Resolution 598 was the final resolution of the United Nations Security Council aimed at ending the Imposed War waged by Iraq against Iran; it was issued on 29‌^th Tir 1366 (20 July 1987), and with its acceptance by Iran on 27‌^th Tir 1367 (18 July 1988), a ceasefire was established between the two countries.

Sixteen days after Operation Karbala-4, Iran’ s armed forces planned and carried out Operation Karbala-5 in the Shalamcheh area, and over 15 days and nights, succeeded, by achieving their intended objectives, in dealing a decisive blow to Iraq’ s military strength; of the 94 Iraqi brigades present in the operation, 16 brigades were destroyed 100 percent, 22 brigades more than 60 percent, and 56 brigades between 10 and 60 percent.⁠[1]

With Iraq’ s defeat at Shalamcheh, new conditions emerged in the Iraq-Iran War. This was because the Iraqi army suffered this defeat despite having built the most heavily fortified defensive lines east of Basra, based on its previous experience and knowledge of the tactics and methods of Iran’ s armed forces; the defeat east of Basra, more than simply constituting a defeat, cast doubt over the country’ s military capability.⁠[2]

For this reason, after Operation Karbala-5, the United States saw its vital interests in the Persian Gulf seriously threatened, and, through the UN Security Council and in coordination with the Soviet Union, sought to end the Iran-Iraq War in order to prevent an Iranian victory in it. Western governments, led by the United States, secured the adoption of Resolution 598 in the Security Council.⁠[3] The Security Council, at its 2750th meeting on 29‌^th Tir 1366 (20 July 1987), with the participation of France, Argentina, Bulgaria, China, Congo, Germany, Ghana, Italy, Japan, the Soviet Union, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, the United States, Venezuela, and Zambia, adopted Resolution 598 unanimously.⁠[4]

According to this resolution: “ The Security Council, reaffirming its resolution 582 (1986), deeply concerned that despite its calls for a ceasefire, the conflict between Iran and Iraq continues unabated, with further heavy loss of human life and material destruction, deploring the initiation and continuation of the conflict, deploring also the bombing of purely civilian population centers, attacks on neutral shipping or civilian aircraft, the violation of international humanitarian law and other laws of armed conflict, and, in particular, the use of chemical weapons contrary to obligations under the 1925 Geneva Protocol, deeply concerned that further escalation and widening of the conflict may occur, determined to bring to an end all military actions between Iran and Iraq, convinced that a comprehensive, just, honorable and durable settlement should be achieved between Iran and Iraq,

Recalling the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, and in particular the obligation of all Member States to settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered, determining that there exists a breach of the peace as regards the conflict between Iran and Iraq, acting under Articles 39 and 40 of the Charter of the United Nations:

1. Demands that, as a first step towards a negotiated settlement, Iran and Iraq observe an immediate ceasefire, discontinue all military actions on land, at sea and in the air, and withdraw all forces to the internationally recognized boundaries without delay;

2. Requests the Secretary-General to dispatch a team of United Nations observers to verify, confirm and supervise the ceasefire and withdrawal, and further requests the Secretary-General to make the necessary arrangements in consultation with the parties to the conflict and to submit a report thereon to the Security Council;

3. Urges that prisoners of war be released and repatriated without delay after the cessation of active hostilities, in accordance with the Third Geneva Convention of 12‌^th   August 1949;

4. Calls upon Iran and Iraq to cooperate with the Secretary-General in implementing this resolution and in mediation efforts to achieve a comprehensive, just and honorable settlement, acceptable to both sides, of all outstanding issues, in accordance with the principles contained in the Charter of the United Nations;

5. Calls upon all other States to exercise the most restraint and to refrain from any act which may lead to further escalation and widening of the conflict, and thus to facilitate the implementation of the present resolution;

6. Requests the Secretary-General to explore, in consultation with Iran and Iraq, the question of entrusting an impartial body with inquiring into responsibility for the conflict, and to report to the Security Council as soon as possible;

7. Recognizes the magnitude of the damage sustained during the conflict and the need for reconstruction efforts, with appropriate international assistance, once the conflict is ended, and, in this regard, requests the Secretary-General to assign a team of experts to study the question of reconstruction and to report to the Security Council;

8. Further requests the Secretary-General, in consultation with Iran and Iraq and with other States of the region, to examine measures to enhance the security and stability of the region;

9. Requests the Secretary-General to keep the Security Council informed on the implementation of this resolution;

10. Decides to meet again as necessary to consider further steps to ensure compliance with this resolution. ”⁠[5]

In this resolution, the Council determined for the first time that a breach of the peace had occurred between Iran and Iraq, and, unlike previous resolutions, used the phrase “ the conflict between Iran and Iraq” instead of “ the situation between Iran and Iraq. ” This resolution was also not merely a recommendation but had a binding, operative character. In fact, the Council made clear in the resolution that what it expected was the implementation of the resolution as a whole, not merely part of it. Among the other positive aspects of Resolution 598 were its emphasis on efforts to seek a just solution to end the hostilities, and the placement of the resolution’ s provisions under Chapter VII of the UN Charter (Chapter VII of the UN Charter authorizes the Security Council to take military and non-military action to restore international peace and security). However, the resolution’ s failure to identify and condemn Iraq as the aggressor and the initiator of the war, and its demand for an immediate ceasefire as a precondition for negotiations, were among its weaknesses.⁠[6]

With Iran’ s acceptance of Resolution 598, the United Nations, on one hand, pursued the establishment of a ceasefire, and, on the other, created a peacekeeping force.⁠[7]

It is said that there was disagreement among the country’ s officials over whether to accept or reject Resolution 598; Ali-Akbar Velayati (the then Minister of Foreign Affairs) opposed accepting the resolution, but Imam Khomeini did not consider it advisable for Iran to reject it.⁠[8] Ultimately, on 20‌^th Mordad 1366 (11 August 1987), Iran submitted its official position on Resolution 598 to the UN Secretary-General in 19 points, in which, while criticizing the content of the resolution and the weak and biased conduct of the Security Council with regard to the Imposed War, and while expressing appreciation for the efforts of the Security Council’ s neutral members and declaring its readiness to cooperate with the organization in establishing a ceasefire, Iran refrained from either accepting or rejecting the resolution.⁠[9]

In contrast, the Iraqi government, in a letter dated 7‌^th Shahrivar 1366 (29 August 1987) to the UN Secretary-General, accepted Resolution 598 unconditionally and welcomed it.⁠[10]

Iran’ s military setbacks in 1367 (1988), which began with the fall of Faw and continued with heavy Iraqi attacks on the southern and western fronts, the recapture of areas previously seized by Iran, and American military intervention, among other factors,⁠[11] ultimately led Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei (the then President), in his letter of 27‌^th Tir 1367 (18 July 1988) addressed to the UN Secretary-General, to announce Iran’ s agreement to accept Resolution 598.⁠[12]

On 25‌^th Tir 1367 (16 July 1988), before Iran’ s acceptance of Resolution 598, a meeting was held at the President’ s office to achieve greater coordination among the country’ s officials, attended by a group of members of the National Consultative Assembly, ministers, members of the Guardian Council, members of the Assembly of Experts for Leadership, members of the Society of Seminary Teachers of Qom, and a number of military officers. At this meeting, following remarks by the President, a confidential message from Imam Khomeini was read out by Hojjat al-Islam Seyyed Ahmad Khomeini. In his message, whose contents were published 18 years later, the Imam cited, as factors behind this “ bitter decision, ” the repeated reports from military and political officials — including the Commander-in-Chief of the IRGC, the Prime Minister, the Minister of Economic Affairs, and the Minister of Culture and Islamic Guidance — indicating a lack of military equipment and sufficient budget, the people’ s declining willingness to go to the war fronts, the repeated defeats of Iran’ s armed forces at the hands of the Iraqi army, the absence of a clear prospect of victory within the next five years, and the enemy’ s extensive use of chemical weapons alongside the lack of countermeasures against them; he described the decision as being “ like drinking poison” for himself. At the end of the message, in order to manage the public atmosphere of the country, he warned officials that any statement contrary to the country’ s official position would provoke his response.⁠[13]

Initially, it had been planned that the announcement of the resolution’ s acceptance would be made by the heads of the three branches of government, followed by Imam Khomeini’ s endorsement of it, but the Imam did not agree to this proposal;⁠[14] instead, despite his personal opposition to accepting the resolution, he took full responsibility for this action in his message to the Iranian people on the anniversary of the bloody Mecca massacre, issued two days after the resolution’ s acceptance.⁠[15]

The acceptance of Resolution 598 led to several developments in the following months, including: the cancellation of all of Imam Khomeini’ s public speeches for the remainder of his life;⁠[16] the revocation of the authority over governmental discretionary punishment that had been delegated to the executive branch;⁠[17] the resignation of Mir-Hossein Mousavi (Prime Minister) and Imam Khomeini’ s opposition to it;⁠[18] the issuance of an order to Hojjat al-Islam Ali Razini (martyred; then head of the Judicial Organization of the Armed Forces) to establish the Special Court for War Violations, and the execution, by Imam Khomeini’ s order, of individuals responsible for the defeat of the Islamic front, which led to the trial of certain individuals involved in the fall of the city of Mehran and the trial of members of the Mojahedin-e Khalq Organization in connection with Operation Mersad;⁠[19] the issuance of an order to address the affairs of offending military personnel and the submission of proposals for punishment and commendation, addressed to Hojjat al-Islam Sadeq Khalkhali (representative of the people of Qom in the Islamic Consultative Assembly) by Hojjat al-Islam Hashemi Rafsanjani, the war commander;⁠[20] and the announcement by Imam Khomeini, addressed to the people of Iran, of the general policies of the state during the period of reconstruction.⁠[21]

The temporary fall in the market price of the dollar and gold was another significant event following the acceptance of Resolution 598, which led to the bankruptcy, and even the death, of some economic operators and dealers. It was well known at the time that a plot numbered 598 had been created at Behesht-e Zahra (cemetery).⁠[22]

Iran’ s acceptance of Resolution 598 also had international repercussions, and Kuwait,⁠[23] Algeria,⁠[24] Spain,⁠[25] Bahrain,⁠[26] Syria,⁠[27] Zimbabwe,⁠[28] Poland,⁠[29] Saint Kitts,⁠[30] Greece,⁠[31] Argentina,⁠[32] Indonesia,⁠[33] Paraguay,⁠[34] the Soviet Union,⁠[35] and the Organization of the Islamic Conference,⁠[36] as well as the 12 member states of the European Community,⁠[37] the seven member states of the Council of the Arab League,⁠[38] and the five permanent members of the UN Security Council,⁠[39] each welcomed, in separate messages, the establishment of a ceasefire between Iraq and Iran.

Ultimately, shortly after Iran’ s acceptance of Security Council Resolution 598, the legal-political process of establishing a ceasefire between the two countries began, and the full-scale military conflict between the two countries came to an end.