Battles
Operation Tariq al-Quds
Zahra Sadat Zuqi
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in 1981, The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the Islamic Republic of Iran Army carried out Operation Tariq al-Quds in Khuzestan Province to liberate the border city of Bostan.
After Operation Thamen al-Aemmah (as) (September 27, 1981),[1] the commanders of the IRGC and the Army developed a long-term twelve-part strategy called the “Karbala Plan” aimed at destroying the Baathist Iraq war machine, liberating Iran’s occupied territories, and enhancing the military capabilities of the forces. The implementation of each phase of the plan depended on the situation of Iran’s military capability in defensive lines after each operation.[2] Accordingly, Colonel Ali Sayyad Shirazi, the commander of the Army Ground Forces, requested the Headquarters of the Army Ground Forces, located in southern Khuzestan, to prepare a plan for conducting offensive operations in Khuzestan and liberating the occupied areas. The headquarters proposed executing operations in Bostan and Dezful. To enhance the Army’s combat capability, it was necessary to utilize popular forces and the IRGC. Colonel Hussain Khorsandi, the coordinating deputy of the Army Ground Forces, after reviewing the operational plan, developed a general plan involving striking attacks simultaneously on the north (Bostan axis) and south (Dezful front) of the Karkheh River.[3] Consequently, Operation Tariq al-Quds, as the first phase of the Karbala Plan was launched to liberate the border city of Bostan. To achieve the objectives, two primary and secondary phases were required. The main one focused on two axes with two IRGC infantry brigades, an Army armored brigade, and an IRGC mechanized battalion advancing through the sandy areas west of the Allah Akbar Hills. The forces then moved towards the Chazabeh Strait to destroy the Baathist troops positioned there. In the other phase, units would move forward in three axes with two IRGC infantry brigades and two Army armored brigades, maneuvering from south of the Karkheh River to north of the Neysan River to liberate Bostan and western Susangerd.[4] To maintain communication and exchange information during the operation, joint briefing and coordination meetings were held between IRGC and Army commanders at Karbala 1 Headquarters (Army), the command posts of the 16th Armored Division, or the 2nd Armored Brigade of the 92nd Division (Army units).[5]
The offensive operations launched by the 2nd Brigade of the 92nd Armored Division (November 17, 1980), the 16th Armored Division in the Karkheh Kor (January 5, 1981), and Kheibar (September 2, 1981) were among the preparatory actions carried out before Operation Tariq al-Quds.[6]
The planning phase of the Operation Tariq al-Quds began on October 7, 1981. To avoid direct confrontation with the Baathist forces and ensure the success of the operation, the IRGC commanders decided to build a road in the northern area (Chazabeh). Road construction began on November 7, 1981, and was completed in twenty days. The road was 18 kilometers long and 7 meters wide.[7] In a letter to Ali Sayyad Shirazi, the Army Ground Forces’ assessment team, analyzed the operation tactically, listing its strengths and weaknesses and predicting the likelihood of failure in the operation. The experts identified the IRGC’s focus on the northern area (Chazabeh) as the key strength of the operation. However, they believed that the operation, even if it were successful, would not provide tactical advantages for Iranian forces.
On November 23rd, a classified letter from the General Staff of the Iraqi Armed Forces was sent to Iraqi units, mentioning an impending Iranian operation on the Bostan front aimed at capturing the Taawun Road and the Bostan-Chazabeh Road, which connected the Iraqi forces inside Iran from the north and south. However, no reference was made to the road construction or maneuver plan. A few days later, a final agreement was reached regarding the maneuver based on the IRGC’s proposal to execute it in the Chazabeh.[8] On November 27th, another letter from the 26th Iraqi Brigade provided detailed information about Iranian forces, the objectives of the operation, and the engaging units, putting Iraqi forces in the area on alert for three days. However, there was no mention of an attack on the Chazabeh front, indicating that despite having precise information about the southern axis, the Iraqis were unaware of the plan for Chazabeh.
On November 28th, the date and time of the operation were announced. On the same day, Ali Sayyad Shirazi and Mohsen Rezaei, the IRGC Commander-in-Chief, concluded the final details and made some recommendations for the operational units. In a letter, Sayyad Shirazi stated that the IRGC would lead the assault units while the Army would handle support operations. The IRGC command also assigned Gholam-Ali Rashid as the operation’s commander.[9] Finally, Operation Tariq al-Quds commenced on November 29, 1981, at 12:30 AM with the code-name “Ya Hussain (as)”.[10]
The main attack was carried out successfully north of the Karkheh River. Under heavy rain, the IRGC forces managed to break through Iraqi trenches and penetrate enemy positions. Forces advancing from the east and north of Bostan infiltrated deep into the area. Those moving from the north of Bostan lost their way several times but eventually took control of the enemy artillery facilities. By 3 AM, a tank battalion under the command of the 16th Armored Division was positioned on the Chazabeh-Bostan Road, cutting off the enemy’s main supply line to Chazabeh. Consequently, the occupied Karkheh area was liberated, and the 3rd Armored Brigade advanced into the area. The IRGC Imam Hussain Brigade (as), along with an IRGC mechanized battalion and a battalion from the 3rd Army Armored Division, reached the Chazabeh Strait, achieving the planned objectives. However, in the Dehlaviyeh axis, south of the Karkheh River, forces were halted after advancing about two kilometers. In the Suweidani axis, another southern front, forces reached the Alwan Bridge but failed to capture it. With the escalation of clashes, the buildup of the forces increased making operational control difficult and resulting in casualties. Furthermore, some IRGC forces were captured by Iraqis. The Iranians failed to achieve the objectives on the southern front and had to retreat.[11]
On the same day, Imam Khomeini congratulated the victory in this operation, calling it the “Greatest Victory”.[12]
At 6:30 AM on November 30th, the Iraqi forces launched a counterattack to reclaim lost positions, but they failed. The operation continued at 9 AM, and the Iranians reached west of Bostan. Also, the forces positioned in the south of Karkheh began moving towards Bostan. Finally, Bostan, which had been occupied since September 26, 1980, was liberated after 412 days, along with about 250 square kilometers of Iranian territory.[13] On December 1st, the situation in the north of the Karkheh River was stable yet Chazabeh and Bostan still witnessed clashes.[14] On the fourth day of the operation, Iraq launched an offensive to retake the liberated areas and escalated the attacks on cities and residential places.[15] Finally, the operation concluded successfully on December 4th, with the retreat of Iraqi forces to the south of the Neysan River.[16]
In this operation, 2,500 Baathist troops were killed and 534 were captured. In addition, 207 tanks armored personnel carriers, and 18 aircraft were destroyed. Also, 19 artillery pieces and 87 bulldozers, loaders, and graders were seized.[17] Iranian casualties included 799 martyrs—674 IRGC and Basij members and 125 Army forces.[18]
Iran’s success in Operation Tariq al-Quds and the Iranians gaining an upper hand on the battlefield became a cause of concern for Iraq. The Washington Post wrote: “Iraq has secretly offered to withdraw troops from Iranian territory and pay financial compensation, provided that Iran agrees to grant concessions, including the revocation of its request for the formation of a committee to determine the party responsible for starting the war”.[19]
After Operation Tariq al-Quds, the enemy took measures to reinforce its position in the occupied territories, including supporting domestic anti-revolutionary forces, attempting to delay subsequent Iranian operations, and offering peace proposals.[20]
The memorial of Operation Tariq al-Quds at Shahid Ali Mardani Pass (Chazabeh) is a site visited by the Rahian-e Noor Caravans every year.[21]
[1] Mohsen Rashid, Atlas-e Jang-e Iran va Iraq (Atlas of the Iran-Iraq War), Tehran: Markaz-e Asnad va Tahqiqat-e Defa-e Muqaddas, 3rd ed., 2013, p. 46.
[2] Ali-Reza Lotfollahzadegan, Ruzshomar-e Jang-e Iran va Iraq, Ketab-e Shanzdahom: Azadsazi-ye Sarzaminhaye Iran, Gam-e Dovom: Bostan (Chronology of the Iran-Iraq War, Vol. 16: Liberation of Iranian Lands, Second Step: Bostan), Tehran: Markaz-e Asnad va Tahqiqat-e Defa-e Muqaddas, 2015, p. 705.
[3] Saeid Purdarab and Nabi Karimi, Taqvim-e Tarikh-e Defa-e Muqaddas, J. 16: Fath-e Bostan (Chronological History of the Sacred Defense, Vol. 16: The Liberation of Bostan), Tehran: Markaz-e Asnad-e Enqelab-e Islami, 2010, Pp. 154-155; Masud Bakhtiari, Amaliat-e Tariq al-Quds (Operation Tariq al-Quds), Tehran: Sazman-e Hefz-e Asar va Arzesh-haye Defa-e Muqaddas-e AJA in collaboration with Entesharat-e Sabah, 2000, Pp. 48-49.
[4] Ali-Reza Lotfollahzadegan, Ruzshomar-e Jang-e Iran va Iraq, Ketab-e Shanzdahom (Chronology of the Iran-Iraq War, Vol. 16), p. 742.
[5] Saeid Purdarab and Nabi Karimi, Taqvim-e Tarikh-e Defa-e Muqaddas, J. 16 (Chronological History of the Sacred Defense, Vol. 16), Pp. 247-248.
[6] Masud Bakhtiari, Amaliat-e Tariq al-Quds (Operation Tariq al-Quds), Pp. 37-42.
[7] Ali-Reza Lotfollahzadegan, Ruzshomar-e Jang-e Iran va Iraq, Ketab-e Shanzdahom (Chronology of the Iran-Iraq War, Vol. 16), p. 20.
[8] Ibid., Pp. 20-21.
[9] Ibid., p. 21.
[10] Ibid., p. 20; Saeid Purdarab and Nabi Karimi, Taqvim-e Tarikh-e Defa-e Muqaddas, J. 16 (Chronological History of the Sacred Defense, Vol. 16), p. 169.
[11] Ali-Reza Lotfollahzadegan, Ruzshomar-e Jang-e Iran va Iraq, Ketab-e Shanzdahom (Chronology of the Iran-Iraq War, Vol. 16), Pp. 781-786.
[12] Saeid Purdarab and Nabi Karimi, Taqvim-e Tarikh-e Defa-e Muqaddas, J. 16 (Chronological History of the Sacred Defense, Vol. 16), Pp. 247-248.
[13] Ali-Reza Lotfollahzadegan, Ruzshomar-e Jang-e Iran va Iraq, Ketab-e Shanzdahom (Chronology of the Iran-Iraq War, Vol. 16), Pp. 801-803; Hussain Niri, Qateie az Aseman: Bostan (A Piece of the Sky: Bostan), Tehran: Sazman-e Honari va Adabiat-e Defa-e Muqaddas, 2014, p. 60.
[14] Ali-Reza Lotfollahzadegan, Ruzshomar-e Jang-e Iran va Iraq, Ketab-e Shanzdahom (Chronology of the Iran-Iraq War, Vol. 16), Pp. 813-814.
[15] Ibid., Pp. 825-836.
[16] Ibid., p. 20; Saeid Purdarab and Nabi Karimi, Taqvim-e Tarikh-e Defa-e Muqaddas, J. 16 (Chronological History of the Sacred Defense, Vol. 16), p. 169; Mohsen Rashid, Atlas-e Jang-e Iran va Iraq (Atlas of the Iran-Iraq War), p. 47.
[17] Saeid Purdarab and Nabi Karimi, Taqvim-e Tarikh-e Defa-e Muqaddas, J. 16 (Chronological History of the Sacred Defense, Vol. 16), Pp. 436-438.
[18] Amir Razaqzadeh, Nabard-e Tariq al-Quds (The Battle of Tariq al-Quds), Tehran: Markaz-e Asnad va Tahqiqat-e Defa-e Muqaddas, 2012, p. 818.
[19] Muhammad Dorudian, Siri dar Jang-e Iran va Iraq, J. 1: Khuninshahr ta Khorramshahr (A Study of the Iran-Iraq War, Vol. 1: From Khuninshahr to Khorramshahr), Tehran: Markaz-e Motaleat va Tahqiqat-e Jang-e Sepah-e Pasdaran-e Enqelab-e Eslami, 9th ed., 2008, p. 80.
[20] Ibid., Pp. 78-80.
[21] Ketab-e Kar-e Ravi 3 (The Book of Narrator’s Work 3), Mashhad: Setareha, 2016, p. 73.
