The Oil War
Oil was Iran’ s most important source of revenue during the Iran– Iraq War.
Following Iraq’ s full-scale invasion, the Abadan Refinery— the country’ s largest oil processing center— and its oil storage facilities came under heavy artillery and mortar fire.[1] In 1980, Iran’ s total refining capacity was about 1.1 million barrels per day. With the Abadan Refinery’ s daily capacity of 650,000 barrels becoming inoperative, nearly half of the country’ s refining capacity was lost,[2] causing fuel shortages and gasoline rationing.[3]
Due to Iran’ s dependence on oil revenue, Iraq’ s attacks on oil facilities— including the world’ s largest refinery in Abadan— significantly reduced Iranian oil production.[4] In response and to weaken Iraq economically, Iran targeted Iraq’ s oil infrastructure, striking pumping stations that transported crude oil to Turkey and the Mediterranean (and from there to Europe), as well as refineries, oil centers, and offshore platforms such as Al-Bakr and Al-Amiyah. Also, by attacking oil storage facilities across Iraq, Iran further disrupted Iraq’ s energy exports.[5] As a result, Iraqi oil exports dropped from 5.3 million barrels per day to 250,000 barrels.[6] Before the war, two-thirds of Iraq’ s oil was exported via the Al-Bakr and Al-Amiyah terminals.[7]
With the start of the invasion, Al-Bakr and Al-Amiyah became strategic sites for espionage against Iranian shipping. To counter these activities and to completely halt Iraq’ s oil exports through the Persian Gulf, Iran planned and carried out attacks on the terminals.[8] On October 31, 1980, under Operation Ashkan, the Iranian Army Navy Force shelled the Al-Bakr and Al-Amiyah terminals using naval artillery.[9] On November 7, in Operation Shahid Safari, Army Naval commandos captured and destroyed the terminals by explosives.[10]
During the war, Iraq also attacked Kharg Island’ s oil storage tanks and terminals.[11] From November 1982, Iraq prioritized halting tanker traffic to Kharg to increase Iran’ s war costs.[12] Iraq also attacked Iranian oil wells in the Persian Gulf. One of the most notable attacks took place on March 2, 1983, when the Nowruz oil field was targeted, causing the spill of six million barrels of crude oil into the Persian Gulf. The disaster polluted the coasts of Kuwait, parts of Saudi Arabia, and Iran.[13]
In the first two years of the Iran-Iraq War, these attacks were conducted with airplanes, missiles, bombs, and Russian mines. From the third year onward, Super Frelon helicopters, Super É tendard aircraft, and French Mirage jets equipped with Exocet missiles played a key role in these attacks.[14] By targeting tankers Iraq sought to disrupt Iranian oil exports and reduce the country’ s foreign currency income.[15]
Although the Iranian Army Air Force[16] was escorting oil tankers to Kharg Island, it could not completely prevent the Iraqi attacks.[17]
On May 13, 1984, an Iranian Phantom fighter struck the Kuwaiti oil tanker Umm al-Casbah with a Maverick missile, marking the start of Iran’ s offensive against Saddam’ s supporters in the Persian Gulf.[18] These attacks were carried out using F-4 Phantom jets with Maverick missiles, helicopters equipped with AS-12 missiles, naval artillery, rockets, and machine guns on high-speed boats.[19]
In the last two years of the war, Iraq increasingly relied on French Mirage jets and Soviet Su-22 aircraft to target Iranian tankers and oil facilities in the Persian Gulf. China supplied Iraq with coastal-to-ship missile systems, which were limited to attacking vessels in the Musa Bay. While these measures raised Iran’ s war costs, they never stopped Iranian oil exports.[20]
From 1985 onward, as Iraqi attacks in the Persian Gulf increased, Iran shifted oil exports to Siri Island,[21] which was likewise targeted. On August 12, 1986, four Iraqi Mirage F-1 jets attacked the Siri terminal, targeting three tankers while they were loading.[22] Consequently, Iranian oil exports dropped from 2.1 million barrels per day to 500,000.[23]
Iran then moved exports to Larak Island,[24] which was also targeted by Iraq. In early 1988, the Iraqi Air Force launched a long-range strike on tankers carrying Iranian oil at Larak.[25] Also, on May 14, 1988, Iraq attacked Larak again, damaging the world’ s largest oil tanker, the Seawise Giant, carrying Iranian oil.[26]
From early 1986, with the escort of Kuwaiti tankers by the U. S. and Soviet navies, a new phase of insecurity in the Persian Gulf began, which led to the direct military confrontations between the U. S. and Iran in the summer of 1987.[27] On July 24, 1987, the tanker Bridgeton, escorted by three U. S. warships, struck a mine.[28] In retaliation, on October 19, 1987, the United States attacked the Reshadat oil field.[29] Earlier, on October 8, 1987, U. S. forces had targeted high-speed boats of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Navy near Farsi Island, capturing several Iranian sailors but also losing one of their advanced military helicopters in the operation.[30] On April 18, 1988, the U. S. Navy attacked the Nasr and Salman oil platforms. In response, Iran deployed its naval vessels Sahand, Joshan, and Sabalan to engage the enemy. Sahand and Joshan were sunk, while Sabalan was heavily damaged.[31]
During the Tanker War, 411 ships carrying oil and goods for Iran and other Persian Gulf states were attacked, 239 of which (58 percent) were tankers. Ten additional ships also were carrying liquefied gas, meaning that 60.5 percent of the attacked vessels were fuel carriers.[32]
Throughout the conflict, repeated attacks on Iranian oil wells and tankers resulted in massive crude oil spills into the Persian Gulf. These spills devastated the ecosystem, wiping out nearly 38 percent of marine species.[33]
During the Iran-Iraq War, the Tehran Refinery was bombed twice, Tabriz Refinery 19 times, Isfahan Refinery 8 times, Kermanshah Refinery 17 times, and Shiraz Refinery 4 times.[34] Moreover, Kharg Island was placed on red alert 2,300 times and attacked 684 times, yet, thanks to the coordinated efforts of the National Iranian Oil Company, the Army, and the IRGC, Iran’ s critical oil flow was never interrupted.[35]
In total, the Iranian oil industry sacrificed 1,017 martyrs, including 242 from Abadan Refinery alone, which accounted for roughly one-quarter of all oil industry casualties.[36]
References
- [1]. Alaei, Hussain, Ravand-e Jang-e Iran va Araq (The Course of Iran-Iraq War), Vol. 1, Tehran, Marz va Boom, 1391, p. 230.
- [2]. Shabake-ye Ettelaresani-ye Naft va Energy, Nagofteha-ye Jang-e Naft dar Hasht Sal Defa Muqaddas (Untold of the Oil War in the Eight Years of Sacred Defense), 4 Mehr 1400, www. shana. ir/news/321385
- [3]. Alaei, Hussain, Ibid., p. 230.
- [4]. Shams, Morteza, Naft va Paydari (Oil and Resilience), Tehran, Pazhooheshgah-e Oloum-e Ensani va Motaleat-e Ejtemai-ye Jahad-e Daneshgahi, 1394, p. 59.
- [5]. Shirmuhammad, Mohsen, Cheshman-e Oqab – Hamaseh-ye Gordan-e 11 Shenasayi-ye Taktiki Niru-ye Havaei va Amaliat-e Aksbardari Havaei dar Defa Muqaddas (Eyes of the Eagle – Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron 11 and Aerial Photography Operations in the Sacred Defense), Tehran, Markaz-e Entesharat-e Rahbordi-ye NAHAJA, 1396, p. 146.
- [6]. Namaki, Ali-Reza, Niru-ye Havaei dar Defa Muqaddas (Air Force in Sacred Defense), Tehran, Iran Sabz, 1389, p. 143.
- [7]. Navias, Martin S. va E. R. Hooton, Jang-e Naftkesh-ha (Tanker War), Trans. Pejman Pourjabari va Rahmat Qarreh, Tehran, Bonyad-e Hefz-e Asar va Nashr va Arzeshha-ye Defa Muqaddas, 1392, p. 43.
- [8]. Shirmuhammad, Mohsen, Bar Faraz-e Daryaha – Negahi be Tarikh-e Havadarya va Hamaseh-ye Eskadranha-ye Havanav, Balgard va Bal Sabet dar Jang-e Tahmili (Above the Seas – A Look at Naval History and Helicopter and Fixed-Wing Squadron Heroism in the Imposed War), Tehran, Daftar-e Pazhoohesha-ye Nazari va Motaleat-e Rahbordi-ye NAHAJA, 1400, p. 119.
- [9]. Ibid., Pp. 119-121.
- [10]. Ibid., Pp. 122-127.
- [11]. Karam Aligoudarzi, Muhammad-Reza, Kharg dar Defa Muqaddas (Kharg in the Sacred Defense), Bushehr, Edareh-ye Kol-e Hefz-e Asar va Nashr-e Arzeshha-ye Defa Muqaddas Ostan-e Bushehr, Nashr-e Pelak-e Eshq, 1401, p. 32.
- [12]. Navias, Martin S. va E. R. Hooton, Ibid., p. 97.
- [13]. Ibid., Pp. 14, 117.
- [14]. Ibid., p. 14.
- [15]. Ibid., Pp. 14-15.
- [16]. Shirmuhammad, Mohsen, Ibid., p. 175.
- [17]. Navias, Martin S. va E. R. Hooton, Ibid., p. 125.
- [18]. Ibid., p. 154.
- [19]. Weinberger, Caspar, Nabard dar Khalij-e Fars (Battle in the Persian Gulf), Trans. Mehran Mofidi Tabatabaei, Tehran, Sarir, 1370, p. 51.
- [20]. Navias, Martin S. va E. R. Hooton, Ibid., Pp. 14-15.
- [21]. Shabake-ye Ettelaresani-ye Naft va Energy, Ibid.
- [22]. Cordesman, Anthony va Abraham Wagner, Darsha-ye Jang-e Modarn – Jang-e Iran va Araq (The Lessons of Modern War- The Iran-Iraq War), Vol. 1, Trans. Hussain Yekta, Tehran, Marz-o-Boom, 1389, Pp. 442-443
- [23]. Shams, Morteza, Ibid., p. 63.
- [24]. Shabake-ye Ettelaresani-ye Naft va Energy, Ibid.
- [25]. Navias, Martin S. va E. R. Hooton, Ibid., p. 285.
- [26]. Ibid., p. 316.
- [27]. Ibid., p. 15.
- [28]. Yazdanfam, Mahmoud, Ruzshomar-e Jang-e Iran va Araq – Escort-e Naft-Keshha (Chronology of Iran-Iraq War – Tanker Escort), Vol. 50, Tehran, Markaz-e Motaleat va Tahqiqat-e Jang, 1378, p. 62.
- [29]. Ansari, Mahdi va Mahmoud Yazdanfam, Ruzshomar-e Jang-e Iran va Araq – Jang-e Mahdud-e Iran va Amrika dar Khalij-e Fars (Chronology of Iran-Iraq War – Limited War with the U. S. in Persian Gulf), Vol. 51, Tehran, Markaz-e Asnad-e Defa Muqaddas, 1387, p. 471.
- [30]. Alaei, Hussan, Ibid., p. 400; Navias, Martin S. va E. R. Hooton, Ibid., p. 15.
- [31]. Shirmuhammad, Mohsen, Ibid., Pp. 277-281.
- [32]. Navias, Martin S. va E. R. Hooton, Ibid., Pp. 15, 344.
- [33]. Ibid., p. 14.
- [34]. Shabake-ye Ettelaresani-ye Naft va Energy, Ibid.
- [35]. Khabargozari-e Mehr, Kharg be Tedad-e Roozhay-e Jang Bombard Shod (Kharg Was Bombed as Many Days as the War Lasted), 1 Mehr 1399, www. mehrnews. com/news/5029758
- [36]. Shabake-ye Ettelaresani-ye Naft va Energy, Ibid.
