Terms & Concepts

Mobile Defense

Written by: Mohsen Shirmuhammad, Translated by: Hadi Qorbanyar
18 دورہ

After a series of consecutive defeats in 1985 and the loss of the Al-Faw Peninsula, the Iraqi army adopted a new strategy for ground warfare called the mobile defense. Following Operation Valfajr 8, Iraq sought to recover from its defeat in Al-Faw and rebuild the morale of its army by implementing the strategy of mobile defense.^[1] Accordingly, Iraqi forces conducted reconnaissance along the entire frontlines, identifying weak points in Iran’s defensive positions and attacking those areas.^[2]

Iraq’s mobile defense strategy aimed to weaken Iranian positions in Al-Faw, restore combat readiness, regain operational initiative for future engagements, and undermine Iranian morale. It also sought to block large-scale Iranian offensives, capture Iranian forces for propaganda purposes, disrupt Iran’s economic infrastructure, pressure Iran to accept UN resolutions, employ propaganda momentum to shape the war’s political landscape, and reassure Iraq’s foreign allies of its control over the situation.^[3]

The first phase of this strategy began on March 6, 1986, in the Valfajr 9 operational area near Sulaymaniyah, Iraq. It continued through May 17, 1986, unfolding successively in Shakh-Tarachar Heights, Darbandikhan, Sharhani, Soumar, Seydakan, the southern Majnoon Island, Fakkeh, Pich-Angizeh, Haj Omran, and Mehran.^[4]

The implementation of Iraq’s mobile defense strategy involved the rapid deployment of 150 Russian-made T-72 tanks. In addition, 150 heavy transport trailers were ready to carry the tanks. Whenever Iranian forces launched an attack, the Iraqis immediately loaded the tanks onto the trailers and rushed them to the point of engagement. Because Iraq had an extensive network of highways and paved roads in its eastern provinces, this mobility was fast and effective—something Iran lacked in its western regions.^[5]

In the meantime, Iranian forces were focused on consolidating and strengthening their defensive positions in the Valfajr 8 operational area to ensure the long-term security of Al-Faw and free up manpower and resources for future operations. As enemy attacks intensified and Iraqi troops concentrated at key positions, Iranian commanders moved quickly to reinforce defenses in Al-Faw and counter Iraq’s advancing forces.^[6]

The commanders of the Iranian Army Ground Forces believed that the appropriate response to Iraq’s mobile defense strategy was to remain on the defensive. Because the Iraqi army, with its well-organized units and extra troops held in reserve, could attack and advance along any axis it chose. Given the circumstances, they argued, the Iranian Army lacked the capacity to defend all frontlines independently. Therefore, they proposed that the Army suspend offensive operations and redirect all available maneuver and support units toward reinforcing defensive positions.^[7] In contrast, the commanders of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) argued that the best way to defend was to take the initiative and go on the attack, as defensive engagements often resulted in higher casualties. The IRGC’s recommendations included initiating offensive operations, reinforcing vital defensive positions, and holding a reserve unit for deployment in critical areas.^[8] During April-May 1986, Iraqi ground forces conducted six operations in twenty-three days, keeping Iranian troops engaged almost continuously.^[9] On May 17, 1986, Iraq launched an assault on the Mehran axis, which was held by the 84th Khorramabad Division and the 4th Brigade of the 21st Hamzeh Division of the Army.^[10] Together, these units fielded a total of six infantry battalions and two armored battalions. Because the defending forces were not fully prepared, the Iraqis advanced rapidly, capturing the city of Mehran, nearby villages, several heights, and key roads. In response, the IRGC mobilized reserve forces already stationed in the area, including the Moslim ibn Aqil and Amir al-Muminin (as) brigades and the Nasr Division, while also deploying additional units. Despite these reinforcements, the enemy advanced up to twenty kilometers inside Iranian territory over a ten-day period.^[11]

During this phase of confrontations, 70 IRGC members were martyred, 666 wounded, 133 went missing, and 8 were taken prisoner. Also, the Iranian Army recorded 9 martyrs, 180 wounded, 98 missing, and about 400 taken prisoner. In addition, most of the defending units’ equipment—including 203 mm artillery pieces, tanks, armored personnel carriers, and other vehicles—was left behind during the retreat and fell into Iraqi hands. Building on their success, the Iraqis filmed the prisoners and captured equipment, using the images extensively in propaganda broadcasts.^[12] The attack on Mehran marked the peak of Iraq’s mobile defense strategy. Iraq’s success in the attack encouraged Baghdad to officially announce its shift to a mobile defense approach. In its propaganda campaign, Iraq portrayed the capture of Mehran as an achievement similar to Iran’s victory in Operation Valfajr 8. Iraqi officials even declared that Mehran would only be returned in exchange for Iran’s withdrawal from the occupied areas of Iraq, particularly the Al-Faw Peninsula.^[13]

It appeared that by occupying Mehran and declaring that it would only withdraw in exchange for Iran’s evacuation of the Al-Faw Peninsula, Baghdad was waiting to see how Tehran would respond. At the same time, Iranian analysts believed Iraq was unable to carry out extended military operations and hold ground under the mobile defense approach. Therefore, it was expected that after the operation in Mehran, the Iraqi army would revert to a defensive posture and hold position until a new situation arises.^[14]

The successful execution of Operation Karbala 1 and the recapture of Mehran not only nullified all of Iraq’s propaganda and its limited gains over the previous three months but also raised the morale among Iranian units. The operation began at 11:30 PM on June 30, 1986, and after ten days of fighting in the Mehran area, the Iranian forces liberated Mehran, more than eight surrounding villages, the Qalavizan and Hamrin mountains, including the region’s highest peak (223), as well as the Dehloran–Mehran–Ilam Road and two border outposts. Moreover, 19 Iraqi brigades were, on average, destroyed by more than 50 percent, and 3,400 Iraqi troops were either captured or went missing. Among the nine IRGC units participating in the operation, about 700 Iranians were martyred, while 5 were reported missing or captured.^[15]

The continuation of Iraq’s mobile defense strategy effectively turned the war into a limited yet grinding conflict against Iran. In response, the IRGC began planning a major offensive in the southern front, which ultimately led to the operations Karbala 4 and Karbala 5 in late 1986 and early 1987. In Karbala 4, the IRGC deployed about 200 combat battalions into action, with another 400 held in reserve. However, since the operational plan had been compromised, the mission failed to achieve its intended objectives. Less than fifteen days later, Karbala 5 was launched from the Shalamcheh axis, catching the Iraqis completely by surprise. In fact, the success of Operation Karbala 1 marked the end of Iraq’s mobile defense strategy, forcing Baghdad to abandon that approach altogether.^[16]

 

 

 

^[1] Strategy-e Defa Motaharek-e Araq (Iraq’s Mobile Defense Strategy), Mahnamey-e Negin-e Iran, No. 8, Bahar 1383, p. 126.

^[2] Ibid., p. 126.

^[3] Hajji Khodaverdi-Khan, Mahdi, Ruzshomar-e Jang-e Iran va Araq (Chronology of the Iran–Iraq War), Ketab 42, Vol. 2: Azadsazi-ye Mehran (Liberation of Mehran), Tehran: Markaz-e Asnad va Tahqiqat-e Defa Muqaddas, 1397, p. 39.

^[4] Ibid.

 

^[5] Strategy-e Defa Motaharek-e Araq va Salha-ye Payani-ye Jang (Iraq’s Mobile Defense Strategy and the Final Years of the War), Hamshahri Online, 8 Tir 1394, www.hamshahrionline.ir/news/299549

^[6] Strategy-e Defa Motaharek-e Araq (Iraq’s Mobile Defense Strategy), p. 131.

^[7] Ibid., p. 130.

^[8] Ibid., p. 131.

^[9] Hajji Khodaverdi-Khan, Mahdi, Ibid., p. 20.

^[10] Ibid., p. 39.

 

^[11] Strategy-e Defa Motaharek-e Araq (Iraq’s Mobile Defense Strategy), p. 140.

^[12] Ibid., p. 141.

^[13] Ibid., p. 140.

^[14] Hajji Khodaverdi-Khan, Mahdi, Ibid., p. 20.

 

^[15] Strategy-e Defa Motaharek-e Araq (Iraq’s Mobile Defense Strategy), p. 141.

^[16] Strategy-e Defa Motaharek-e Araq va Salha-ye Payani-ye Jang (Iraq’s Mobile Defense Strategy and the Final Years of the War), Hamshahri Online, 8 Tir 1394, www.hamshahrionline.ir/news/299549