High-Speed Boats
The high-speed boats of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) played a key role during the Iran-Iraq War, particularly in the Tanker War, serving as one of Iran’s retaliatory naval assets in the Persian Gulf.
High-speed boats are small, strategic vessels capable of moving fast. They are used for different purposes, including maritime patrol, safeguarding national waterways, and defending against potential aggressors, such as pirates or hostile states targeting a country’s maritime borders.[1]
The use of high-speed boats in Iran goes back to the establishment of the IRGC Navy on September 17, 1985.[2] Three naval regions were set up based in Bandar Abbas, Bushehr, and Mahshahr to defend the Persian Gulf islands.[3]
Besides deploying military forces to the islands, the IRGC Navy had to maintain an operational presence at sea to secure shipping lanes. While warships were ideal for this role, they were very expensive and vulnerable—particularly against U.S. warships and Iraqi Exocet missiles. Analysis showed that small, high-speed boats are the best solution. Their small size and large numbers made them difficult targets, and losses could be quickly replaced.[4] By early 1987, the IRGC Navy had a fleet of small boats that were difficult to detect by radar, equipped with supersonic missiles, machine guns, light weapons, and 107 mm cannons.[5]
Following the formation of the IRGC Navy (September 17, 1985), vessels were selected to be small enough to remain radar-evading, as the smaller the vessel’s radar cross-section, the harder it was to target. Speed was also a critical factor.[6]
In 1982, Iran purchased fifty 13-meter high-speed boats built by the Swedish company Boghammar. They were gradually deployed in the Persian Gulf, and 29 of them were operational.[7] These boats, originally racing boats, were designated as Tariq in the IRGC Navy.[8] The radar systems capable of detecting targets up to 48 miles away were also installed on them.[9] With an operational speed of approximately 40 knots, each boat could carry 6 crew members and over 1,000 pounds (500 kg) of armaments over distances up to 500 nautical miles.[10] In addition, a rear-facing 23 mm cannon was installed on each vessel.[11]
Another weapon system mounted on these boats was the mini-Katyusha—a 12-tube 107 mm rocket launcher with a maximum range of 8.5 km.[12] Its ease of use made it highly effective.[13]
Subsequently, the IRGC Navy developed Ashura Boats through reverse engineering of British FAC Boat.[14] These vessels were equipped with naval mines, 12-tube 107 mm rocket launchers with an 8.5 km range, 12.7 mm machine guns, RPG launchers, and man-portable surface-to-air missiles.[15]
From early 1986, the IRGC Navy launched retaliatory operations in the Persian Gulf (during the Tanker War),[16] expanding the operations toward the Strait of Hormuz by 1987.[17] Most attacks were launched from high-speed boats based on Farsi Island, situated between Iran’s coast and northern Saudi Arabia.[18] To reduce firing errors, rockets were launched from close range against enemy ships,[19] targeting distances of 2–3 kilometers.[20]
Farsi Island, Iran’s closest island to international waterways, served as the main base for the IRGC Navy’s most powerful retaliatory group, commanded by Nader Mahdavi (martyred).[21]
In the Persian Gulf, U.S. forces struggled to counter these high-speed boats.[22] Due to their small size and speed, they were difficult to detect on radar, and even when detected, they were not easily targeted by aircraft, helicopters, or warships. Once the IRGC high-speed boats became operational, U.S. naval forces had to adapt, placing sandbags and machine guns on deck and rethinking their tactical strategies.[23]
During these retaliatory operations, the IRGC Navy suffered casualties only once.[24] On October 8, 1987, U.S. helicopters attacked IRGC high-speed boats near Farsi Island, resulting in 8 martyrs, 6 captured personnel, and the sinking of 4 Iranian vessels. Also, one U.S. helicopter was destroyed by a Stinger missile.[25] Nader Mahdavi,[26] head of the IRGC high-speed boat operations on Farsi Island, was among the most prominent figures martyred in this attack.[27]
At the beginning of the Tanker War, only one out of every six attacks on Iranian vessels received a response. By 1987, with the increased deployment of high-speed boats, every attack was met with retaliation. By 1988, Iran gained the upper hand, responding with one or two attacks for each enemy assault. Following this success, Iran replaced its larger and more costly warships with high-speed boats, effectively filling the naval gap.[28]
After the Iran-Iraq War, high-speed boats remained operational, and detailed programs for their technical development were implemented. Their weapon systems were also gradually upgraded for improved performance. Hydraulic stabilizers and fire-control systems were installed on rocket launchers for greater accuracy and range. Moreover, larger, more precise cannons were added to enhance their firepower and intimidation factor. In recent years, thanks to the development of Iran’s missile program, Iranian high-speed boats have been equipped with short- and medium-range cruise missiles as well as torpedo launchers.[29] Light vessels such as the Ashura and Tariq classes maintain high agility and maneuverability at sea while carrying missiles instead of rockets, capable of striking targets with precision from 10 to 180 km.[30]
References:
- [1] Sait-e Kashtidaran, Moarefi-e Qayeqha-ye Tondro-ye Sepah (Introduction to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps High-Speed Boats, 29 Farvardin 1402, www.kashtidaran.com/blog/iranian-army-speedboats
- [2] Alaei, Hussain, Ravand-e Jang-e Iran va Araq (The Course of the Iran-Iraq War), Vol. 2, Tehran, Marz-o-Boom, 1391, p. 130.
- [3] Haji-Khodaverdi Khan, Mahdi, Etekhaz-e Modeli Chahar-Bodi dar Amaliyat-haye Niru-ye Daryayi-ye Sepah: Tarikh Shafahi-ye Sardar Dr. Hussain Alaei (Adopting a Four-Dimensional Model in Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Naval Operations: Oral History of Dr. Hussain Alaei), Faslname-ye Negin Iran, No. 50, Paeez 1393, p. 80.
- [4] Haji-Khodaverdi Khan, Mahdi & Hussain Ahmadi, Tarikh Shafahi-ye Defa Muqaddas – Revayat-e Hussain Alaei (Oral History of the Sacred Defense – Hussain Alaei’s Narrative), Vol. 1, Tehran, Markaz-e Asnad va Tahqiqate Defa Muqaddas, 1402, p. 595.
- [5] Cordesman, Anthony & Abraham Wagner, Darha-ye Jang-e Modern- Jang-e Iran va Araq (Lessons of Modern War – The Iran-Iraq War), Vol. 2, Trans. Hussain Yekta, Tehran, Marz-o-Boom, 1390, p. 58.
- [6] Haji-Khodaverdi Khan, Mahdi, Faslname-ye Negin Iran, Ibid., Pp. 83–84.
- [7] Cordesman, Anthony & Abraham Wagner, Ibid., p. 58.
- [8] Haji-Khodaverdi Khan, Mahdi & Hussain Ahmadi, Ibid., p. 546.
- [9] Ibid., p. 547.
- [10] Cordesman, Anthony & Abraham Wagner, Ibid., p. 58.
- [11] Asadi, Heybatollah, Atash-e Topkhaneh (Artillery Fire), Tehran, Entesharat-e DAFOOS AJA, 1394, Pp. 305–306.
- [12] Haji-Khodaverdi Khan, Mahdi, Faslname-ye Negin Iran, Ibid., p. 82.
- [13] Ibid., p. 83.
- [14] Haji-Khodaverdi Khan, Mahdi & Hussain Ahmadi, Tarikh Shafahi-ye Defa Muqaddas, Ibid., p. 548.
- [15] Sait-e Diplomasi-e Irani, Iran Tondtarin Qayeq-e Donyar ra Kharid va Kopi Zad (Iran Purchased and Replicated the World’s Fastest Boat), 28 Khordad 1391, www.irdiplomacy.ir/fa/news/1902829/
- [16] Alaei, Hussain, Ibid., p. 331.
- [17] Khabargozari-e Defa Muqaddas, Niroooy-e Darya-ye Sepah Chgouneh Tashkil Shod (How the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy Was Formed), 26 Shahrivar 1399, www.defapress.ir/fa/news/416066
- [18] Cordesman, Anthony & Abraham Wagner, Ibid., p. 63.
- [19] Sait-e Diplomasi-e Irani, Ibid.
- [20] Haji-Khodaverdi Khan, Mahdi, Faslname-ye Negin Iran, Ibid., p. 84.
- [21] Shiralinia, Jafar, Mowj-e Sorkh – Revayat-e Jang dar Khalij-e Fars (The Red Wave – A Narrative of the War in the Persian Gulf), Tehran, Fatehan, 1391, p. 125.
- [22] Haji-Khodaverdi Khan, Mahdi, Faslname-ye Negin Iran, Ibid., p. 84.
- [23] Ibid., p. 84; Haji-Khodaverdi Khan, Mahdi va Hussain Ahmadi, Tarikh Shafahi-ye Defa Muqaddas (Oral History of the Sacred Defense), Ibid., p. 540.
- [24] Haji-Khodaverdi Khan, Mahdi va Hussain Ahmadi, Tarikh Shafahi-ye Defa Muqaddas (Oral History of the Sacred Defense), Ibid., p. 618.
- [25] Shiralinia, Jafar, Ibid., p. 149.
- [26] Yahussaini, Seyyed Qasem, Bar Degar-e Nader (Once Again Nader), Tehran, Entesharat-e Fatehan, 1394, Pp. 16–17.
- [27] Shiralinia, Jafar, Ibid., p. 149.
- [28] Khabargozari-e Fars, Qayeqha-ye Tondro-ye Irani: Az Jang-e Naftkeshha to Zanbourha-ye Sorkh (Iranian High-Speed Boats: From Tanker War to Red Wasps), 5 Aban 1398, www.farsnews.ir/news/13980724000752
- [29] Ibid.
- [30] Mashregh News, Kolleksion-e Qayeqha-ye Tondro-ye Sepah ba Zolfaqar Mojahaz be Mooshak-e Navab Kamel Shod (The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps High-Speed Boats Collection Completed with Zolfaqar Equipped with Navab Missile), 28 Esfand 1401, www.mashreghnews.ir/news/1474444
