraq war process, vol.2, p.483.

[3] Drodian, M., A Review of the Iran-Iraq war, vol.5, pp. 185 and 186.

[4] Porjabari, P., Atlas of Epic Geography 3: Kermanshah at War, Tehran: Foundation for the Preservation of the Works and Publication of Holy Defense Values, 2013, p.54; Drodian, M., A Review of Iran-Iraq war, vol.5, p.186.

[5] Drodian, M., A Review of Iran-Iraq war, vol.5, p.186; Alaei, H., Iran-Iraq war process, vol.2, p.486.

[6]A Review of Alinia, Jafar, an impossible mission, Tehran: Fatihan, 2018, pp. 116 and 121.

[7] Vatani, R., Talaiyedaran Morsad, Qom: Zamzam Hedayat, 2009, p. 112

[8] Ibid, pp. 127-134.

[9] Ibid, pp. 124 and 194.

[10]Alaei, H., Iran-Iraq war process, vol.2, p.489.

[11]Drodian, M., A Review in Iran-Iraq war, vol.5, p.190.

[12] Bahmani, M. M., Hypocrites in Sayad's Ambush, Tehran: Iran Sabz, 2013, pp. 78-80.

[13] Ibid, p. 171.

[14] Alaei, H., Iran-Iraq war process, Vol. 2, pp. 489 and 490; Drodian, M., A Review of Iran-Iraq war, vol.5, p.190.

[15] Drodian, M., A Review of Iran-Iraq war, vol.5, p.190.

[16] Ibid, pp. 190-197.

[17] Shiralinia, J., Illustrated encyclopedia of Iran-Iraq war history, Tehran: Sayan, Ch 5, 2012, pp. 422 and 423.

[18] Porjabari, P., Atlas of Epic Geography 3, p. 55.