Operation Beit al-Muqaddas 2
Operation Beit al-Muqaddas 2 was carried out by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) on January 15, 1988, by the code of “ Ya Zahra (sa) ”. It aimed at liberating the heights west of the Iraqi city of Mawat in the northern part of Sulaymaniyah Governorate.
By early 1987, with Iran no longer having viable operational options on the southern fronts, the IRGC redirected part of its combat capability to the northwestern fronts— particularly east of Sulaymaniyah Governorate in Iraq.[1]
With Operation Nasr 4 (June 1987) and the capture of Mawat completed, Iran was now able to conduct operations on the left flank, particularly east of the Qale-Cholan River. Then, with the seizure of the Gardeh-Rash Heights during Operation Nasr 8 (November 1987), the way was opened to cross the Qale-Cholan River, enter its western side, and push northwest and south.
The successes of earlier operations, along with the opportunity to push into the heights northwest of Mawat, led to the planning of Operation Beit al-Muqaddas 2 to capture several additional heights.[2] The operation was first designated Beit al‑Muqaddas 1, but the War Propagation Headquarters in Tehran changed the name, noting that the liberation of Khorramshahr had already been called Beit al‑Muqaddas; therefore, this operation became Beit al‑Muqaddas 2.[3]
The operational area of Beit al‑Muqaddas 2 lay north of Sulaymaniyah and covered the Hermedan Plain along with the heights of Veyolan, Gojar, Qamish, Dolbashk, Alaghlu, and Amedyan. The plan was to advance south and west of the operational zone in order to approach the city of Sulaymaniyah and the Dukan Dam in the Qale-Dizeh area.[4]
The road that Jahad‑e Sazandegi had constructed through the rugged mountains for Operation Nasr 8 later served as the main supply route for the forces in Beit al‑Muqaddas 2.[5]
Given the geographical feature of the area— divided into eastern and western sectors by the Qale‑Cholan River— two separate headquarters were formed for Operation Beit al‑Muqaddas 2: Najaf Headquarters and Quds Headquarters.[6] During the operation, heavy rainfall caused the Qale-Cholan River (40 meters wide) to flood, and the area was covered with 1.5 meters of snow.[7]
Due to the large number of IRGC units involved, command of the operation was divided between two commanders and two headquarters. Najaf Headquarters was responsible for the Qamish Heights axis, while Quds Headquarters handled the Amedyan Heights axis.
On the Amedyan axis, units from the following formations were deployed under Quds Headquarters: 10th Seyyed al-Shuhada (as) Division (15 battalions), 27th Muhammad Rasulullah (pbuh) Division (8 battalions), 31st Ashura Division (8 battalions), 32nd Ansar al-Hussain (as) Division (7 battalions), 52nd Quds Division (5 battalions), 57th Hazrat Abalfazl (as) Division (4 battalions), and the 20th Ramazan Armored Brigade (2 companies of Khashayar armored personnel carriers).
On the Qamish axis, Najaf Headquarters commanded the 5th Nasr Division (12 battalions), 21st Imam Reza (as) Division (10 battalions), 55th Shuhada Division (6 battalions), 12th Qaem (as) Brigade (5 battalions), 18th Al-Ghadir Brigade (5 battalions), 35th Imam Hassan (as) Brigade (8 battalions), and 48th Fath Brigade (5 battalions). Altogether, the two headquarters deployed 15 units with a combined strength of 104 battalions.[8]
Since Beit al-Muqaddas 2 was Iran’ s major annual operation in 1988 and the first to be conducted on the northwestern front, both Ali Shamkhani (then commander of the IRGC Ground Forces) and Mohsen Rezaei (the IRGC Commander-in-Chief) attended the operational headquarters.[9]
Despite the challenges of carrying out an operation in winter— freezing temperatures and rugged heights— the operation began at 1:15 AM on Friday, January 15, 1988, by the code of “ Ya Zahra (sa) ”. Najaf Headquarters units moved first, followed by Quds Headquarters forces along three axes: Veyolan, the Hermedan Plain, and the Qamish Heights.[10] In an innovative move, a 200-meter bridge was constructed across the Qale-Cholan River using steel cables. The bridge stood 40 meters above the water level, and troops crossed ten at a time.[11]
In the first phase, the forces gained control of 29 key heights.[12] This phase led to the liberation of the Hermedan Plain and Qamish, Dari, Shafra, Meshkineh, and Basava villages, the heights of 1598, 1652, 1449, 1225, 1473, 1045, 990, 993, and 1139 meters, as well as the five Gojar heights, the three Vavylan heights, the Shilanah Valley, and the two heights between Dola and Golaleh. With these gains, 110 square kilometers of territory west of Mawat came under Iranian control.[13]
Among the obstacles to continuing the operation were enemy alertness, the destruction of the Gardeh-Rash bridge and road due to river flooding (blocking the rear), and heavy, continuous snowfall.[14] Nevertheless, phase two began at dawn on January 17, 1988. Despite adverse weather, three more peaks in the Gojar range and heights 1100 and 1150 meters overlooking the Qamish Valley were captured and cleared, in addition to another 20 square kilometers west of Mawat.[15] In this phase, Iraq— aware of Iranian movements in the area— deployed new units and equipment.[16] Using commando brigades from the First and Fifth Corps, the commando battalion of the 24th Division, and the 413th Infantry Brigade, Iraq launched counterattacks toward the Mawat Heights but lost over 80 percent of its forces, and the survivors fled in panic.[17]
Phase three began on January 20, 1988. By crossing the Zab-e Kouchak Valley,[18] Iranian forces managed to pass through Mawat under harsh weather conditions, and seize the strategic Karkar Heights as well as heights 2482, 2545, and 2301 meters, in addition to the Veisi range and the main Veyolan– Veisi connecting ridge. This phase liberated another 15 square kilometers of Iraqi territory. Qale‑Dizeh in northern Iraq also came under direct Iranian observation and fire once Iranian forces secured the left flank. Zarun, Golan, and the Dasht-e Quchan villages were also freed, and Mawat— which had been liberated in Operation Nasr 4 but remained within enemy observation and fire— was fully removed from enemy view and fire out to a radius of 10 kilometers.[19]
In Operation Beit al-Muqaddas 2, Iraqi forces suffered heavy losses. The 83rd and 603rd infantry brigades, the 1st Battalion of the 412th Brigade, and the 7th Nissian Tank Battalion were destroyed by up to 80 percent. The commando battalions of the 39th Division and the 1st Battalion of the 81st Brigade lost about 50 percent of their combat capability. The 53rd Artillery Battalion suffered about 30 percent losses. The 1st Commando Brigade of the First Corps, the 3rd Special Forces Brigade of the Presidential Guard, and the commando battalion of the 41st Division were hit hardest, suffering 70– 90 percent destruction. 15 tanks and armored personnel carriers, 70 mortars, 21 vehicles, 16 anti‑aircraft guns, one RASIT radar, and many communications and engineering equipment, as well as light weapons, and ammunition were captured by Iranian forces. About 2,000 Iraqi troops were killed or wounded, and 200 were taken prisoner.[20]
By capturing the Amedyan, Veyolan, Gojar, Qamish, Tappeh-Suzani, and Gardeh-Shilan heights, the operation also secured passage to the newly liberated areas inside Iraqi territory.[21]
The Army Aviation supported the operation with 25 helicopters, logging 828 flight hours to transport 2,141 personnel, evacuate 1,120 wounded, and deliver 65 tons of ammunition and supplies. Three helicopters were hit by enemy fire.[22]
One of the key factors in the success of Operation Beit al-Muqaddas 2 was the precise and effective artillery fire of the IRGC units.[23]
References
- [1]. Ardestani, Hussain va Yadollah Izadi, Roozshomar-e Jang-e Iran va Araq (Ketab-e Panjah-o-Sevvom: Nabard-e Bozorg-e Zemestani dar Jebhe-ye Shomali) (Chronology of the Iran– Iraq War; Book 53: The Great Winter Battle in the Northern Front), Vol. 1, Tehran, Markaz-e Asnad va Tahqiqat-e Defa Muqaddas, 1398, p. 25.
- [2]. Pourahmad, Ahmad, Joghrafiya-ye Amalyat-e Mandegar-e Defa Moqaddas (Geography of the Enduring Operation of the Sacred Defense), Tehran, Bonyad-e Hefz-e Asar va Nashr-e Arzeshha-ye Defa Muqaddas, 2nd ed., 1390, p. 391.
- [3]. Ardestani, Hussain va Yadollah Izadi, Ibid., p. 47.
- [4]. Hamshahri Online, Ashnaei ba Amalyat-e Beit al-Muqaddas 2 (Introduction to Operation Beit al-Muqaddas 2), 12 Esfand 1391, www. hamshahrionline. ir/news/203740
- [5]. Ibid.
- [6]. Pourahmad, Ahmad, Ibid., p. 409.
- [7]. Hamshahri Online, Ibid.
- [8]. Ibid.
- [9]. Ardestani, Hussain va Yadollah Izadi, Ibid., p. 47.
- [10]. Pourahmad, Ahmad, Ibid., Pp. 409– 410.
- [11]. Hamshahri Online, Ibid.
- [12]. Pourahmad, Ahmad, Ibid., p. 411.
- [13]. Ibid., p. 412.
- [14]. Ibid., p. 415.
- [15]. Ibid., p. 412.
- [16]. Ibid., p. 411.
- [17]. Ibid., Pp. 413– 414.
- [18]. Ibid., p. 411.
- [19]. Ibid., p. 412.
- [20]. Ibid., p. 413.
- [21]. Hamshahri Online, Ibid.
- [22]. Ardeshirzadeh, Karim, Hemasehha-ye Mandegar-e Havanirooz dar Defa Muqaddas (Enduring Epics of Army Aviation in the Sacred Defense), Tehran, Nodid Tarahan, 1388, Pp. 155– 156.
- [23]. Pourahmad, Ahmad, Ibid., p. 414.