Operation Shaheed Madani

Samane Karamian
53 بازدید

Operation Shaheed Madani was the last Iranian operation conducted during the first year of Iraq's imposed war. It was carried out on September 17, 1981, to the south of the Sosangard-Bostan road.

             After Operation Shaheed Rostami,[1] which was carried out to liberate Dehlavieh on June 16, 1981, the Iraqis evacuated Dehlavieh and settled to its west.[2] However, this area was still not completely under the control of the Iranian forces.[3] So, in order to seize the embankment of the enemy's front line, i.e., from Daghaghleh to Dehlavieh, and then enter the village of Dehlavieh and encamp there,[4] on the September 14, 1981 the commanders of the army and the Revolutionary Guards planned a joint operation and chose the September 17, 1981 to conduct it.[5] This operation was carried out to reduce the enemy's pressure on the forces stationed to the east of Karun and to remove the southern flank of the 92nd Khuzestan Armored Division from the field of sight and direct fire. It was also intended to threaten the communication lines of the 2nd and 3rd Iraqi Corps in the east of Bostan and to create mobility in these fronts.[6]

             This operation was named after Shaheed Ayatollah Seyed Asadullah Madani, who was the Friday Prayer leader and Imam Khomeini’s representative in Tabriz, and who was martyred by hypocrites on September 10, 1981, i.e., a week before the operation.

The area of this operation was located between the west of Dehlavieh and Daghaghleh villages and to the north of the Nisan River.[7]

             At 4:30 a.m. on September 17, 1981, Operation Martyr Madani began in the Dehlavieh axis. An hour into it, the Iranian fighters destroyed several Iraqi tanks, cleared their trenches and captured the enemy's first embankment. Following this success, the movement continued towards the second embankment of Iraq. After capturing the second embankment, the Iranian forces continued to advance and captured the third embankment.

             When day broke, the Iraqis began to march forward. The vulnerable point of their forces from the left flank of the embankment was on the side of the Al-Abbas River. It was at this point that a fierce battle took place. The Iraqi army had concentrated its forces on the embankment of the Al-Abbas River with a formation of tanks. This battle continued until the afternoon of the first day and Iraq was able to regain half of the embankment.

              In the Sweidani axis, at 2:00 a.m. on  September 18, the Iranian forces started their movement from the west of Cholaneh towards the Iraqi positions. By bypassing the existing obstacles, they advanced a distance of around two hundred meters and were ready to fight and continue their advance. They started to advance under the counterfire of the Iraqi army. At 5:30 a.m., Iraq lost its first embankment position. However, the presence of obstacles and tank trenches of the Iraqi army had made it difficult for the Iranian forces to infiltrate the second and third embankments. Despite this, the advance continued towards the second and third embankments. By 7:00 a.m., the operating forces were able to capture the villages of Sweidani, Ramleh, Dahimi and Magasis, in addition to the second and third embankments.

              Following the success of the Iranian fighters, the Iraqi army conducted several ambushes to try and regain their positions. They recaptured the village of Magasis and the Sweidani- Daghaghleh embankment by 11:00 a.m. However, the Iraqis could not return to the positions held before the operation.[8]

             In this operation, units from the 55th Airborne Brigade, the 16th Armored Division of the Iranian army, two battalions from the Revolutionary Guards and two battalions from the Unconventional Wars Headquarters participated.[9]

              In addition to liberating an area of ​​ten to fifteen kilometers,[10] one of the most important achievements of this operation west of Sosangard was the involvement of Iraqi forces in this front and the reduction of their pressure and attention to the operational area east of Karun. This facilitated the implementation of the Thamin al-Aimmah Operation and the breaking of the siege of Abadan in October 1981.[11]

            In this operation, 500 Iraqi forces were killed or injured and 190 others were killed. Also, 50 Iraqi tanks and personnel carriers were destroyed and some tanks and personnel carriers were seized. In this operation, 168 Iranian fighters were martyred, including Hasan Khojagaran, the IRGC's operational commander in the Dehlavieh axis.[12]

            After Operation Martyr Madani, the defense lines of the operational area of ​​Hamidiyeh-Sousengard and Tepe Allah Akbar remained unchanged until the implementation of the Tariq al-Quds Operation, which was carried out two months later in early December 1981. Scattered battles and skirmishes did not change this front.[13]

 

 

 

[1] Iraj Rostami was one of the army commanders and the deputy of Dr. Mustafa Chamran in irregular wars and he was martyred in Dehlawiya on June 11, 1. Jafari, Mojtabi, Atlas of Eternal Battles, Tehran: Sore Sabz, 2013, ch 35, p. 29.

[2] Fatahi, Sh., Dehlawiyeh, Tehran: Foundation for Preservation of Works and Publishing Values ​​of Holy Defence, Art and Literature Organization of Holy Defence 2013, p.58.

[3] Ibid, pp. 70 and 71.

[4] Pourarkani, M.A., The Battles of Azadegan Plain: Record of the History and Geography of the Operational Areas of West Ahvaz (Investigation of Holy Defense Events in Azadegan Plain 1980-1988), Tehran: Foundation for the Preservation of Works and Publication of Sacred Defense Values, 2009, p. 132.

[5] Hosseini, Y., Bakhtiari, Massoud, Lotfi, Mohammad Hassan, Army of the Islamic Republic of Iran in eight years of holy defense, Volume 2: Battles of West Ahvaz and Sosangard, Tehran: Ideological Political Organization of the Army of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 1994, p. 181.

[6] Behrouzi, F., Calendar of the History of Holy Defence, Vol. 13: Towards Bostan, Tehran: Islamic Revolution Records Center, 2009, pp. 708 and 709.

[7] Porjabari, Pejman, Atlas of Epic Geography, Volume 1: Khuzestan at War, Tehran: The Foundation for the Preservation of the Works and Publication of Sacred Defense Values, Sarir Publishing, 2009, p. 144; Yazidi, Yadullah, Chronicle of the Iran-Iraq War, book 15, breaking the siege of Abadan, liberating the lands of Iran, the first step, Saman Al-Aima operation, Tehran, Holy Defense Document and Research Center, first edition, 2016, pp. 822 and 823.

[8] Behrouzi, F., Calendar of the History of Holy Defence, Vol. 13: Towards Bostan, Tehran: Islamic Revolution Records Center, 2009, pp. 708 and 709.

[9] Ibid, p. 140.

[10] Ibid, p. 141.

[11] Hosseini, Y., Bakhtiari, M., & Lotfi, M. H., Army of the Islamic Republic of Iran in eight years of sacred defense, vol.2, p.182.

[12] Habibi, A., Khuzestan in Iran-Iraq war, p. 141.

[13] Hosseini, Y., Bakhtiari, M., Lotfi,. H., Army of the Islamic Republic of Iran in eight years of sacred defense, vol.2, p.182