Nosrat Headquarters
The Nosrat Reconnaissance Headquarters was the most secretive command center set up during the Iran-Iraq War by Ali Hashemi on the orders of Mohsen Rezaei, then commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). It sought to break the deadlock in the Hoor al-Hoveyzeh (Hawizeh Marshes). The headquarters’ work led to the planning and execution of two major operations — Kheibar and Badr. In addition to combat operations, observation, and reconnaissance, it also carried out extensive engineering work throughout the war.
During Operation Valfajr-e Muqaddamati, it was proposed that the flooded area of Hoor al-Hoveyzeh could be used to reach the Ghazileh Bridge near the Iraqi city of Al-Amara.[1] In early 1982, Mohsen Rezaei, the IRGC commander, tasked Ali Hashemi — commander of the Susangerd IRGC — with planning the reconnaissance of Hoor al-Hoveyzeh and assessing its potential for an independent operation, using local forces and Arab tribal fighters from the area. This idea gradually gave shape to a secret headquarters called Nosrat. The headquarters began its work in late spring 1983 and was based in the Rufayi area.[2]
On the founding of the Nosrat Headquarters, Mohsen Rezaei has said: “ After Operation Beit al-Muqaddas, the Iraqis had read us and understood how we operated. As a result, we could not reach the objectives in both operations Ramazan and Valfajr-e Muqaddamati. No matter how hard we tried, nothing came of it. That sense of failure was really weighing on the other commanders and me.[3] The initial idea for an operation in the marshes took shape during visits to the area in August 1982.[4] After thinking it through and becoming confident it could work, I was looking for someone I could entrust with it — meaning the reconnaissance of the area and the preparation for an operation. After days of thinking through various people, among the commanders, I came across one whose judgment and courage made me feel he was the person I had been looking for to do this secret mission. That person was Ali Hashemi. He was one of the best fighters and could carry the heavy burden of this mission”.[5]
On naming the headquarters, Rezaei has said: “ Ali first set up the headquarters in one of the schools in Hoveyzeh — a place no one would have suspected. The intelligence and operations personnel worked there. I named the headquarters Nosrat, hoping we might find a way out of the deadlock and that divine mercy would come to our aid.[6] In fact, Nosrat was the most complex and secretive headquarters of the entire war. No other headquarters had such secrecy. I trusted the personnel of Nosrat Headquarters completely”.[7]
Under Ali Hashemi’ s command, and through the reconnaissance it conducted in the Hoor al-Hoveyzeh, the Nosrat Headquarters changed the situation on the fronts. In the meantime, the IRGC concluded that it could launch an operation from the Hoor al-Hoveyzeh toward Iraqi positions to seize the Al-Amara– Basra Road and increase pressure on the Iraqi army.
Operation Kheibar was the fruit of a year of round-the-clock effort by the Nosrat Headquarters personnel, and it was the primary headquarters responsible for planning and directing the operation.
Rezaei has said: “ We launched Operation Kheibar with the grace of Imam Mahdi (as) and the hard work of the Nosrat Headquarters personnel.[8] When the operation began on February 22, 1984, in the Hoor al-Hoveyzeh and concluded with the seizure of the Majnoon Islands, all that sacrifice paid off. Operation Kheibar was finished. We went through many difficulties to consolidate the area. After Operation Kheibar, I had to decide what to do with the Nosrat Headquarters. By merging it into the Region 8 Command, I instructed it to pursue an important task. Nosrat continued to function as a tactical headquarters.[9] On the eve of Operation Valfajr 8, after all axes in the Al-Faw area had been fully studied and reconnoitered, Ali Hashemi and the headquarters under his command were engaged in defense on one of the operational axes.[10] I can say with confidence that the capture of Al-Faw owes a debt to the unsung efforts of Ali Hashemi. After the operation, he never claimed credit and never said a word — as if he had played no part at all”.[11]
After the capture of Al-Faw, responsibility for defending the seized territory was assigned to Ali Hashemi. He became deputy commander of the Karbala Headquarters, and the Nosrat Tactical Headquarters was relocated there. Ali Hashemi’ s last assignment was as commander of the Imam Jafar Sadeq (as) Corps in 1986. Nosrat Headquarters was also participated in Operation Valfajr 10.[12]
The fate of the Nosrat Headquarters and Ali Hashemi are intertwined. On Hashemi’ s place and that of the headquarters, Mohsen Rezaei has said: “ Ali Hashemi’ s life and his acts of steadfastness are one of the finest models of national unity. We see the clearest example of national unity in the Nosrat Headquarters and in Ali’ s tireless efforts. Although he knew the most closely guarded secrets of the war’ s operations, he kept them within himself, and with complete sincerity and devotion gave his precious life for the Sacred Defense — for the people of Iran and the dignity of Islam”.[13]
Ali Hashemi was martyred on June 25, 1988, following Iraq’ s large-scale offensive to retake the Hoor area. The remains of his body returned to the country on May 9, 2010, after twenty-two years.
References
- [1]. Yahussaini, Seyyed Qasem, Penhan Zir-e Baran: Khaterehha-ye Sardar Ali Nasseri (Hidden Under the Rain: Memoirs of Brigadier General Ali Nasseri), Tehran: Sooreh Mehr, 1385, p. 151.
- [2]. Ibid., Pp. 162, 165.
- [3]. Behdarvand, Muhammad-Mahdi, Gomshodeh-ye Man (My Lost One), Tehran: Sooreh Mehr, 1389, p. 9.
- [4]. Poorjabari, Pezhman, Jang be Revayat-e Farmandeh, Darsgoftarha-ye Jang; Dr. Mohsen Rezaei (War as Narrated by the Commander, War Lectures; Dr. Mohsen Rezaei), Tehran: Bonyad-e Hefz-e Aasar va Nashr-e Arzeshha-ye Defa Muqaddas, 1390, p. 132.
- [5]. Behdarvand, Muhammad-Mahdi, Gomshodeh-ye Man (My Lost One), p. 11.
- [6]. Ibid., Pp. 14-16.
- [7]. Ibid., p. 20.
- [8]. Ibid., p. 31.
- [9]. Ibid., Pp. 34-36.
- [10]. Ibid., p. 40.
- [11]. Ibid., p. 43.
- [12]. Ibid., p. 47.
- [13]. Ibid., p. 69.