Truth-Finding Commissions

During the imposed war, truth-finding commissions, at the request of the governments of Iran and Iraq or organs of the United Nations, assessed the parties' compliance with human rights and humanitarian law in the war zones.

The history of establishing truth-finding commissions dates back to the years after World War II and the establishment of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights in 1947.⁠[1]

During the imposed war, at the request of the countries involved in the war or various organs of the United Nations, truth-finding commissions were present in war-affected areas or third countries and submitted their views on the claims raised by the parties to the dispute to the Secretary-General; most of these reports confirmed human-rights violations by the Ba' athist government of Iraq.⁠[2]

After publication of these commissions' reports, the party supporting the report thanked the commission⁠[3], while the party condemned in the report sometimes criticized it.⁠[4] The parties to the conflict also sometimes requested the formation of a commission for decision-making.⁠[5]

The most important issue examined by these commissions during the imposed war was the expansion of the scope of the conflict and the War of the Cities.

On 2 May 1983, Iran' s mission to the United Nations requested that the Secretary-General send a delegation to visit Iranian civilian areas targeted by Iraq. Iraq made a similar request, which the Secretary-General accepted. The fact-finding group visited the areas claimed by Iran from 21 to 26 May 1983 and the areas claimed by Iraq from 28 to 30 May, and reported that the cities of Dezful, Andimeshk, Pol-e Dokhtar, Musian, Dehloran, Abadan, Khorramshahr, Hoveyzeh, Susangerd, Sarpol-e Zahab, Qasr-e Shirin, and Baneh in Iran, and Zarbatiah, Mandali, and Zubair in Iraq, had been attacked by the opposing side. Damage to the Iraqi cities was not apparent. Damage to Khanqin, Faw, and Abu al-Khasib resulted from Iranian attacks on refineries and factories inside the cities, and damage to civilian areas was deemed unintentional. Because the areas claimed in Kirkuk had been rebuilt, the delegation gave no opinion.⁠[6]

After publication of the report, the Iranian government thanked the delegation for its impartial positions and asked the Secretary-General to send another delegation to Ahvaz, Paveh, Hamadan, Nowsood, Bakhtaran, Minou Island, Bostan, Jafair, Shush, Somar, Thaleth Babajani, Mehran, Ilam, and Rafsanjan in Iran.⁠[7] The Iraqi government accused Iran of exploiting the report and portraying itself as a victim.⁠[8]

With the beginning of a new round of the War of the Cities, on 9 June 1984, the UN Secretary-General asked the presidents of the two countries to refrain from attacking residential areas. Both countries agreed but accused the other of attacking their residential areas. A delegation entered Iraq and recorded only one rocket strike on Abu Mughaira village southeast of Basra⁠[9], which was determined to have resulted from the rocket deviating from its original path and to have been unintentional. The delegation entered Iran on 7 and 8 January 1985, and on 27 January of the same year the fact-finding group confirmed Iraqi air attacks with cluster bombs on the residential areas of Bardieh, Dehalavieh, and Alvaneh (Susangerd).⁠[10]

The fact-finding group again entered Iraq to investigate its claims and reported that it could not regard Iran' s attacks on the Iraqi villages of Al-Jawaber and Sariqah as intentional.⁠[11]

The second investigation by the fact-finding groups during the imposed war concerned the condition of prisoners of war from both countries.

On 10 October 1984, while representatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross were present at the Iraqi prisoners-of-war camp in Gorgan, one prisoner handed the organization a sheet containing the names of several prisoners who were to be registered by the Red Cross. This aroused another prisoner' s suspicion and led to a confrontation between two prisoners. The confrontation spread among the prisoners, went out of control, and forced the guards to open fire. Six prisoners were killed by gunfire and three by other Iraqi prisoners, while 47 prisoners were wounded.⁠[12]

On 25 October of the same year, the Iraqi government, referring to the Gorgan camp incident, requested in a letter to the UN Secretary-General that fact-finding groups be sent to Iran. Iran announced that it would permit the committee to enter Iran only if its members also visited the camps of Iranian prisoners of war in Iraq.⁠[13] After Iraq agreed to this request, the committee members conducted their investigations in both countries from 21 January to 5 February 1985.⁠[14]

On the last day of the fact-finding committee' s presence in Iraq (5 January 1985), the representative of Iraq to the United Nations accused Iran of mistreating prisoners of war.⁠[15] The Iranian representative, in a letter to the Secretary-General, described Iraq' s accusations as a preemptive action intended to overshadow the report of the UN investigation team on Iranian prisoner camps.⁠[16]

The committee' s report was ultimately published on 22 February 1985. According to the report, in neither country was the treatment of prisoners as dangerous as the other government claimed; however, the treatment of prisoners was not as good as the detaining government claimed either. Excessive use of force by guards, especially in Iraq, violent incidents, isolation from the outside world, and uncertainty about the duration of captivity were among the matters mentioned in the report. The committee stated that it could neither confirm nor reject claims concerning missing persons and the mass killing of prisoners.⁠[17]

After Iran accepted Resolution 598, the Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Iraq on 2 July 1988, the Iraqi Foreign Minister on 7 July 1988, and the Deputy Head of Iran' s Mission to the United Nations on 11 July 1988 asked the Secretary-General to send a delegation to examine the condition of prisoners of war in both countries.⁠[18]

Following this request, the fact-finding group was present in both countries from 23 July to 5 August 1988 and submitted its report on 23 August. According to the report, the material conditions of Iraqi prisoners in Iran were generally acceptable. However, prolonged captivity and ideological differences affected their psychological condition. Religious and political developments, including opposition to the Ba' athist government and support for the Islamic Republic, were visible among the prisoners, and prisoners supporting the Islamic Republic had been able to manage various sections of the camps.⁠[19]

According to the same report, the material conditions of Iranian prisoners in Iraq were also generally acceptable, although in some cases, such as Camp No. 4 (Mosul), improvement was required. Iraq also announced that it was prepared to register all prisoners who had not previously been registered by the Red Cross. According to the delegation' s report, some civilian prisoners lived with their families in enclosed camps and their living conditions were almost normal, while others lived in camps with other prisoners. The uncertain fate of these prisoners was a cause for concern.⁠[20]

The third issue investigated by fact-finding groups during the imposed war was Iraq' s continued use of chemical weapons. Although evidence of Iraq' s use of chemical weapons existed from the early months of the imposed war, the issue was raised seriously from 1984.

On 6 November 1983, the Iranian government claimed in a letter to the UN Secretary-General that Iraq had used chemical weapons and asked him to investigate the situation in the region. Following this request, a group entered Iran from 14 to 20 March 1984 and submitted its report on 26 March. According to the report, chemical weapons had been used in aerial bombs containing bis (2-chloroethyl) sulfide (mustard gas) and ethyl N, N-dimethylphosphoramidocyanidate (tabun).⁠[21]

After publication of the report, the President of the UN Security Council issued a statement condemning Iraq' s use of chemical weapons.⁠[22]

On 24 April 1985, the UN Secretary-General, in a letter to the President of the Security Council, presented a report by Dr. Manuel Dominguez, who had examined Iranian chemical casualties hospitalized in Belgium, Germany, and England, and acknowledged Iraq' s use of mustard gas and hydrogen cyanide against Iranian forces.⁠[23] The following day, the Security Council, confirming Iraq' s use of chemical weapons against Iranian soldiers, condemned it.⁠[24] In Dr. Dominguez' s supplementary report, Iraq' s use of tabun gas (cyanide) was also confirmed.⁠[25]

Following the adoption of Security Council Resolution 582 on 24 February 1984 condemning Iraq' s use of chemical weapons, Iraq' s chemical attacks did not decrease; rather, they increased. In this situation, the Secretary-General sent a delegation to Iran' s war zones in March 1986. The investigation group reported that Iraq' s use of chemical weapons had become more widespread than in previous months⁠[26]; the report confirmed Iraq' s use of mustard gas and lethal chemical agents.⁠[27]

After publication of this report, the President of the Security Council and the UN Secretary-General, while condemning Iraq, emphasized the rapid implementation of Security Council Resolution 582.⁠[28] The Secretary-General again sent a fact-finding group to Iran, which reported that although the severity of injuries among Iranian chemical casualties had decreased compared with previous years, many civilians had also been injured as a result of Iraq' s attacks using mustard gas.⁠[29]

On 14 May of the same year, the President of the Security Council expressed concern; the members of the Council condemned Iraq' s use of chemical weapons against Iranian forces and asked the two governments to respond positively to the Secretary-General' s efforts.⁠[30]

At the beginning of 1988, the major powers sought to end the war; therefore, unlike previous years, the United Nations issued two resolutions putting pressure on the Iraqi government.

Following Operation Valfajr 10 in March 1988 in the Halabcheh region, Iraq extensively used chemical weapons against the indigenous population and Iranian forces. The Iranian government asked the Secretary-General to send a group to the region, and Iraq made a similar request. The fact-finding group traveled to both countries and, based on clinical examinations in the Islamic Republic of Iran, reported that many civilians had been targeted with mustard gas and the prohibited agent acetylcholinesterase; most Iraqi casualties were military personnel who had also been exposed to mustard gas and acetylcholinesterase.⁠[31]Although the group did not comment on the origin of the attack on Iraqi forces, the geographical area and identical chemical agents among casualties indicated that Iraqi forces present in Halabcheh had also been targeted by the Iraqi Army.

After publication of the report, the Security Council adopted Resolution 612 concerning the use of chemical weapons.⁠[32]

Despite Iran' s acceptance of Resolution 598 and the beginning of the ceasefire, UN activities concerning the use of chemical weapons in the imposed war continued.

A Secretary-General delegation to Iran on 20 July 1988 emphasized Iraq' s large-scale and repeated use of chemical weapons against Iranian forces.⁠[33] At Iraq' s request, the delegation also reported that only nine Iraqi soldiers had been injured by chemical agents.⁠[34]

The final fact-finding report concerning the use of chemical weapons during the imposed war was published on 19 August 1988. According to the report, civilians in Oshnavieh, West Azerbaijan Province, had been affected by mustard gas as a result of an Iraqi air attack.⁠[35]

Finally, on 25 August 1988, the Security Council adopted Resolution 620 condemning the use of chemical weapons⁠[36], and the UN case on this issue was closed.


References

  • [1]. Dalvori, Abolfazl, “ Truth and Reconciliation: The Role of Truth-Finding Commissions in Resolving Political and International Disputes, ” Public Law Research Quarterly, Vol. 11, No. 26, Tir 1388 SH, p. 154.
  • [2]. Khorrami, Mohammad-Ali, Iran-Iraq War in United Nations Documents (1361– 1362), Vol. 2, Tehran, Center for Sacred Defense Documents and Research of the IRGC, 1387 SH, pp. 63– 93; the same work, Vol. 4, pp. 34– 39, 44, 228; Vol. 5, pp. 106, 131– 149, 166; Vol. 6, pp. 157– 186, 193– 223; Vol. 8, pp. 205– 224, 251– 298; Vol. 9, pp. 71– 103, 112– 134, 176– 188.
  • [3]. Khorrami, Mohammad-Ali, Ibid., Vol. 2, pp. 94– 96; Vol. 5, p. 151.
  • [4]. Ibid., Vol. 4, pp. 134– 143, 249; Vol. 6, pp. 224– 225.
  • [5]. Ibid., Vol. 4, pp. 124– 127.
  • [6]. Ibid., Vol. 2, pp. 63– 93.
  • [7]. Ibid., pp. 94– 95.
  • [8]. Ibid., p. 97.
  • [9]. Ibid., Vol. 3, pp. 17– 168.
  • [10]. Ibid., Vol. 4, pp. 34– 39.
  • [11]. Ibid., p. 47.
  • [12]. Ibid., pp. 114– 116.
  • [13]. Ibid., pp. 53– 54.
  • [14]. Ibid., p. 55.
  • [15]. Ibid., pp. 40– 43.
  • [16]. Ibid., pp. 47– 48.
  • [17]. Ibid., pp. 53, 109– 110.
  • [18]. Ibid., Vol. 9, p. 193.
  • [19]. Ibid., pp. 192, 193, 212.
  • [20]. Ibid., pp. 225– 226.
  • [21]. Ibid., Vol. 3, pp. 79– 100.
  • [22]. Ibid., pp. 115– 116.
  • [23]. Ibid., Vol. 4, pp. 215– 216, 218.
  • [24]. Ibid., pp. 219– 220.
  • [25]. Ibid., pp. 228– 229.
  • [26]. Ibid., Vol. 5, pp. 109, 112– 113, 127.
  • [27]. Ibid., p. 167.
  • [28]. Ibid., pp. 154, 158– 159.
  • [29]. Ibid., Vol. 6, pp. 157– 178.
  • [30]. Ibid., pp. 190– 191.
  • [31]. Ibid., Vol. 8, pp. 206, 209, 219– 220.
  • [32]. Ibid., p. 250.
  • [33]. Ibid., Vol. 9, pp. 71, 85.
  • [34]. Ibid., pp. 89, 98.
  • [35]. Ibid., pp. 176, 185.
  • [36]. Ibid., pp. 238– 240.

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