Ports and Shipping Organization of Iran

The Ports and Shipping Organization of Iran was one of the key organizations that played a key role during the Iran-Iraq War, managing exports and imports via various ports along the Persian Gulf and Sea of Oman.

In November 25, 1814, to assert Iranian government authority over southern coasts and ports in maritime trade matters and to collect related duties and fees, an office called the “ Southern Customs Branch” was established in Bandar Bushehr. This office handled both port and maritime affairs. More than a century later, on February 5, 1936, the “ General Ports Administration” was founded in Tehran, centralizing all Iranian port affairs. In 1949, the General Ports and Shipping Agency replaced the General Ports Administration under the Ministry of Roads. In 1960, it was transformed into the Ports and Shipping Organization of Iran with expanded responsibilities and authority. In 1961, the organization was transferred to the Ministry of Commerce, and a year later, it came under the newly formed Ministry of Finance. In 1974, it was separated from the Ministry of Finance and moved back to the Ministry of Roads and Transportation.⁠[1]

When the Iran-Iraq War broke out, Khorramshahr Port— the country’ s most important commercial port— was subjected to all-out enemy attacks in the very first days and faced severe difficulties.⁠[2] During the siege of Abadan and Khorramshahr, the only supply route for the Iranian forces was the waterway via the Bahmanshir River. For this reason, Chavibdeh Port was opened, and for nearly a year, all logistics and support for Abadan were handled from Bandar Imam Khomeini (ra) to Chavibdeh Port.⁠[3]

From the second week of the war, Bandar Imam Khomeini (ra) became the most important Iranian port and took on a central role in the country’ s maritime and port activities.⁠[4]

Compared to other ports, Bandar Imam Khomeini (ra)⁠[5] was the closest to Tehran, which added to its strategic importance. After the fall of Khorramshahr and the halt of port operations there, Bandar Imam Khomeini (ra) received even greater attention. During the war, it was the only port with a direct railway connection to Tehran. Another advantage was its proximity— just 12 kilometers— to the Mahshahr oil terminal. Refined petroleum products from the Abadan Refinery were transferred through this port to the Mahshahr terminal and then distributed nationwide. Due to the war, Khorramshahr⁠[6] and Abadan ports were taken out of service, and most of their personnel were reassigned to Bandar Imam Khomeini (ra).⁠[7] Support for Abadan continued for almost eleven months (second half of 1980 and first half of 1981) via Pier 11 at Bandar Imam Khomeini (ra) and the Musa Bay.⁠[8]

During Iraqi air raids, Bandar Imam Khomeini (ra) was repeatedly hit. At that time, the port had limited facilities, equipment, yards, and warehouses— mostly just piers— but even the existing warehouses were targeted by air strikes.⁠[9] On October 15, 1980, following an attack by two Iraqi fighter aircraft, rockets struck the tugboat Payam and the ship Navid; both vessels sank, and nine crew members (employees of the Shipping Organization) were martyred.⁠[10]

With the arrival of war-displaced people from Khorramshahr and Abadan at Bandar Imam Khomeini (ra), the Meqdad residential complex belonging to the Ports and Shipping Organization was used to accommodate the displaced families.⁠[11]

Iraq started directly attacking Iranian commercial ships in the Persian Gulf in 1981.⁠[12] Given the widespread attacks, Iran decided to organize ship movements in convoys for security.⁠[13] Convoys typically consisted of 15, 20, or sometimes 30– 40 vessels entering the area. For every 15 incoming ships, 15 outgoing ships would depart. To manage this process, 15 pilots from the Ports and Shipping Organization were flown by helicopter to Bandar Abbas, and after the war headquarters were relocated to Bushehr, they continued their operations from there.

Another 15 pilots boarded outgoing vessels. Ship movements followed a strict schedule and the Joint Staff of the Army-approved protocols.⁠[14]

When ships reached the Musa Bay (entrance to Bandar Imam Khomeini (ra)), pilots (local guides) took over navigation and led them to the inner anchorage. Other senior pilots then berthed the ships at piers or assisted in departure. The port had two anchorages: inner and outer. Ships bound for Iran were required to anchor at Buoy 12. From that point onward, a pilot took over the navigation from the captain and guided the vessel to the designated port and berth.⁠[15]

As soon as convoys arrived, Bandar Imam Khomeini (ra) staff worked at full speed to unload or load cargo. Ships had to be discharged quickly and leave the port to rejoin their convoy. If a ship fell behind schedule, the port was liable for demurrage and delay penalties. Therefore— even under enemy bombardment— the unloading process had to be completed on time to avoid financial penalties.⁠[16]

The enemy attacked the Iranian port, piers, and berthed ships by every possible means. During raids, the staff and workers took cover in surface bunkers on the piers, then returned to work after the all-clear siren sounded.⁠[17]

Throughout the Iran-Iraq War, the Ports and Maritime Organization maintained close and effective cooperation with the Islamic Republic of Iran Army Navy. Coordination included ship movement and communication procedures, maritime operations following Navy instructions (such as nighttime dredging and blackout compliance), respect for friendly unit signals, advance notification to the Navy about dredging locations, provision of berths at Bandar Abbas Naval Base to ease congestion and speed up discharge of waiting commercial vessels, berth allocation at Bandar Imam Khomeini (ra) and post-discharge departure, and protection of refueling tankers.⁠[18]

During the Iran-Iraq War, the Ports and Maritime Organization focused mainly on activating Bandar Shahid Rajaee (Bandar Abbas). Finally, by 1985, twelve berths at the port were made ready for ocean-going vessels. In wartime conditions,⁠[19] this development greatly helped berth and discharge essential imported goods.⁠[20]

Bandar Shahid Beheshti in Chabahar was also established in 1982 as the first major port in the region. Given the special circumstances in the Persian Gulf due to the war and the government’ s emphasis on having a port outside the Strait of Hormuz and Persian Gulf, it played a significant role in imports and exports thanks to its location on the Sea of Oman and distance from the war zone. Bandar Shahid Kalantari, the second port in Chabahar, came online in 1983.⁠[21]

Throughout the Iran-Iraq War, 98 employees of the Ports and Maritime Organization were martyred, 300 were wounded, and 73 were captured.⁠[22]

Starting in 1993, the organization began salvaging vessels that had sunk during the war in the Karun and Arvand rivers. By 2017, 56 and 125 wrecks had been removed from the Arvand Rud and Karun, respectively. Salvaging wrecks in the Arvand Rud is a prerequisite for dredging that waterway, a process currently being pursued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ports and Maritime Organization in talks with the Iraqi side.⁠[23]

In 2008, by decision of the Islamic Consultative Assembly, the name of the organization was officially changed from Ports and Shipping Organization to Ports and Maritime Organization.⁠[24]

 


References

  • [1]. Sazman-e Benader va Daryanavardi, Moarefi-ye Sazman-e Benader va Daryanavardi (An Introduction to the Ports and Maritime Organization), Sait-e Rasmi-e Sazman-e Benader va Daryanavardi, www. pmo. ir/fa/aboutpmo/introduction
  • [2]. Vadadi, Hamid va Digaran, Zanjireh-ye Taamin va Jang - Naqsh-e Sazman-e Benader va Daryanavardi dar Jang-e Tahmili (Supply Chain and War - The Role of the Ports and Maritime Organization in the Iran-Iraq War), Tehran: Entesharat-e Sazman-e Benader va Daryanavardi, 1396, p. 96.
  • [3]. Mahnameh-e Bandar va Darya, Defa-e Mardomi dar Noqteh-ye Sefr-e Marzi (Popular Defense at the Zero-Point Line), No. 190, Khordad 1391, p. 43.
  • [4]. Vedadi, Hamid va Digaran, Ibid., p. 107.
  • [5]. Ibid., p. 107.
  • [6]. Ibid., p. 108.
  • [7]. Ibid.
  • [8]. Ibid., p. 109.
  • [9]. Ibid., p. 110.
  • [10]. Ibid., p. 118.
  • [11]. Ibid., p. 116.
  • [12]. Ibid., p. 110.
  • [13]. Ibid., p. 112.
  • [14]. Ibid., p. 114.
  • [15]. Ibid., p. 112.
  • [16]. Ibid., p. 116.
  • [17]. Ibid.
  • [18]. Ibid., p. 96.
  • [19]. Ibid., p. 121.
  • [20]. Ibid., p. 122.
  • [21]. Ibid., p. 124.
  • [22]. Tashrih-e Naqsh-e Sazman-e Benader dar Dowran-e Defa Muqaddas (Explaining the Role of the Ports Organization During the Sacred Defense), Sait-e Khabari-e Vezarat-e Raah va Tarabari, Mehr 3, 1398, www. news. mrud. ir/news/73054/
  • [23]. Tashrih-e Naqsh-e Sazman-e Benader dar Dowran-e Defa Muqaddas (Explaining the Role of the Ports Organization During the Sacred Defense), Tabeen News, Shabakei-e Khabari Tahlili-e Sanaat-e Haml va Naql, Mehr 7, 1396. www. tinn. ir/
  • [24]. Sazman-e Benader va Daryanavardi, Moarefi-ye Sazman-e Benader va Daryanavardi (An Introduction to the Ports and Maritime Organization), Sait-e Rasmi-e Sazman-e Benader va Daryanavardi, www. pmo. ir/fa/aboutpmo/introduction

Send Feedback & Corrections