Battles
Karbala 5
Leila Heidari Bateni
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In early 1987, the Iranian forces launched Operation Karbala 5 on the southern front under the command of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) to advance towards the east of Basrah and capture Shalamcheh. As a result of this operation, most of the enemy's fortified positions were destroyed, Iran gained political and military superiority, and the main step was taken to end the war.[1]
Iranian military commanders decided to prioritize the strategy of launching “decisive operations” to maintain political and military superiority, as the region east of Basrah played a key role in determining the outcome of the war.[2]
Operation Karbala 4 was launched on December 24, 1986, to capture the city of Abul-Khasib and advance towards Basrah. However, due to Iraqis’ military and combat readiness (the disclosure of Iranian tactical plans through friendly forces, the activities of enemy spies and American intelligence devices in the area, and using defensive measures such as flooding), the operation was unsuccessful. Therefore, it ended on December 26, 1986, preventing Iran from attacking the general area east of Basrah (Talaieh Outpost to Shalamcheh). This failure overshadowed Iran’s superior position after the capture of Faw, as Iraq regained the initiative. Subsequently, by organizing propaganda campaigns to promote the message of “failure of the decisive operation”, increasing the airstrikes, continuing urban bombings, and even trying to recapture Faw, Iraq sought to change the balance of power in its favor.[3]
Therefore, to neutralize Iraq’s measures, Iran designed and launched Operation Karbala 5 less than two weeks after Karbala 4, on January 9, 1987.[4]
Shalamcheh, being the closest route for capturing Basrah, was the target area for carrying out Operation Karbala 5. This city bordered the flooded areas south of Zaid to the north, the Iran-Iraq border fortifications to the east, the Arvand River and the minor Arvand to the south, and the Zuji Canal and the Iraqi cities of Tanuma and Al-Haretha to the west.[5]
The combat organization of Operation Karbala 5 was based in four headquarters: Najaf, Quds, Karbala, and Nuh which were going to attack the fortifications of Iraq’s 3rd, 6th, and 7th Army Corps with over ten divisions. However, the Nuh Headquarters took on the responsibility of providing the logistics. Commanded by Ahmad Gholampour, the Karbala Headquarters was operating in the northern axis and consisted of the 33rd Al-Mahdi (as) Division, the 10th Seyyed-al-Shuhada (as) Division, the 19th Fajr Division, the 25th Karbala Division, the 31st Ashura Division, the 41st Tharallah (as) Division, as well as the 18th Al-Ghadir and 48th Fath brigades. Quds Headquarters, operating in the central axis under Muhammad Ali Jafari, consisted of the 14th Imam Hussein (as) Division, the 8th Najaf Ashraf Division, the 32nd Ansar al-Hussain (as) Division, the 7th Vali Asr (as) Division, the 27th Muhammad Rasulullah (pbuh) Division, and the 44th Qamar Bani Hashem (as) Division. Also, the Najaf Headquarters which covered the southern axis under Mostafa Izadi, comprised the 5th Nasr Division, the 17th Ali Ibn Abi Taleb (as) Division, the 105th Quds Division, the 155th Special Martyrs Division, the 21st Imam Reza (as) Division, as well as Hazrat Abolfazl (as) Brigade, 29th Nabi Akram (pbuh) Brigade, and the 12th Qaem (as) Brigade. Iranian troops included 200 infantry battalions, 24 armored battalions, 22 mechanized battalions, and 24 artillery battalions.[6]
The operation was carried out in four main axes. Accordingly, the 18th al-Ghadir Brigade and the 33rd al-Mahdi (as) Division engaged in the right flank, the 25th Karbala and 41st Tharallah (as) divisions led the forces in the Fishing Area, the 31st Ashura and 19th Fajr divisions backed by the 10th Seyyed al-Shuhada (as) Division covered the Pentagonal-shaped Area, and the 10th Seyyed al-Shuhada (as) Division fought against the enemy along the Shalamcheh Road. Two axes were commanded by Karbala Headquarters and the remaining two were under the command of Quds and Najaf headquarters.[7]
On January 9, 1987, at 2 AM, Operation Karbala 5 began under the command of Khatam al-Anbiya (pbuh) Headquarters with the code-name “Ya Zahra (s)” to capture Shalamcheh and advance towards Basrah. It continued until January 27th.[8]
Hours after the operation started, the 41st Tharallah (as) Division managed to cross the Fish-breeding Canal as well as the first and second embankments, catching the enemy off guard. The 19th Fajr Division also moved forward along the second axis, while the 31st Ashura Division advanced into the Pentagonal-shaped Area and joined the 41st Tharallah (as) Division east of the Fish Canal. In the meantime, the 33rd Al-Mahdi (as) Division crossed the embankments. On January 10th, the 10th and 19th divisions reached the Haft Pol Canal and captured the surrounding areas of Shalamcheh as well as the western triangle-shaped area of the Zuji Canal. Meanwhile, the 19th Division began clearing the area around the bridge after linking up with its units in the two flanks. Also, the 31st Ashura Division took control of one side of the Fish Canal in an attempt to seize the bridgehead at the canal’s entrance.[9]
After securing the western bridgehead of the Fish Canal, one of the most critical axes of the operation, Iranian fighters inflicted heavy casualties on the Baathist army and destroyed significant amounts of military equipment. To free the Shalamcheh Road and in response to increasing enemy pressure, Najaf and Quds headquarters deployed fresh troops to the battlefield. Consequently, when the 19th Division destroyed enemy positions east of the Pentagonal-shaped Area, the 10th Division was able to attack Shalamcheh. The 27th Muhammad Rasulullah (pbuh) Division, backed by the 25th Karbala Division, was deployed to the west of the Fish Canal to repel the enemy.[10]
As a result, the Iraqi army was caught off guard at the Fish Canal due to flooding and the existing obstacles thereby focusing instead on the Pentagonal-shaped Area and Bavarin Island.[11]
The second phase of the operation began on January 10th with the engagement of all three headquarters. The Karbala Headquarters forces, due to a lack of reinforcements and fierce Iraqi resistance, found themselves surrounded by the enemy while holding the captured bridgehead. Quds and Najaf headquarters engaged in combat in the Pentagonal-shaped Area in an attempt to maintain their positions and move forward towards Bavarin. However, to break Iranian forces’ resistance in the Pentagonal-shaped Area and open the Shalamcheh Road on the one hand, and retake the western bridgehead of the Fish Canal on the other, Iraq launched intense waves of airstrikes and heavy artillery fire on the Fajr and Shalamcheh roads, targeting Iranian artillery positions.[12]
On the third day of the operation, Iraq deployed two military units to the Fish Canal and Shalamcheh fronts, managing to push Iranian forces back but failing to capture the canal and its bridge. Iraq’s increased pressure from ground and air, and its penetration into several areas—such as the triangular-shaped area at the tip of the Fish Canal—faced Iranian resistance.[13]
On the fourth day of the operation, the Quds and Karbala headquarters failed to join each other in the triangle-shaped area behind the Fish Canal, while the Najaf Headquarters advanced into the Bavarin Island despite enemy resistance. To maintain the right flank positions and stabilize the situation in the Fish Canal, the Karbala Headquarters took several measures on this day including resisting the enemy in an attempt to create favorable conditions for the Quds and Najaf headquarters, carrying out diversionary attacks, trying to link the Fish Canal and Pentagonal-shaped Area, and strengthening defensive lines. Therefore, the mission of Karbala Headquarters was concluded, and Quds and Najaf headquarters were tasked with capturing the Jasim River front and clearing Bavarin Island. Iraq, for its part, chose to withdraw from the area in order to preserve its manpower.[14]
On the fifth day, Iraqi pressure diminished, and the 8th Najaf and 14th Imam Hussain (as) divisions penetrated deep into enemy territory in the northern area of the Douayji River. On the sixth day of the operation, Najaf Headquarters launched an unsuccessful attack to capture Iraq’s Qasr Headquarters and Bavarin Island. On the seventh day, the battle became a stalemate. However, as the Army was no longer engaging in Operation Karbala 6, the IRGC could use its capabilities and resources.
On the eighth day of the operation, the Karbala Headquarters sought to defeat the Iraqi forces in the Fish Canal area. However, due to the failure to achieve objectives and the increasing enemy pressure, the forces retreated. Nevertheless, the divisions led by Quds and Najaf headquarters managed to push the Iraqi forces back across the Jasim River. When Iran captured the islands in that area and deployed troops to the east of the Jasim River, the operation entered a new phase.
From January 16th onwards, the general strategy of the operation shifted towards carrying out more attacks and reinforcing the forces, in addition to preventing Iraqis from holding positions west of the Jasim River, capturing the bridgehead west of the river, advancing towards the Zuji Canal, and clearing the occupied areas. Accordingly, efforts to capture the bridgehead west of the Jasim River began on January 18th yet with no significant achievement in later days. Having lost the eastern bank of the Jasim River, the enemy concentrated all its efforts on holding the western bank with increased pressure and heavy fire. Therefore, operations continued until January 27th when Iraq had suffered significant losses and retreated from eastern Basrah up to the Jasim River but continued to resist at the Shalamcheh crossroads. Subsequently, Iraq deployed over 100 units to the battlefield where there were only 25 Iranian units. However, capturing the western Jasim River and Zuji Canal was not easy due to Iraq’s intense anti-aircraft and artillery fire, ammunition shortages, and the lack of engineering equipment and reinforcements. As the operation lasted for several weeks, proper planning based on the current situation was necessary. Therefore, the Iranian commanders concluded that continuing the operation, given the enemy’s capability to predict attacks, had no bright future unless there was a significant boost to military strength through utilizing parts of the Army’s resources.[15]
It is worth mentioning that as a result of Iran adopting a new strategy in this operation, Iraq used chemical bombs to prevent the further advance of Iranian forces.[16] Also, to make up for past failures, it initiated the third phase of urban warfare with the bombing of Susangerd which lasted for 42 days.[17]
During Operation Karbala 5, Hujjatoleslam Abdullah Meithami, head of Imam Khomeini’s representative office at Khatam al-Anbiya (pbuh) Headquarters, Ismail Daqayeqi, commander of the 9th Badr Division, Hussain Kharrazi, commander of the 14th Imam Hussain (as) Division in the complementary Operation Karbala 5, Yadollah Kalhor, Deputy Commander of the 10th Division, and Hussain Shafie Zadeh, Artillery Commander of Khatam al-Anbiya (pbuh) Headquarters, were martyred.[18]
By breaking through enemy lines and positions east of Basrah, 80% of the objectives were achieved, and 75 square kilometers of Iraq’s strategic areas were captured by Iran. Iraq’s military losses included the destruction of 40 aircraft, 5 helicopters, 800 tanks and personal carriers, 180 artillery pieces, 400 pieces of equipment, 90 engineering machines, and 1,000 vehicles. Furthermore, Iranian forces captured 190 tanks and armored vehicles, 20 artillery pieces, 250 pieces of equipment, and 200 vehicles.[19] Also, 81 independent Iraqi brigades and battalions were destroyed, and 24 more others suffered severe damage. 90,000 Iraqi forces were killed or wounded, and 2,365 were taken captive.[20]
Besides the tangible results of the operation, achieved by catching the enemy troops off guard both in terms of timing (shortly after Karbala 4) and tactics (contrary to Iraq’s military deployment Iran attacked from two axes: east-west and north-south, forcing the Iraqi troops to create two completely different defensive lines), the psychological impact was also significant. Whereas Iran’s superior political and military standing, which had been established after the capture of Faw, was reaffirmed, the political and military position of Iraq was severely damaged due to its inability to recapture eastern Basrah, and part of its army was shattered. Furthermore, as Iran’s capability and Iraq’s inability on the frontlines became evident, international efforts to end the war intensified.[21]
Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei, the then-President of Iran, described this operation as “the last hammers brought down upon Saddam”. Hujjatoleslam Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, the then-Supreme War Commander and spokesperson of the Supreme Defense Council, referred to the Iranian forces as “lightning-like fighters” who achieved victory by showing “courage and bravery”.[22]
Mohsen Rezaei, the former Command-in-Chief of the IRGC, said: “For over two weeks, we were continuously targeted day and night by enemy missiles, aircraft, and artillery. On the tenth or twelfth day, we intercepted a conversation between Adnan Khairullah and Saddam. Saddam asked Adnan, ‘What are you doing?’ Adnan replied, ‘Sir! We are firing with two thousand artillery pieces but to no avail’”.[23]
The victory in the operation had widespread global media coverage. Acknowledging Iran’s upper hand on the battlefield, the international newspapers described Karbala 5 as “the most successful military operation” and considered an Iranian victory in the war more likely.[24]
Operation Karbala 5 was completed with two semi-large-scale operations. Karbala 6 was conducted on January 13 and 14, 1987, in northwestern Iran, aimed at liberating Naft Shahr and capturing Iraq’s Naft Khaneh. Also, Operation Karbala 5 began on February 22, 1987, lasting ten days, to reinforce the front line at the Jasim River and establish a secure defensive line for future operations.[25] This complementary operation marked the end of the “pursuit of the aggressor” policy, as the war shifted to the northern fronts to target Iraq’s cities of Suleimaniyeh and Kirkuk.[26]
The success of Operation Karbala 5 led to the U.S. military presence in the Persian Gulf and increased involvement of other countries in the war. In addition, Iran’s military victories paved the way for the adoption of Resolution 598 to end the war.[27]
[1] Fowzi, Yahya; Lotfollahzadegan, Alireza, Rouzshomar-e Jang-e Iran va Araq, Ketab-e Chehelosevom: Zamineh-sazi dar Tadarok-e Amaliyat-e Sarnevesht-saz (Chronology of Iran-Iraq War, Volume 43: Preparation for the Decisive Operation), Tehran: Markaz-e Motaleat va Tahqiqat-e Jang-e Sepah-e Pasdaran-e Enqelab-e Eslami, 1999, p. 18.
[2] Amaliyat-e Karbala-ye 5: Darh am Shekastan-e Dezhha-ye Defai-ye Basrah (Operation Karbala 5: Breaking Basrah’s Defensive Lines), Tehran: Markaz-e Motaleat va Tahqiqat-e Jang-e Sepah-e Pasdaran-e Enqelab-e Eslami, 2004, Pp. 11, 18.
[3] Dorudian, Muhammad, Nabard-e Sharq-e Basrah (Battle of East Basrah), Tehran: Markaz-e Motaleat va Tahqiqat-e Jang-e Sepah-e Pasdaran-e Enqelab-e Eslami, 1995, p. 23; Haji Khodaverdi Khan, Mahdi, Nabard dar Kanal-e Mahi (Battle in Fish Canal), Tehran: Markaz-e Motaleat va Tahqiqat-e Jang-e Sepah-e Pasdaran-e Enqelab-e Eslami, 2014, p. 18; Jamshidi, Mohammad Hussain; Yazdanfam, Mahmoud, Rouzshomar-e Jang-e Iran va Araq, Ketab-e Chehelohaftom: Akharin Talashha dar Jonoob (Chronology of Iran-Iraq War, Volume 47: Last Efforts in the South), Tehran: Markaz-e Motaleat va Tahqiqat-e Jang-e Sepah-e Pasdaran-e Enqelab-e Eslami, 2002, p. 18; Amaliyat-e Karbala-ye 5: Darham Shekastan-e Dezhha-ye Defai-ye Basrah (Operation Karbala 5: Breaking Basrah’s Defensive Lines), p. 17.
[4] Jazayeri, Seyyed Masoud, Bar Bolandhaye Shalamcheh (On the Heights of Shalamcheh), Qom: Nasim Hayat; Tehran: Sarir, 2005, Pp. 25, 28, 53; Jamshidi, Muhammad Hussain; Yazdanfam, Mahmoud, Rouzshomar-e Jang-e Iran va Araq, Ketab-e Chehelohaftom (Chronology of Iran-Iraq War, Volume 47), p. 18; Amaliyat-e Karbala-ye 5: Darham Shekastan-e Dezhha-ye Defai-ye Basrah (Operation Karbala 5: Breaking Basrah’s Defensive Lines), p. 11.
[5] Jazayeri, Seyyed Masoud, Bar Bolandhaye Shalamcheh (On the Heights of Shalamcheh), p. 40.
[6] Amaliyat-e Karbala-ye 5: Darham Shekastan-e Dezhha-ye Defai-ye Basrah (Operation Karbala 5: Breaking Basrah’s Defensive Lines), Pp. 9-23; Dorudian, Muhammad, Nabard-e Sharq-e Basrah (Battle of East Basrah), Pp. 45-199; Jafari, Mojtaba, Atlas-e Nabardha-ye Mandegar (Atlas of Enduring Battles), Tehran: Navid Tarahan, 2004, p. 127.
[7] Dorudian, Muhammad, Nabard-e Sharq-e Basrah (Battle of East Basrah), p. 71.
[8] Amaliyat-e Karbala-ye 5: Darham Shekastan-e Dezhha-ye Defai-ye Basrah (Operation Karbala 5: Breaking Basrah’s Defensive Lines), p. 9.
[9] Ibid., Pp. 25, 26.
[10] Haji Khodaverdi Khan, Mahdi, Nabard dar Kanal-e Mahi (Battle in Fish Canal), Pp. 19, 20; Dorudian, Muhammad, Nabard-e Sharq-e Basrah (Battle of East Basrah), p. 73.
[11] Dorudian, Muhammad, Nabard-e Sharq-e Basrah (Battle of East Basrah), p. 73.
[12] Amaliyat-e Karbala-ye 5: Darham Shekastan-e Dezhha-ye Defai-ye Basrah (Operation Karbala 5: Breaking Basrah’s Defensive Lines), Pp. 28, 29.
[13] Ibid., p. 33; Dorudian, Muhammad, Nabard-e Sharq-e Basrah (Battle of East Basrah), Pp. 108, 110.
[14] Amaliyat-e Karbala-ye 5: Darham Shekastan-e Dezhha-ye Defai-ye Basrah (Operation Karbala 5: Breaking Basrah’s Defensive Lines), p. 35.
[15] Ibid., Pp. 37-46; Dorudian, Muhammad, Nabard-e Sharq-e Basrah (Battle of East Basrah), Pp. 130-138.
[16] Daerat-ol-Maaref-e Enqelab-e Eslami-ye Vijeh-ye Nojavanan va Javan, vol. 3 (Encyclopedia of the Islamic Revolution for Youth and Adolescents), Tehran: Sooreh Mehr, 2015, Pp. 180-182.
[17] Amaliyat-e Karbala-ye 5: Darham Shekastan-e Dezhha-ye Defai-ye Basrah (Operation Karbala 5: Breaking Basrah’s Defensive Lines), p. 9.
[18] Daerat-ol-Maaref-e Enqelab-e Eslami (Encyclopedia of the Islamic Revolution), vol. 3, Pp. 180-182.
[19] Amaliyat-e Karbala-ye 5: Darham Shekastan-e Dezhha-ye Defai-ye Basrah (Operation Karbala 5: Breaking Basrah’s Defensive Lines), p. 9; Rashid, Mohsen, Atlas-e Jang-e Iran va Araq (Atlas of Iran-Iraq War), Tehran: Markaz-e Motaleat va Tahqiqat-e Jang-e Sepah-e Pasdaran-e Enqelab-e Eslami, 2010, p. 77.
[20] Amaliyat-e Karbala-ye 5: Darham Shekastan-e Dezhha-ye Defai-ye Basrah (Operation Karbala 5: Breaking Basrah’s Defensive Lines), p. 9; Daerat-ol-Maaref-e Enqelab-e Eslami (Encyclopedia of the Islamic Revolution), vol. 3, Pp. 180-182.
[21] Amaliyat-e Karbala-ye 5: Darham Shekastan-e Dezhha-ye Defai-ye Basrah (Operation Karbala 5: Breaking Basrah’s Defensive Lines), Pp. 48-51; Dorudian, Muhammad, Nabard-e Sharq-e Basrah (Battle of East Basrah), Pp. 153-154; Rashid, Mohsen, Atlas-e Jang-e Iran va Araq (Atlas of Iran-Iraq War), Pp. 77-78.
[22] Haji Khodaverdi Khan, Mahdi, Nabard dar Kanal-e Mahi (Battle in Fish Canal), Pp. 287-288; Jamshidi, Mohammad Hussain; Yazdanfam, Mahmoud, Rouzshomar-e Jang-e Iran va Araq, Ketab-e Chehelohaftom (Chronology of Iran-Iraq War, Volume 47), p. 18.
[23] Nagoftehaye Amaliyat-e Karbala-ye 5 be Revayat-e Sardar Mohsen Rezaei (Untold Stories of Operation Karbala 5 by General Mohsen Rezaei), 09/01/2016, Tasnim News Agency.
[24] Dorudian, Muhammad, Nabard-e Sharq-e Basrah (Battle of East Basrah), Pp. 162-164.
[25] Jamshidi, Muhammad Hussain; Yazdanfam, Mahmoud, Rouzshomar-e Jang-e Iran va Araq, Ketab-e Chehelohaftom: Akharin Talashha dar Jonoob (Chronology of Iran-Iraq War, Volume 47: Last Efforts in the South), p. 21; Daerat-ol-Maaref-e Enqelab-e Eslami (Encyclopedia of the Islamic Revolution), vol. 3, p. 182.
[26] Rashid, Mohsen, Atlas-e Jang-e Iran va Araq (Atlas of Iran-Iraq War), p. 66.
[27] Dorudian, Muhammad, Nabard-e Sharq-e Basrah (Battle of East Basrah), p. 195.
