United Nations Security Council Resolution 522

United Nations Security Council Resolution 522 was adopted on October 4, 1982, at Iraq’ s request, following Iran’ s major military gains and the extension of the war into Iraqi territory. After the decisive Iranian success in Operation Beit al-Muqaddas in 1982, which liberated Khorramshahr and more than 5,000 square kilometers of occupied land, it was expected that Iran’ s military superiority would pave the way for an honorable peace. However, the West— led by the United States— worked to keep the Baath regime in place and to increase pressure on the Islamic Republic of Iran. Iraq’ s supporters and international organizations sought to impose conditions that would undermine Iran’ s leverage at the negotiating table. In the meantime, the Baath regime insisted on its previous positions, including the abrogation of the 1975 Algiers Agreement. In addition, Iraq continued to occupy several strategically important border areas— such as Shalamcheh, Talaiyeh, the Hamrin range, the Mehran heights, the Qasr‑e Shirin heights, and Naft Shahr— to maintain a constant threat of military action and the possibility of renewed attacks.⁠[1]

In this situation, the Islamic Republic of Iran— seeking an honorable peace that included identifying and punishing the aggressor, securing reparations, and ending the prolonged “ neither war nor peace” situation— had to continue defending its territory to safeguard the rights of its people. Accordingly, the high‑ranking military commanders— meeting in the presence of Imam Khomeini (ra) as Commander‑in‑Chief— formulated and articulated the Islamic Republic’ s military strategy for continuing the war. The centerpiece of this strategy was the capture of the Basra region and then using it as leverage to bring the conflict to an end. This approach, known as “ Punishing the Aggressor”, was adopted by the senior military leadership in mid-1982.⁠[2]

Based on this strategy, Iranian forces were to capture areas north and east of Basra, establish positions along the Tigris and Arvand Rud, and control and consolidate access routes to Basra. This strategy pursued several objectives, the most important of which was to secure an advantage in future negotiations if successful.⁠[3]

With the intensification of Iranian military attacks against Iraqi forces south and southwest of Ahvaz during Operation Ramazan (July 14, 1982), the liberation of vast areas in the Somar region during Operation Moslim ibn Aqil (October 1, 1982), and Iran’ s control over the city of Mandali, the Iraqi government and its allies resorted to every possible means to prevent defeat.

On October 1, 1982, Saddam’ s regime, backed by the West and Arab countries, requested a Security Council meeting to pressure Iran into accepting an imposed peace. In the session, Iraqi Foreign Minister Sadun Hammadi asked the Council to take effective measures against Iran, which he claimed “ rejects peace”. This paved the way for the adoption of Resolution 522, which the Security Council unanimously approved on October 4, 1982.⁠[4]

The text of Security Council Resolution 522 reads as follows:

“ The Security Council;
Having considered again the question entitled ‘ The situation between Iran and Iraq’;
Deploring the prolongation and the escalation of the conflict between the two countries, resulting in heavy losses of human lives and considerable material damage, and endangering peace and security;
Reaffirming that the restoration of peace and security in the region requires all Member States to strictly comply with their obligations under the Charter of the United Nations;
Recalling its resolution 479 (1980), adopted unanimously on 28th of September 1980, as well as the statement of the President of the Security Council of November 5, 1980;

Further recalling its resolution 514 (1982), adopted unanimously on 12th of July 1982, and the statement of the President of the Security Council of July 15, 1982;
Taking note of the report of the Secretary-General of July 15, 1982;
1. Urgently calls again for an immediate cease-fire and an end to all military operations;
2. Reaffirms its call for a withdrawal of forces to internationally recognized boundaries;
3. Welcomes the fact that one of the parties has already expressed its readiness to cooperate in the implementation of resolution 514 (1982) and calls upon the other to do likewise;
4. Affirms the necessity of implementing without further delay its decision to dispatch United Nations observers to verify, confirm, and supervise the cease-fire and withdrawal;
5. Reaffirms the urgency of the continuation of the current mediation efforts;
6. Reaffirms its request to all other States to abstain from all actions which could contribute to the continuation of the conflict and to facilitate the implementation of the present resolution;
7. Further requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the implementation of the present resolution within seventy-two hours”.⁠[5]

The Security Council session to adopt Resolution 522 took place while Iran’ s representative chose not to participate. Nonetheless, the Council— with its fifteen members— fully supported it. The text of the resolution was prepared by Jordan, which held the Council presidency from October 1982, and had been approved in a short consultative session at Iraq’ s request. The resolution repeated the same points as Resolution 514 adopted on July 12, 1982, which had not been implemented.⁠[6]

In his speech during the Security Council session, Iraqi Foreign Minister Sadun Hammadi said: “ Iran’ s rejection of Iraq’ s peace initiatives and the Council’ s resolutions, as well as its insistence that Iraqi soldiers still occupy Iranian territory, are mere pretexts for continuing the war. Nevertheless, Iraq seeks a just and honorable solution and is fully committed to cooperating with the Council to achieve it. To prevent further threats to peace and security, the Council must take effective measures against the party that rejects peace”.⁠[7]

Moroccan Foreign Minister Mhamed Boucetta, who attended the session without voting rights, sided with Iraq and expressed appreciation for the mediation efforts of the Secretary‑General, his special representative, the Non‑Aligned Movement, and the Islamic Conference’ s Peace Committee. He reiterated the request of the Arab countries and called on the parties to respond to these efforts “ in good faith”.

Boucetta said that if both sides showed good faith and a genuine desire for peace, the dispute could be resolved through diplomacy. He praised Iraq’ s recent actions, describing its unilateral cease-fire announcement as a courageous, responsible, and valuable step toward international peace efforts. He believed the Security Council should urge Iran to cooperate with the Council to restore peace.⁠[8]

Following the vote, UN Secretary-General Javier Pé rez de Cué llar told the Council: “ The deployment of UN observers is subject to the agreement of both Iran and Iraq”. He emphasized that if such consent were received, observers would be sent to the region within 48 hours. The Secretary-General said he would continue his efforts to find a political solution to the conflict.⁠[9]

Before the Security Council session— aware that the outcome had already been predetermined— the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement protesting Jordan’ s presidency of the Council, given Amman’ s role as one of Iraq’ s principal allies in the war against Iran, and condemning the Council’ s months‑long silence regarding Iraq’ s aggression and its occupation of Iranian territory.⁠[10]

In this resolution, the Council offered no new initiative. Confident of Iran’ s negative response, its sole motivation was to isolate Iran internationally. In fact, the Security Council’ s rhetoric was purely political and pursued goals other than ending the war and establishing peace.⁠[11]

After the Security Council session and the announcement of the vote, Iran’ s Permanent Representative to the United Nations submitted a statement to the Secretary‑General protesting the manner in which the meeting had been convened, the Council’ s political bias in favor of Iraq, and outlining Iran’ s conditions for cooperating with the Council. The statement denounced the partisan conduct of the Security Council and the issuance of what it described as futile resolutions 479, 514, and 522, characterizing Resolution 522 in particular as a hasty measure intended to prevent the collapse of Saddam Hussein’ s regime.⁠[12]

Iran’ s Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Saeed Rajaei Khorasani, protested Jordan’ s presidency of the session during a press interview held at the time of the Security Council meeting. He pointed to numerous indications of the Council’ s bias toward Iraq. The Iranian representative rejected Resolution 522, reaffirmed Iran’ s commitment to securing its legitimate demands through diplomatic means, and emphasized that the fighting would continue if those demands were not met. Rajaie Khorasani stated that recognizing and punishing the aggressor, obtaining reparations from Iraq, and securing adequate guarantees against future aggression constituted Iran’ s conditions for establishing peace.⁠[13]

Finally, the Islamic Republic of Iran did not accept the resolution because it failed to meet Iran’ s three conditions.

 

 


References

  • [1]. Dary, Hassan, Rahbord-e Amalyat-e Mahdood-e Iran pas az Amalyat-e Ramazan (1/9/1361 ta 7/5/1361) (Iran’ s Limited-Scale Operations Strategy after Operation Ramazan; November 22, 1982 to July 29, 1982), Faslnameh-e Negin Iran, Year 10, No. 37, Tabestan 1390, p. 22.
  • [2]. Ibid.
  • [3]. Ibid.
  • [4]. Soudagar, Ahmad, Jang va Qatnamehha-ye Sazman-e Mellal-e Mottahed (The War and UN Resolutions), Qom, Vela-ye Montazer, 1391, p. 148.
  • [5]. Ibid., Pp. 148-149.
  • [6]. Lotfollahzadegan, Ali-Reza, Roozshomar-e Jang-e Iran va Araq, Vol. 21 – Amalyat-e Moslem ibn Aqil (Chronology of the Iran-Iraq War, Vol. 21 – Operation Moslem ibn Aqil), Tehran, Markaz-e Asnad va Tahqiqat-e Defa Muqaddas Sepah-e Pasdaran-e Enqelab-e Eslami, 1391, p. 659.
  • [7]. Ibid.
  • [8]. Ibid.
  • [9]. Ibid., p. 660.
  • [10]. Ibid., p. 660.
  • [11]. Soudagar, Ahmad, Ibid., Pp. 149-150.
  • [12]. Lotfollahzadegan, Ali-Reza, Ibid., Pp. 661, 663.
  • [13]. Ibid., p. 665.

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