Operation Nasr

Saeed Alamian
144 بازدید

Operation Nasr began on January 5, 1980. It was commanded by the army of the Islamic Republic of Iran, who were joined by the Revolutionary Guards, Basij and the forces of the Irregular Wars Headquarters in the south of Hoveyzeh, Karkhekor and the Farsiat region, which was located in the south of Ahvaz. This operation, which was initially highly successful, was unsuccessful due to the Iraqi army's tactics. Eventually, it ended on January 9 with the retreat of the Iranian forces.

After the operation to liberate Susangerd on November 16, 1980, the people, authorities and religious leaders wanted to expel Iraq from the occupied areas. This request of the people, which was expressed in the media, speeches and Friday Prayer sermons, was echoed in the decision-making centers, including the Supreme Council of Defense. Subsequently, Abolhassan Bani Sadr, the then president and commander-in-chief of Iran, on December 16, 1980 proposed a plan for an offensive operation to the command of the army's ground forces: "The ground forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran will be assigned a mission, according to the plan approved by the Supreme Defense Council. They will command an offensive operation in Ahvaz intended to destroy the enemy in the Karkhekor-Deb Hardan area. They will also prepare for the regulatory plans of that force, repair the border line and, according to the order, move the offensive operation to the enemy's territory in order to attain the mentioned objectives. This means that the attack should take place within a week.”[1]

Operation Nasr's area was limited to the Susangerd-Hoveyzeh Road from the west, the Karun River from the east, the Hamidiyeh-Susangerd Road from the north, and the Hamid Barracks Road, located 40 km south of Ahvaz. Karkhekor River is located in the center of this region and the Iraqis had occupied a part of its northern bank. Hamid Barracks, which was the main target, was located in the southeast of this area.[2]

In this operation, the mission of the army's ground forces was to destroy the Iraqi forces in the Karkhekur region and the southwest of Ahvaz. In this operation, the 92nd and 16th Armored Divisions, the 148th Infantry Battalion and the 291st Armored Battalion of the 77th Brigade, soldiers from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and some members of the Irregular Wars Headquarters of Mustafa Chamran participated.

The Moghadam Base of the Army Ground Forces in the south estimated that there were two complete and reinforced Iraqi divisions awaiting the Iranian forces. In total their physical combat power was twice that of the Iranian forces.[3]

On Saturday, January 3, 1980, the commanders of the Hamidiyeh, Susangerd and Hoveyzeh Brigades, along with the operations and intelligence officials, went to the headquarters of the 16th Armored Division for clarification and coordination. It was decided that two equipped companies will be assigned to the 3rd Brigade of Hamadan and five companies will be assigned to the 1st Brigade of the 16th Qazvin Division, and two guards will be present alongside each armored element to identify the terrain. In addition, the Khorasan Army Corps also merged with the 2nd Dezful Brigade.

According to the plan, the Farsiat region was assigned to the 92nd Division. The 1st Brigade of the 92nd Division was supposed to defend the entrance Ahvaz, and two armored cavalry battalions, after crossing Karun, were to advance 3 km from the road and attack the Ahvaz-Khorramshahr Road, and in the second stage, help in the recapture of  the Hamid Barracks.[4]

Operation Nasr began at 10:00 on January 5, 1980, following fifteen minutes of preparatory gunfire. First, Hamadan's 3rd Brigade started a rapid movement from the Abu Hamizah-Susangerd axis and, by surprising the Iraqi infantry forces, successfully crossed Karkhekor at approximately 12:00. Thereafter, Qazvin's 1st Brigade, which was supposed to move from Hoveyzeh, advanced towards the south of Karkhekor at a slower rate. From the Farsiat axis, the operation started with a delay of 20 minutes, i.e. 10:20, which was detrimental to the operation. Nevertheless, the Iranian forces were able to advance about 30 km with minimum casualties. On this day, the Iraqis did not get the opportunity to respond and had around 800 soldiers captured. The Iranian forces were able to acquire a large amount of war-booty. Thus, the first day of the operation ended with victory. In a message to Imam Khomeini, Bani Sadr informed him of the successful operation in Hoveyzeh. In response, Imam Khomeini praised the performance of the armed forces and fighters, and congratulated him on this victory.[5]

According to the operational plan, the second phase of the attack started at 08:00 on January 6, 1980. In this phase of the operation, armored and infantry forces advanced towards Hamid and Jofir. The IRGC forces were about a kilometer ahead of them. But an hour later, the gunfire of the Iraqis intensified and the advance of the fighters stopped. Although the orders issued until 16:00 still emphasized resistance, the armed forces retreated. But the infantry forces of the IRGC, who were ahead of them and did not know about the retreat, were surrounded by the Iraqis. On this day, 140 Basiji fighters were martyred.[6] Among them was Hossein Alam al-Huda, who was one of the commanders of the IRGC.[7]

On the January 7, Iran's 2nd Armored Brigade was caught in a heavy Iraqi ambush, suffering severe losses.[8] This state continued and the Iranian fighters, despite trying to advance and resist, finally had to retreat completely on January 9,  losing at least 88 tanks in the process.[9] On this day, Operation Nasr ended after 22 days of air and 5 days of ground combat, and without accomplishing any of its objectives.[10]

With the advance of the Iraqi forces, Hoveyzeh was surrounded and occupied on January 7, 1980, and after sixteen months, i.e., on May 8, 1982, it was liberated in Operation Quds.[11]

Operation Nasr started with one of the the most extensive tank battles after the October War.[12] (The Arab-Israeli war in October 1973, which led to the defeat of the Arabs.)[13] After the occupation of Hoveyzeh, stagnation prevailed on the fronts. The method of armored attack and regular warfare was not benefitting Iran. Armored war was also very costly for Iran due to the high number of casualties and their inability to purchase new equipment due to economic sanctions. However, Iraq could buy and use advanced equipment and weapons without any financial and political restrictions. So, returning to regular war and using armored equipment meant accepting Iraq's superiority and welcoming defeat. This operation caused the revolutionary forces to be gradually organized in the form of the IRGC and the Basij whose war strategy, based on the faith and commitment of the Basij forces, overcame the lack of equipment and regular armored warfare.[14]

 

 

[1] Khazaei, Kh., Qazvin 16th Armored Division in operation Nasr, Tehran: Foundation for the Preservation and Publication of Sacred Defense Values, Qazvin Province General Directorate for Preservation and Publication of Sacred Defense Values, 2014, pp. 10 and 11.

[2] Ibid, p. 12.

[3] Hosseini, Y., Bakhtiari, M., Lotfi, M.H., The Army of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the Eight Years of Holy Defense, Vol. 2, Political Ideological Organization of the Army of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 1993, pp. 114 and 115.

[4] Alamian, S., Hassan B., Tehran: Martyr Hassan Bagheri Publishing Center, 2010, volume 1, collection of works of Martyr Hassan Bagheri - 8, pp. 427 and 428.

[5] Lotfollahzadegan, A., Chronicle of Iran's War and Araf, Book 11: The Last Steps of the Occupier, Grounding and Complete Stopping of the Enemy: November 5 to January 17, 1979, Tehran: Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, Center for War Studies and Research, 2001, p. 557; 559, 560.

[6] Ibid., pp. 569-565

[7] Ibid, p. 596.

[8] Ibid, p. 596.

[9] Ibid, pp. 608, 616, and 617

[10] Namaki Iraqi, A., Khalili, H., History of Air Battles of Holy Defense, Volume 6, Tehran: Islamic Republic of Iran Army, Air Force, Nahaja Strategic Publishing Center, 2016, p.366.

[11] Habibi, A., Guide Atlas 4: Azadegan Plain in War, Tehran: Guards Corps War Studies and Research Center, Vol. 1 2002, pp. 74 and 111.

[12] Nagin Iran Quarterly, Year 1, No. 3, winter 2012, p.93.

[13] Encyclopaedia of the Islamic Revolution for teenagers and young people, second volume, Islamic Revolution Literature Office, Tehran, Surah Mehr, 2014, p. 49

[14] Nagin Iran Quarterly, p.93.