McFarlane, Robert Carl
Robert Carl McFarlane was President Reagan’ s special envoy who made a secret trip to Iran in May 1986 to resolve the issue of American hostages in Lebanon and arrange arms sales to Iran. His unauthorized visit and the United States’ covert efforts to develop relations with Iran became known as the McFarlane affair.
Robert Carl McFarlane was born on July 12, 1937. After graduating from high school, McFarlane entered the United States Naval Academy at Annapolis in 1955. Following graduation from the Naval Academy in 1959, he was commissioned a second lieutenant in the Marine Corps, where he served as a field artillery officer. He also taught Gunnery. Robert McFarlane was the executive assistant to the Marine Corps’ Operations Deputy from 1968 to 1971. He joined the U. S. Navy in 1959 and deployed to Vietnam twice. Later, he was selected as Military Assistant to Henry Kissinger at the National Security Council. In this post, McFarlane dealt with intelligence exchanges with the People’ s Republic of China from 1973 to 1976. He was then assigned to the National Defense University. In 1979, McFarlane was appointed by U. S. Senator John Tower to the staff of the Senate Armed Services Committee, where he served until 1981. In 1981, McFarlane was appointed as Counselor at the Department of State. In 1982, Reagan appointed him as Deputy National Security Advisor. In 1985, he was one of the main advocates of selling arms to Iran in order to secure the release of American hostages in Lebanon. After retiring in May 1986, he continued to act as special envoy for arms deliveries to Iran.[1]
During the Iran– Iraq War, when Iran was under an arms embargo, seven Western security and political agents were taken hostage in seven separate incidents in Beirut between March 1984 and June 1985. One of them was William Buckley, CIA station chief in Beirut, who was abducted in March 1984. U. S. intelligence agencies believed the hostages were held by members of Hezbollah, which was influenced by the ideals of the Islamic Revolution of Iran. Despite extensive efforts, the Americans were unable to free their citizens. In the meantime, on June 14, 1985, a U. S. TWA airliner was also hijacked.
After Syria failed to resolve the crisis, actions by the Iranian government— particularly the visit of then-Speaker of the Islamic Consultative Assembly Hojatoleslam Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani to Syria and Lebanon— played a major role in settling the TWA hijacking. In return, the United States promised to help secure the release of Lebanese prisoners held in Israeli jails. Iran’ s demonstrated potential to solve the hijacking problem created a U. S. desire for secret contacts with Tehran. The Americans realized that by supplying certain spare parts and equipment Iran needed, they could win over Iranian officials.[2] Amid the Iran-Iraq War and Western arms sanctions, Iran was actively seeking weapons on international markets— especially TOW missiles, Hawk missile launchers, Harpoon missiles, Phoenix missiles, and sensitive radar components, all of U. S. manufacture— and was trying to obtain them from various sources.[3] The United States initially claimed neutrality in the Iran-Iraq War but later supported Iraq. However, Iraq’ s defeats and Iran’ s successive victories prompted Washington to reassess its policy. On the recommendation of National Security Council experts, the Americans sought to use Iran’ s urgent need for arms to pave the way for establishing relations by selling weapons.[4] Contacts with Iran began with limited arms shipments from mid-1985 to early 1986.[5] The United States unilaterally sent the first and second consignments of American weapons to Iran.[6] On August 20, 1985, 100 TOW missiles, and on September 14, another 408 TOW missiles from third-country stockpiles were delivered to Iran. On September 15, Benjamin Weir— one of the five hostages the Americans were most eager to free— was released.[7] Afterward, the United States sought to establish direct relations with Iran and move past the use of intermediaries. This led to Robert McFarlane’ s trip to Iran. On May 25, 1986, the aircraft carrying McFarlane, Deputy National Security Advisor, and his team landed in Tehran.[8] They entered Iran using forged Irish passports, presented themselves as airline crew, and obtained covert entry permission. They brought a special message from President Reagan, three Colt pistols for the heads of Iran’ s three branches of government, and a cake shaped like a key.[9] No high-ranking Iranian official welcomed them. After waiting four hours,[10] they were taken to the Esteqlal Hotel (Hilton).[11] Following a four-hour rest break, the first meeting was held with them at the hotel.[12] Oliver North, George Cave, Howard Teicher, Amiram Nir, and a CIA liaison accompanied McFarlane. The Iranian negotiating team used the pseudonyms Najafi, Mostafavi, Samii, and Kangarloo.[13]
In the first two‑hour round of talks, McFarlane said he was in Iran to talk and to open a line of communication between the two countries, and added that the United States was ready to help provide some of the items Iran needed. In the second round— which lasted only half an hour— McFarlane said that he held ministerial rank and expected to meet decision-making officials; otherwise, the Iranians could speak with his staff. The next (third) session took place without McFarlane and lasted six hours. After lengthy discussions, it ended without any agreement. At the end of the meeting, Howard Teicher, seeking to impress the Iranian side, reminded them of Soviet threats against Iran— such as the deployment of 26 divisions along Iran’ s borders— and repeated McFarlane’ s request to meet one of Iran’ s top leaders. The Americans’ request was relayed to Imam Khomeini (ra) and senior Islamic Republic officials, and subsequent negotiations were carried out under his supervision. After hearing the report, he stated, “ None of the officials should negotiate with them”. In the fourth and fifth rounds, the talks focused on various issues, including ways and obstacles to freeing American hostages in Lebanon, arms sales to Iran, potential Soviet threats against Iran, support for Iraq in the war, and ways to end the conflict. In the sixth round, after the American delegation failed to achieve its desired outcome and decided to leave— while presenting a draft proposal for the gradual development of bilateral relations— they were given their passports and allowed to leave the country.[14]
Although none of the American delegation’ s objectives were met, they still had to hand over the aircraft parts they had brought and leave Iran.[15] Both sides initially treated the contacts as strictly confidential.[16] However, the issue was exposed when the Lebanese weekly Al-Shiraa published a report on McFarlane’ s trip on November 3, 1986. The disclosure in Lebanon stemmed from opposition by certain Hezbollah members to the process of freeing American hostages. McFarlane immediately denied having traveled to Iran.[17]
Following the report, Hojatoleslam Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, then Speaker of the Islamic Consultative Assembly, explained McFarlane’ s visit and that of his team— on Imam Khomeini’ s recommendation and instruction— in a speech on November 4 and in later interviews with journalists. Therefore, the initiative in the affair shifted to Iran, creating a major crisis for the U. S. government. Ten days after the story became public, President Reagan formally acknowledged the affair and tried to justify it. He mentioned renewing relations with Iran, ending the Iran-Iraq War, combating state-sponsored terrorism and sabotage, and influencing the release of hostages from Lebanon as the reasons for that visit.[18]
Inside Iran, the fallout took a different form. Given the intense anti-American sentiment prevailing in Iranian society, eight members of the Islamic Consultative Assembly submitted a question to the Foreign Minister demanding an explanation about relations with the United States. However, after Imam Khomeini’ s remarks on Unity Week on November 20, 1986, they withdrew their inquiry. He stated: “ … The President of the United States should go into mourning over this scandal, and the White House should turn into a Black House— and it always has been”.[19]
On November 5, 1986, the heads of the three branches of the Iranian government decided to pursue the release of American hostages in exchange for meeting Iran’ s needs. In the affair, approximately 2,000 TOW missiles and several thousand spare parts for Hawk missiles were delivered to Iran, and most of the American hostages in Lebanon were eventually freed.[20]
The exposure of the affair turned into a deep crisis for the U. S. government. A committee headed by Senator Tower was formed to investigate the matter, which became known as the Tower Commission. The U. S. Congress questioned and interrogated the Secretary of State, McFarlane, and the team that designed the negotiations. The negotiators were sidelined, and further talks were assigned to the State Department. Meanwhile, the Republican administration found itself in a weakened position, leading to increased U. S. pressure on Iran, and the second round of sanctions against Iran also began.[21]
On February 9, 1987, McFarlane attempted suicide with an overdose of 25 to 30 valium tablets. In 1988, he pleaded guilty to four misdemeanor counts of withholding information from Congress and was sentenced to probation and a fine. Eventually, McFarlane and his team were pardoned by President George H. W. Bush. After leaving government service, McFarlane founded a company called Global Energy Investors.[22] Robert McFarlane died on May 12, 2022, at the age of 84.[23] The McFarlane affair became known in the United States as the “ Iran-gate” scandal.[24]
References
- [1]. Hashemi, Mohsen va Habibollah Hamidi, Majeraye McFarlane (Forush-e Selah – Azadi-ye Geroganha) (The McFarlane Affair; Arms Sales – Hostage Release), Tehran, Daftar-e Nashr-e Maaref-e Enqelab, 1388, Pp. 228– 229.
- [2]. Doroudian, Muhammad, Seiri dar Jang-e Iran va Araq – Faw ta Shalamcheh (A Survey of the Iran– Iraq War – Al-Faw to Shalamcheh), Vol. 3, Tehran, Markaz-e Motaleat va Tahqiqat-e Jang-e Sepah-e Pasdaran-e Enqelab-e Eslami, 2nd ed., 1378, Pp. 88– 90; Dezfouli, Seyyed Muhammad-Mahdi, Qomar (Ramzgoshaei az Parvandeh-ye Iran-Contra) (Gamble; Decoding the Iran-Contra Case), Qom, Entehsharat-e Shahid Kazemi, 1399, Pp. 24– 25.
- [3]. Hashemi, Mohsen va Habibollah Hamidi, Ibid., Pp. 22, 23, 25.
- [4]. Mabadi, Hamid, Chaleshha-ye Iran va Amrika bad az Piruzi-ye Enqelab-e Eslami-ye Iran (Challenges between Iran and the United States after the Victory of the Islamic Revolution of Iran), Tehran, Markaz-e Asnad-e Enqelab-e Eslami, 1381, Pp. 123– 124.
- [5]. Doroudian, Muhammad, Ibid., p. 91.
- [6]. Mabadi, Hamid, Ibid., p. 124.
- [7]. Hashemi, Mohsen va Habibollah Hamidi, Ibid., p. 76.
- [8]. Doroudian, Muhammad, Ibid., p. 91.
- [9]. Alizadeh, Fatemeh, Ba Cheshm-e Baz – McFarlane (With Open Eyes – McFarlane), Tehran, Moasseseh-ye Entehsharati-ye Ruznameh-ye Iran, 1388, p. 10.
- [10]. Dezfouli, Seyyed Muhammad-Mahdi, Ibid., Pp. 59– 60.
- [11]. Mabadi, Hamid, Ibid., p. 124.
- [12]. Dezfouli, Seyyed Muhammad-Mahdi, Ibid., p. 60.
- [13]. Alizadeh, Fatemeh, Ibid., p. 10; Dezfouli, Seyyed Muhammad-Mahdi, Ibid., p. 59.
- [14]. Alizadeh, Fatemeh, Ibid., Pp. 15– 16.
- [15]. Dezfouli, Seyyed Muhammad-Mahdi, Ibid., Pp. 67– 68.
- [16]. Ansari, Mahdi va Digaran, Roozshomar-e Jang-e Iran va Araq (Majeraye McFarlane) (Chronology of the Iran– Iraq War; The McFarlane Affair), Vol. 44, Tehran, Markaz-e Motaleat va Tahqiqat-e Jang-e Sepah-e Pasdaran-e Enqelab-e Eslami, 1379, p. 40.
- [17]. Alaei, Hussain, Ravand-e Jang-e Iran va Araq (The Course of the Iran– Iraq War), Vol. 2, Tehran, Marz-o-Boom, 1391, p. 268.
- [18]. Ansari, Mahdi va Digaran, Ibid., p. 40; Hashemi Rafsanjani, Akbar, Karnameh va Khaterat-e Hashemi Rafsanjani, Sal 1365 – Owj-e Defa (Record and Memoirs of Hashemi Rafsanjani, 1986-1987 – Peak of the Defense), Tehran, Daftar-e Nashr-e Maaref-e Enqelab, 1388, Pp. 13, 334– 335.
- [19]. Mabadi, Hamid, Ibid., p. 125; Kaffash, Muhammad, Tomeh-ye Hotel Hilton (The Prey of the Hilton Hotel), Tehran, Sazman-e Tablighat-e Eslami, Sherkat-e Chap va Nashr-e Beynolmelal, 1402, Pp. 385– 386.
- [20]. Alaei, Hussain, Ibid., Pp. 269– 271.
- [21]. Alaei, Hussain, Ibid., Pp. 273– 274; Dezfouli, Seyyed Muhammad-Mahdi, Ibid., p. 279.
- [22]. Ramin, Ali va Digaran, Daneshnameh-ye Daneshgostar (Daneshgostar Encyclopedia), Vol. 15, Tehran, Moasseseh-ye Daneshgostar Rooz, 1389, p. 754; Hashemi, Mohsen va Habibollah Hamidi, Ibid., Pp. 229– 230.
- [23]. Khabargozari-e ISNA, McFarlane Dargozasht (McFarlane Died), 24 Ordibehesht 1401.
- [24]. Dezfouli, Seyyed Muhammad-Mahdi, Ibid., p. 18.