Umm Qasr Port

Umm Qasr Port is located in southwestern Iraq. It is connected to the Persian Gulf via the Khor Abdullah waterway. As the main headquarters of the Iraqi Navy during the Iran– Iraq War, it played a key role in the maritime operations during the conflict.

Umm Qasr was originally a small fishing town. During the World War II a temporary port was established there by the Allies to unload supplies to dispatch to the Soviet Union. In the 1950s, the government of King Faisal II sought to establish a permanent port there. In 1958 after the coup d’ etat of the Iraqi Army, the Iraqi Navy established a base in that area. The new regime of General Abdul-Karim Qassem undertook mass planning of the economy of Iraq, based on oil export and factory-based production, which required new shipping facilities. Founded in 1961, it was intended to serve as Iraq’ s only deep-water port, reducing the country’ s dependence on the disputed Arvand Rud waterway that marks the border with Iran. The port facilities were built by a consortium of companies from West Germany, Sweden and Lebanon, with Iraqi Republic Railways services connecting it to Basra and Baghdad. The port opened for business in July 1967.⁠[1]

Unlike Iran’ s, the Iraqi Navy was not particularly large and remained relatively small compared to the rest of the country’ s armed forces. The existence of only an 80-kilometer coastline in the northern Persian Gulf— which consisted only of narrow strips along the Arvand Rud and Khor Abdullah— made the expansion of a naval fleet difficult. Furthermore, these narrow waterways were shallow, making the passage of very high-tonnage vessels impossible. The Port of Basra on the Shatt al-Arab (Arvand Rud), the naval facilities at Al-Faw, and Umm Qasr Port on the Khor Abdullah were Iraq’ s three major naval bases during the war.⁠[2]

On May 21, 1980— just months before the war began— the Iranian Air Force used RF‑4 aircraft to conduct aerial reconnaissance of the port, aiming to evaluate the Iraqi Navy’ s condition due to Umm Qasr’ s strategic significance.⁠[3]

With the start of Iraq’ s full-scale invasion of Iran on September 22, 1980, the Iranian Air Force launched a massive counter-attack. On September 23, Umm Qasr Port was targeted by Phantoms from the Sixth Tactical Fighter Base of Bushehr.⁠[4] On September 25, Phantoms took off from Bushehr and again bombed the military piers at Umm Qasr.⁠[5]

Aerial photographs taken on September 25, 1980, indicated that the facilities at Umm Qasr Port remained intact,⁠[6] leading to repeated subsequent Iranian airstrikes on the area. These attacks also aimed to halt the transport of goods and maritime trade.⁠[7]

Following Operation Morvarid on November 28, 1980, which saw the destruction of a large portion of Iraq’ s naval power by the Iranian Navy and Air Force, some of Iraq’ s combat vessels, including five Osa-class missile boats, two landing crafts, six torpedo boats, and one anti-submarine corvette, were stationed at Umm Qasr Port.⁠[8]

As the war continued and Iraqi vessels in the Arvand Rud came within range of Iranian fire, the Iraqi Navy relocated several of its missile boats to Umm Qasr by transporting them overland on trailers in June 1981. Before the war, in 1977, a wide shipping canal was built from northern Khor Abdullah to Basra to provide a maritime link between Umm Qasr and Basra. This waterway was dredged at the start of the war to allow small vessels to travel between the two areas.⁠[9]

Later in the conflict, Iraq’ s Super Frelon helicopter squadron, originally stationed at the Shuaiba Air Base, was relocated to Umm Qasr after the construction of a new base. This reduced their flight time to targets— which was typically 90 minutes— to just 15 minutes. These helicopters carried out many attacks against oil tankers and oil platforms using Exocet missiles.⁠[10]

In 1986, Operation Valfajr 8 was conducted by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), resulting in the capture of the Al-Faw Peninsula. While the next objective was the capture of Umm Qasr, this was not achieved due to the resistance of the Iraqi troops and two naval battalions stationed in the city.⁠[11] However, the fall of Al-Faw made Umm Qasr ineffective and left it under threat.⁠[12] The Iraqi Navy moved Silkworm missile systems to this area and, despite a reduced operational range, continued to use them against maritime targets.⁠[13] Umm Qasr Port also housed a naval radar station with a 100-kilometer range, which was utilized following Iraq’ s deployment of Silkworm missiles against maritime targets.⁠[14]

The Umm Qasr naval base played a vital role in 1988 during the Iraqi offensive to retake Al‑Faw, serving as one of the two main axes of attack. Two marine brigades and 200 divers dispatched from Umm Qasr formed the core of the operation, which ultimately led to the recapture of Al-Faw.⁠[15]

Following the U. S. invasion of Iraq in 2002, the naval facilities of this port were captured by the invading forces.⁠[16]

As Iraq’ s primary large-scale port for container shipping, Umm Qasr can facilitate Iraq’ s presence in global markets and ensure access to essential goods. Iraq’ s current development plans for Umm Qasr include creating a container terminal, dredging the port waters to increase the draft for container ships, expanding existing facilities, and developing new infrastructure.⁠[17]

 


References

  • [1]. “ Umm Qasr Port”, Wikipedia, available at: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Umm_Qasr_Port
  • [2]. Shirmuhammad, Mohsen, Bar Faraz-e Daryaha: Negahi be Tarikh‑e Hava‑Darya va Hamase‑ye Eskadranha‑ye Havanav, Balgard va Bal‑e Sabet dar Jang‑e Tahmili (Above the Seas: A Look at the History of Iran’ s Naval Aviation and the Heroic Operations of Hovercraft, Helicopter, and Fixed‑Wing Squadrons in the Iran– Iraq War), Tehran: Daftar-e Pazhoheshha-ye Nazari va Motaleaat-e Rahbordi-ye NEDAJA, 1400, p. 259.
  • [3]. Taqvim-e Mostanad-e Amalkard-e Niroo-ye Havaei-ye Artesh-e Jomhoori-ye Eslami-ye Iran (Documented Chronology of the Performance of the Islamic Republic of Iran Army Navy Force), Vol. 2, Tehran: Markaz-e Entehsharat-e Rahbordi-ye NEHAJA, 1396, p. 162.
  • [4]. Ibid., Vol. 3 (Mehrmah 1359), Tehran: Markaz-e Entehsharat-e Rahbordi-ye NEHAJA, 1397, p. 80.
  • [5]. Ibid., p. 155.
  • [6]. Sayyari, Habibollah va Digaran, Taqvim-e Tarikh-e Defa Muqaddas-e NEDAJA; Avardgah-e Takavaran-e Daryaei (Chronological History of the Islamic Republic of Iran Army Navy Force in the Sacred Defense; The Arena of Naval Commandos) Vol. 2 Tehran: Daftar-e Pazhoheshha-ye Nazari va Motaleaat-e Rahbordi-ye Niroo-ye Daryaei-ye Artesh-e Jomhoori-ye Eslami-ye Iran, 1389, p. 303.
  • [7]. Taqvim-e Mostanad-e Amalkard-e Niroo-ye Havaei-ye Artesh-e Jomhoori-ye Eslami-ye Iran (Documented Chronology of the Performance of the Islamic Republic of Iran Army Navy Force), Ibid., Vol. 3, Pp. 181, 189.
  • [8]. Sayyari, Habibollah va Digaran, Taqvim-e Tarikh-e Defa Muqaddas-e NEDAJA; Havades va Roydadha-ye 1 ta 15 Azar-e 1359 (Chronological History of the Islamic Republic of Iran Army Navy Force in the Sacred Defense; Events and Developments from November 22 to December 6, 1980), Vol. 6, Tehran: Daftar-e Pazhoheshha-ye Nazari va Motaleaat-e Rahbordi-ye Niroo-ye Daryaei-ye Artesh-e Jomhoori-ye Eslami-ye Iran, 1390, p. 383.
  • [9]. Woods, Kevin M. va Digaran, Jang-e Iran va Araq az Didgah-e Farmandehan-e Saddam (Saddam’ s Generals: Perspectives of the Iran-Iraq War), trans. Abdolhamid Heydari, Tehran: Marz-o-Boom, 1393, p. 303; Sayyari, Habibollah va Majid Mansoori, Tarikh-e Taqvim-e Defa Muqaddas-e NEDAJA; Havades va Roydadhaye 1 ta 31 Khordad 1360 (Chronological History of the Islamic Republic of Iran Army Navy Force in the Sacred Defense; Events and Developments from May 22 to June 21, 1981), Vol. 15, Tehran: Daftar-e Pazhoheshha-ye Nazari va Motaleaat-e Rahbordi-ye NEDAJA, 1392, p. 568; Sayyari, Habibollah va Digaran, Tarikh-e Taqvim-e Defa Muqaddas-e NEDAJA; Morvarid (Chronological History of the Islamic Republic of Iran Army Navy Force in the Sacred Defense; Morvarid), Vol. 6, Tehran: Daftar-e Pazhoheshha-ye Nazari va Motaleaat-e Rahbordi-ye NEDAJA, 1390, p. 405.
  • [10]. Shirmuhammad, Mohsen, Ibid., Pp. 261– 263.
  • [11]. Woods, Kevin M. va Digaran, Ibid., Pp. 316– 318.
  • [12]. Alaei, Hussain, Ravand-e Jang-e Iran va Araq (The Course of the Iran-Iraq War), Vol. 2, Tehran: Marz-o-Boom, 1391, p. 197.
  • [13]. Woods, Kevin M. va Digaran, Ibid., p. 293.
  • [14]. Ibid., p. 281.
  • [15]. Ibid., Pp. 311– 312.
  • [16]. Tripsas, Basil et al., Coast Guard Operations During Operation Iraqi Freedom, Virginia, USA, 2004, p. 30.
  • [17]. Sait-e Sazman-e Banader va Keshtirani, 14 Mehr 1400, https://www.pmo.ir/fa/news/55637; Shabake-ye Ettelaresani-ye MANA (MANA News Agency), Sarmayegozari-e 125 Million Dollari dar Tarh-e Tosee-ye Bandar-e Umm Qasr-e Araq (125 Million USD Investment in the Development Plan of Umm Qasr Port), 11 Mehr 1400, https://www.mana.ir/fa/news/91030

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