Operation Pol‑e Naderi (Naderi Bridge) was Iran’ s first fully conventional, symmetric engagement against the Iraqi army. The 21st Hamzeh Division of the Iranian Army carried out the operation on October 15, 1980, but it was not successful.

Pol‑e Naderi — also known as Jisr‑e Naderi, Pol-e Karkheh, Pay-e Pol or Pol-e Sorkheh-Naderi — sits at kilometer 20 of the Andimeshk– Dehloran Road, just north of Sorkheh‑Naderi Village. It is built over the Karkheh River. The bridge forms a vital link between Khuzestan and Ilam provinces, connecting Andimeshk to Dehloran and tying together the areas of Musian, Ein‑Khosh, and Dasht‑e Abbas.⁠[1] In September 1980, as Iraqi border attacks intensified, Iran needed to move heavy armor across the Karkheh. Therefore, a floating bridge was installed downstream from the metal one, as the original structure could not support the weight of Chieftain tanks.⁠[2]

When Iraq launched its full‑scale invasion, capturing Pol‑e Naderi became one of its first priorities. Control of the bridge would allow Iraqi forces to cut Khuzestan’ s connection to the northern provinces and open the way to occupying Andimeshk and Dezful. For this reason, the Iraqi 10th Armored Division made the (metal) Naderi crossing the main axis of its advance along the Dehloran– Andimeshk Road.⁠[3]

As Iraqi forces pushed forward on September 28, 1980, Brigadier General Qasem‑Ali Zahirnejad, Commander of the Iranian Army Ground Forces, arrived at Vahdati Air Base in Dezful and requested heavy air support to cover Iranian units west of the Karkheh River. This would allow the 283rd Battalion and the 37th Armored Brigade to withdraw safely and reposition on the eastern bank of the river.⁠[4]

By September 30, with the Iraqi advance continuing, the 92nd Armored Division of Ahvaz prepared to destroy the bridges over the Karkheh River if necessary and mine the eastern bank to prevent further Iraqi movement.⁠[5] Despite fierce resistance by Iranian forces, the engineering unit of the 92nd Armored Division had no choice but to destroy sections of the floating PMP bridge to prevent it from falling into Iraqi hands, while the metal Naderi bridge remained intact.⁠[6] On October 1, with support from Air Force aircraft, the 283rd Armored Battalion of the 2nd Brigade of the 92nd Armored Division, based in Ahvaz, managed to halt the Iraqi advance toward the eastern bank of the Karkheh River at the Naderi Bridge.⁠[7]

On October 5, supported by Army Aviation and artillery, the 2nd Brigade of the 92nd Armored Division and the 37th Armored Brigade crossed the river using both the floating and fixed Naderi bridges. They pushed Iraqi forces back from the western bank and established a bridgehead about 5 kilometers wide and 300 meters to 3 kilometers deep.⁠[8] With Iraq’ s advance stopped west of the Karkheh, Iranian military commanders decided to launch an attack (October 15) as quickly as possible to drive the enemy back to the international border. The task was assigned to the 21st Hamzeh Division of the Army.⁠[9]

On October 9, 1980, the Commander of the Army Ground Forces issued the attack order to Colonel Zein al‑Abedin Varshosaz, commander of the 21st Division. The operation was initially scheduled for October 13, but Varshosaz requested a delay to allow more preparation time. The final date was set for October 15.⁠[10]

According to the plan, the division’ s 1st Brigade was to advance along the Dehloran axis with an armored battalion, putting pressure on Ali‑Gereh‑Zad Hill from the east, while another battalion would move from the Qahveh‑Khaneh junction toward Abu‑Salibi‑Khat Hill and capture it. The brigade had been reinforced with the 250th Armored Battalion equipped with Chieftain tanks, the 291st Tank Battalion of the 77th Khorasan Division, and the 131st Infantry Battalion, effectively turning it into an armored brigade. Meanwhile, the 3rd Infantry Brigade of the 21st Division was tasked with attacking from the northern heights of the Dehloran axis toward the south to capture the western side of Ali‑Gereh‑Zad.

The attack began at 7 AM, on October 15 — an hour later than planned because of the heavy traffic of troops and equipment on the fixed and floating bridges. The 3rd Brigade, exposed on both flanks and unfamiliar with the terrain, was unable to advance toward its assigned objectives, leaving the operation dependent solely on the 1st Brigade’ s attack. Tank units of the 1st Brigade, backed by the artillery fire, moved out near the Naderi Bridge and the Qahveh‑Khaneh junction. At first, Iraqi forces showed no reaction. Two armored tank columns advanced three kilometers beyond the bridge and approached within two kilometers of the Iraqi defensive line. At 8 AM, Iraqi anti‑tank fire suddenly began. The closer the Iranian tanks moved toward the frontline, the heavier the fire became.⁠[11] Iraq had positioned all its anti‑armor weapons along the Dehloran Road, firing into the flanks of the advancing tanks heading toward Ali‑Gereh‑Zad. By 9 AM, as the Iranian tanks pushed forward, Iraqi fire intensified. The attacking units had not expected such a strong response, nor had they been given accurate information about the enemy’ s positions. The tanks advancing toward Ali‑Gereh‑Zad veered west after crossing the bridgehead, moving almost parallel to the asphalt road between the Qahveh‑Khaneh junction and the Ali‑Gereh‑Zad Hill. This exposed them fully to Iraqi observation and anti‑tank fire, which resulted in heavy losses.⁠[12]

At 10 AM, the 21st Hamzah Division reported that its 1st Brigade had become pinned down north of the road, four kilometers from the Qahveh‑Khaneh junction, and had lost three‑quarters of its personnel and equipment. The remaining forces were surrounded. The 291st Tank Battalion, positioned between the junction and the Karkheh River, had also been halted and had lost most of its vehicles. Several crew members were wounded, and seven tanks had been abandoned.

By noon, the division commander reported a critical situation and requested instructions from the Army Ground Forces command.⁠[13] The decision was made to withdraw the 21st Division’ s units from encirclement and reposition them on the northern heights of the area (the Kharuli Heights) to establish a defensive line. Due to the disorganization of the forces, the division was ordered to regroup east of the Karkheh River, except for its remaining armored elements. The surviving armored vehicles formed a single company, and the relatively intact 291st Tank Battalion was assigned to the 2nd Brigade of Dezful to reinforce the bridgehead. The rest of the division retreated to the eastern bank of the river.⁠[14]

In Operation Pol‑e Naderi, 102 Iranians were martyred, 161 were wounded, and 31 were captured.⁠[15] Iraqi losses included 140 killed, along with the destruction of 19 helicopters, 10 tanks, 50 light and heavy vehicles, five small‑caliber artillery pieces, two large‑caliber guns, and one anti‑aircraft weapon.⁠[16]