Battles

Operation Karbala 3

Leila Heidari Bateni
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Operation Karbala 3 was carried out on September 2, 1986, in the northwestern region of the Persian Gulf to destroy two Iraqi oil terminals, namely al-Umayyah and al-Bakr. It concluded with the capture of these two terminals and the destruction of their equipment and installations. The naval battle of Karbala 3 was among the first series of limited operations launched by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Navy in the Persian Gulf. Following its success, the IRGC's presence in the region became more highlighted. After Operation Valfajr 8 (February 1986) and the fall of Faw, Iraq launched an offensive against Iran’s defensive lines along the border (mobile defense strategy) and reoccupied the city of Mehran. For some Iranian military commanders and officials, the year 1986 could be a “turning point”, but Iraq’s new strategy posed a major obstacle to preparing and executing a large-scale operation by Iran. Therefore, in response to Iraq’s actions that were based on the mobile defense strategy, the operations Karbala 1 and Karbala 2 were launched (liberation of Mehran in May-June 1986 and capture of heights overlooking the Haj Omran Garrison, September 1986). In the same context, Operation Karbala 3 was planned to be launched in eastern Basra to pave the way for a “decisive operation”.[1]

The al-Umayyah and al-Bakr, two of Iraq’s largest oil export centers, were located in the northwestern Persian Gulf. They had been destroyed by the Iranian Army in the early years of the war. However, after rebuilding the two oil terminals, Iraq began monitoring commercial ships and oil tankers in the Persian Gulf by using tracking devices.[2] Moreover, by employing Rasit radars, it gained control over Iranian fighter jets and warships and posed a threat to Iran’s military and economic activities by targeting them with anti-aircraft guns. As advanced radars were installed in the two oil terminals, Iraq could even monitor commercial, military, and oil tanker traffic in the region. Therefore, capturing and destroying these facilities was of great importance to Iranian military commanders. On the other hand, a successful operation would severely weaken the missile defense systems installed along Iraq’s coast in the port of Umm al-Qasr, and would be highly valuable from a military perspective.[3]

Also, completing the achievements of Operation Valfajr 8 (the capture of Faw and cutting off Iraq’s access to the Persian Gulf) and restricting Iraq’s activity in the northern part of the Persian Gulf were among the secondary objectives of the operation.[4] The distance between al-Umayyah and al-Bakr, both of which were located in the Persian Gulf southeast of Ras al-Bisheh, was eleven kilometers. Iran’s coastline was located to the north of these terminals, while Faw, Khor Abdullah, and Bubiyan Island were to their west.[5] Due to their importance, Iraq deployed both ground and naval forces to protect al-Umayyah and al-Bakr, and the 7th Army Corps was also stationed nearby. Furthermore, a Marine Infantry Company was overseeing all activities and movements throughout al-Umayyah. In addition to their primary duty, the forces of this company were required to throw special grenades into the sea around the clock in a way that the shrapnel would reach up to fifty meters. Being located southeast of Umm al-Qasr, the two oil terminals had been constructed by multinational companies. Al-Umayyah was the first oil terminal that would connect Iraq to the sea.[6]

The 14th Imam Hussain (as) Division was tasked with executing the operation before which the division had built docks and posts on the water for transporting mortars, tanks, and anti-aircraft guns, and also equipped boats with weapons and ladders. Furthermore, by employing special tactics, the capturing and clearing of the area, as well as the operation’s success, were guaranteed.[8]

Operation Karbala 3 was launched at 1:30 AM on September 2, 1986, with the code-name: “Hasbunallah wa Nemal Wakil” (Allah is sufficient for us, and He is an excellent trustee) with the participation of the commandos of the Younus Naval Battalion from Imam Hussain (as) Division as the lead assault force, accompanied by three additional companies, namely Nouh (pbuh), Mousa (pbuh), and Ismaeil (pbuh). Also, Imam Reza (as), Imam Muhammad Baqir (as), and Imam Musa Kazim (as) battalions, as well as the Kowsar and Amir al-Muminin (as) Naval brigades, later engaged in the operation.[9]

One night before the operation, around 120 divers began their mission despite challenges such as strong opposing winds and water infiltration into their radio containers. They managed to reach as close as three kilometers to the oil terminal. Although the left and middle units failed to get close to the target, the Mousa (pbuh) Company successfully cleared the helicopter landing pad and destroyed barriers, thereby preparing the ground for the engagement of other forces. The battle began once reinforcements arrived.[10]

Advancing from the north side of the oil terminal, the Iranian forces crossed the helicopter pad, cleared the central section, and captured the Iraqi command headquarters, which was located in a worn-out building known as the “hotel” at the southern end of the terminal.[11]

In response, the Iraqis disrupted the radio communications of the Imam Hussain (as) Division, preventing the engaging forces from establishing contact with the Iranian commanders. Furthermore, by flying at a low altitude, the Iraqi aircraft bombed the oil terminal and targeted Iranian air defense positions. Using two 57 mm anti-aircraft guns positioned on the right side of al-Umayyah, they fired at Iranian boats and set fire to the other part of the oil terminal. However, with the arrival of Iranian naval units in addition to Iranian gunboats launching 23 mm and 106 mm shells at the terminal and seizing one of the anti-aircraft guns, the control of the terminal fell into the hands of Iranian forces. They deployed fifteen mines in the Khor Abdullah Waterway, and therefore, the Iraqis were forced to surrender. Capturing the second 57 mm anti-aircraft gun, as the enemy’s last stronghold, along with the Iraqi command center, concluded the seizure of the oil terminal.[12]

Iraq tried to retake the oil terminal by launching long-range missiles from Umm al-Qasr at the helicopter pad and deploying eight warships to bombard the facility. Eventually, due to the lack of air and naval support, and disruptions of their communication with the commanders, Iranian troops withdrew, and Iraq recaptured the oil terminal in which had no longer any equipment.[13]

Alongside the battle in al-Umayyah, Iranian forces initiated another attack at the al-Bakr oil terminal with the help of Nouh (pbuh) Headquarters Engineering Unit. At 9 AM, a large quantity of oil from the Faw–Bakr pipeline was pumped onto the terminal by using six pumps. The Iranian forces then ignited the oil using 155 mm artillery fire, causing a massive blaze that engulfed half of the terminal and its equipment, as well as an Osa-class missile boat (a class of missile boats developed by the Soviet Navy)[14] docked nearby. The fire was visible from 34 kilometers away. Because of such a huge fire, the operation became known as “Operation Nar al-Rahmah”.[15]

As a result of the Operation Karbala 3, Iraq suffered significant losses, including the destruction of two fighter jets, one tugboat, one Osa-class missile boat, fifteen anti-aircraft guns, a significant amount of light and heavy weapons, radars installed in al-Bakr, al-Umayyah Oil Terminal and the partial damage to al-Bakr Oil Terminal. On the other hand, Iran captured twelve anti-aircraft guns, two aerial radars, one Rasit radar, two Sahand-class missiles, various sea mines, ten boats, one naval radar, and many light and heavy weapons. Moreover, about 60 Iraqis were killed and 110 captured, including 5 officers and the commander of al-Umayyah Oil Terminal. On the Iranian side, there were 75 martyrs, 186 wounded, and 25 destroyed boats.[16]

Following the capture of the al-Ummaya, Iraq issued a statement distorting the facts and downplaying the significance of the two oil terminals.[17] However, eventually, in an attempt to mitigate the negative military and political consequences of the operation, Iraq implicitly acknowledged the setback, referring to it as an “unsuccessful move”.[18]

In 1988, Rasoul Mollaqolipour made the film “Ofoq” (Horizon) based on Operation Karbala 3, depicting the efforts of IRGC divers to destroy al-Ummaya Oil Terminal.[19]

 

 

[1] Eshaqi, Seyed Muhammad, Nakhaei, Hadi, Khodaverdi Khan, Mahdi, Nabard-e al-Umayyah (The Battle of al-Umayyah), Tehran: Markaz-e Motaleat va Tahqiqat-e Jang-e Sepah-e Pasdaran-e Enghlab-e Eslami, 1375, Pp. 11, 12, and 15–17; Ansari, Mahdi, Fowzi, Yahya, Lotfollahzadegan, Alireza, Roozshomar-e Jang-e Iran va Araq, Vol. 44: Majara-ye MacFarlin (Chronology of the Iran-Iraq War, Vol. 44: The MacFarlin Affair), Tehran: Markaz-e Motaleat va Tahqiqat-e Jang-e Sepah-e Pasdaran-e Enghlab-e Eslami, 1380, p. 19; Fowzi, Yahya, Lotfollahzadegan, Alireza, Roozshomar-e Jang-e Iran va Araq, Vol. 43: Zamineh-sazi dar Tadarak-e Amaliyat-e Sarnevesht-saz (Chronology of the Iran-Iraq War, Vol. 43: Preparations for a Decisive Operation), Tehran: Markaz-e Motaleat va Tahqiqat-e Jang-e Sepah-e Pasdaran-e Enghlab-e Eslami, 1378, p. 16; Daeratolmaaref-e Enghlab-e Eslami (Encyclopedia of the Islamic Revolution), Vol. 3, Vizheh-ye Nojavanan va Javanan (For Adolescents and Youth), Tehran: Sureh-ye Mehr, 1394, Pp. 180 and 181. 

[2] Samiei, Ali, Karnameh-ye Towsifi-ye Amaliyat-ha-ye Hasht Sal Defa-e Muqaddas (Descriptive Record of Operations During the Eight Years of Sacred Defense), Tehran: Moavenat-e Tablighat va Modiriyat-e Nashr, 1376, p. 257. 

[3] Eshaqi, Seyyed Muhammad, Nakhaei, Hadi, Khodaverdi Khan, Mahdi, Nabard-e al-Umayyah (The Battle of al-Umayyah), Pp. 22, 24, 25, 33, and 92. 

[4] Ibid., Pp. 92 and 93. 

[5] Jang dar Sal-e 65: Karnameh-ye Yeksaleh-ye Sepah (The War in 1986: A One-Year Record of the Sepah), Tehran: Markaz-e Motaleat va Tahqiqat-e Jang-e Setad-e Markazi, 1367, Pp. 145 and 146. 

[6] Rooznameh Jomhouri Eslami (Jomhouri Eslami Newspaper), 12 Shahrivar 1365, No. 2106, Year 8, p. 2. 

[7] Eshaqi, Seyyed Muhammad, Nakhaei, Hadi, Khodaverdi Khan, Mahdi, Nabard-e al-Umayyah (The Battle of al-Umayyah), Pp. 93 and 96. 

[8] Jang dar Sal-e 65: Karnameh-ye Yeksaleh-ye Sepah (The War in 1986: A One-Year Record of the Sepah), Pp. 145, 149–151, and 157. 

[9] Samiei, Ali, Karnameh-ye Towsifi-ye Amaliyat-ha-ye Hasht Sal-e Defa-e Muqaddas (Descriptive Record of Operations During the Eight Years of Sacred Defense), p. 258; Eshaqi, Seyyed Muhammad, Nakhaei, Hadi, Khodaverdi Khan, Mahdi, Nabard-e al-Umayyah (The Battle of al-Umayyah), Pp. 101 and 102. 

[10] Fowzi, Yahya, Lotfollahzadegan, Alireza, Roozshomar-e Jang-e Iran va Araq (Chronology of the Iran-Iraq War), Vol. 43, Pp. 617 and 620; Jang dar Sal-e 65: Karnameh-ye Yeksaleh-ye Sepah (The War in 1986: A One-Year Record of the Sepah), 1366, Pp. 163–165. 

[11] Eshaqi, Seyyed Muhammad, Nakhaei, Hadi, Khodaverdi Khan, Mahdi, Nabard-e al-Umayyah (The Battle of al-Umayyah), p. 161. 

[12] Roozshomar-e Jang-e Iran va Araq (Chronology of the Iran-Iraq War), Vol. 43, Pp. 618, 621, and 641; Jang dar Sal-e 65: Karnameh-ye Yeksaleh-ye Sepah (The War in 1986: A One-Year Record of the Sepah), Pp. 167 and 168; Eshaqi, Seyed Muhammad, Nakhaei, Hadi, Khodaverdi Khan, Mahdi, Nabard-e al-Umayyah (The Battle of al-Umayyah), Pp. 171 and 173. 

[13] Jang dar Sal-e 65: Karnameh-ye Yeksaleh-ye Sepah (The War in 1986: A One-Year Record of the Sepah), Pp. 169–171; Eshaqi, Seyyed Muhammad, Nakhaei, Hadi, Khodaverdi Khan, Mahdi, Nabard-e al-Umayyah (The Battle of al-Umayyah), Pp. 186, 190, and 193. 

[14] Masbuq, Muhammad, Javaheri, Alireza, Amaliyat-e Morvarid (Operation Morvarid), Tehran: Markaz-e Entesharat-e Rahbordi-ye Artesh-e Jomhouri-ye Eslami-ye Iran, 1394, p. 222. 

[15] Fowzi, Yahya, Lotfollahzadegan, Alireza, Roozshomar-e Jang-e Iran va Araq (Chronology of the Iran-Iraq War), Vol. 43, p. 622; Eshaqi, Seyyed Muhammad, Nakhaei, Hadi, Khodaverdi Khan, Mahdi, Nabard-e al-Umayyah (The Battle of al-Umayyah), Pp. 167, 170, and 179. 

[16] Samiei, Ali, Karnameh-ye Towsifi-ye Amaliyat-ha-ye Hasht Sal-e Defa-e Muqaddas (Descriptive Record of Operations During the Eight Years of Sacred Defense), Pp. 260 and 261; Fowzi, Yahya, Lotfollahzadegan, Alireza, Roozshomar-e Jang-e Iran va Araq (Chronology of the Iran-Iraq War), Vol. 43, p. 642; Eshaqi, Seyyed Muhammad, Nakhaei, Hadi, Khodaverdi Khan, Mahdi, Nabard-e al-Umayyah (The Battle of al-Umayyah), p. 199. 

[17] Eshaqi, Seyyed Muhammad, Nakhaei, Hadi, Khodaverdi Khan, Mahdi, Nabard-e al-Umayyah (The Battle of al-Umayyah), p. 170. 

[18] Samiei, Ali, Karnameh-ye Towsifi-ye Amaliyat-ha-ye Hasht Sal-e Defa-e Muqaddas (Descriptive Record of Operations During the Eight Years of Sacred Defense), p. 259. 

[19] Farasati, Masoud, Farhang-e Film-ha-ye Jang va Defa-e Iran (Encyclopedia of Iranian War and Defense Films), Tehran: Saghi, Sazman-e Honari va Adabiyat-e Defa-e Muqaddas, 1392, p. 41.