Operation Beit al-Muqaddas 5
The limited-scale Operation Beit al-Muqaddas 5 was launched on April 10, 1988, with the codeword “ Ya Aba Abdellah al-Hussain (as) ” in Panjvin. Carried out by the Islamic Republic of Iran Army, its objective was to undermine the enemy’ s combat organization.
Operation Beit al-Muqaddas 5 was planned by the 28th Infantry Division of Kurdistan from the Army Ground Forces.[1] The objective was to capture the heights of Sang-e Maadan, Kalleh-Qandi, Kuh-Sheikh Abdulkarim, and 1830[2] in the Panjvin region.[3]
The operation began on April 10, 1988, in the Panjvin Heights along three axes. On the first axis, Brigade 1 of the 28th Division— with three battalions— advanced from the right side of Kalleh-Qandi Height toward the right side of Sang-e Maadan Height. Its mission was to seize the Qolunjan, Kalleh-Qandi, and Kuri-Kobleh mountains. On the second axis, Brigade 2— with three commando battalions— was responsible for reaching the operation’ s most important objective: Mount Sheikh Abdulkarim and Sang-e Maadan Height. The third axis was assigned to Brigade 3, which— with three battalions— was tasked with capturing and clearing Height 1830 and its left ridge. In addition to these nine maneuver battalions, three battalions from the 55th Airborne Brigade were held in reserve under the 28th Division of Kurdistan (Sanandaj).
After the operation began, the forces on the first axis advanced deep into the area and engaged the enemy at 2:30 AM. They captured Kalleh-Qandi Height and the border marker hill, then defeated the Iraqi forces on the Jangali Hill. However, enemy resistance on Kuri-Kobleh Height continued until daylight, forcing Iranians to fall back to Kalleh-Qandi. Iranian forces on the second axis clashed with the enemy at 1:45 AM, captured parts of Sang‑e Maadan Height, and advanced swiftly along its ridges to secure the objectives.[4] By 4:30 AM, after seizing Kalleh-Qandi, Sang-e Maadan, the border marker, and surrounding heights, brigades 1 and 2 linked up; however, the effort to take control of the western ridges of Sang‑e Maadan and the western height (Kani Shokat) did not succeed on the first day.
On the third axis, where Brigade 3 was in contact with the enemy, Iranian forces engaged at 2:25 AM, but the brigade was unable to secure its objectives due to the enemy’ s alertness and resistance, together with imbalanced advances among friendly units. Consequently, at 6 AM, after sustaining martyrs and wounded, the brigade withdrew from its positions. From 7 AM, the enemy launched counterattacks, which were repelled by the Iranians’ resistance. Enemy pressure in the first day continued steadily until dark. Meanwhile, sustained Iranian artillery fire targeted the enemy’ s rear areas. Around 5 PM, a fresh battalion was deployed to strengthen friendly positions and continue operations after dark, with the mission of completing the capture of Sang‑e Maadan and Kani Shokat. However, an artillery shell struck the battalion commander and the three company commanders as they moved forward to conduct reconnaissance, leading to their martyrdom and bringing the mission to a halt. On the other hand, heavy enemy fire also stopped the Jahad‑e Sazandegi teams working to connect access roads to the combat zone, and they had to pause their work until conditions improved.
From the early hours of the operation, the enemy used chemical weapons, firing about 30 chemical artillery shells and 40 chemical mortar rounds at Iranian positions, causing 176 casualties.
The Iranian Army Air Force began operations at 5:30 AM and conducted 41 bombing sorties against Iraqi positions and assembly points by 7 PM. Army Aviation, in addition to transporting troops, carried out several attacks against enemy positions using Cobra helicopter teams. In contrast, Iraqi aircraft managed only three sorties.[5]
On the second day of the operation, Iraqi troops continued to exert pressure on the border heights facing Panjvin. As a result, the Iranian forces on Sang-e Maadan Height fell back to three large hills at the end of the heights 1830, 1810, and 1806. By the afternoon, enemy pressure to retake lost points intensified. For reinforcement, one company was airlifted and two others reached the area by ground, after which the enemy attacks were pushed back. The Iranian Army units then held their positions, and artillery fire— guided by forward observers— kept enemy movements under control.[6]
On the third day of the operation (April 12, 1988), Iraqi forces continued their pressure to retake the heights they had lost. The Iranian Army deployed a reserve battalion, but at 9:30 AM, forces withdrew from positions they had defended continuously for three nights and two days. The enemy, backed by concentrated artillery fire, launched an early‑morning assault on the Iranian‑held sector of Kalleh Qandi Height, broke through the lines, and forced the troops to fall back.[7]
Thus, Operation Beit al-Muqaddas 5, after three nights and days of fighting, did not achieve its planned objectives[8] and ultimately ended with a withdrawal.[9]
Despite the withdrawal from Kalleh‑Qandi Height, artillery forward observers from the 28th Division remained in the area directing fire on Iraqi positions, thereby delaying the enemy’ s ability to occupy the height until 8 PM. In the meantime, Jahad-e Sazandegi teams— under heavy enemy fire and despite two engineering vehicles being targeted— were trying to build three access roads toward the heights. By 5:30 PM, one road had reached to about 200 meters from Kalleh-Qandi Height, yet the withdrawal from the height left the Jahad teams’ effort incomplete. As forces withdrew from Kalleh-Qandi, the Jahad teams pulled back the loaders and bulldozers so that they would not fall into enemy hands.[10]
In this operation, Army Aviation— using 17 helicopters from Masjed Soleyman Base stationed west of Marivan— flew a total of 487 hours, transporting 1,714 combat personnel, 780 wounded, and 20 tons of ammunition.[11]
During the operation, the Iraqis suffered heavy losses: 40– 80 percent of brigades 96 and 424 of the 27th Division; battalions 1, 2, and 3 of Brigade 86 of the same division; battalions 1 and 3 of Brigade 36 Infantry; two al‑Harithah battalions from Division 8; the Salahuddin Naqshbandi Battalion; and 30– 80 percent of artillery battalions 8 and 18 of the 27th Division. In addition, 45 tanks and armored personnel carriers were destroyed. About 3,500 Iraqi personnel were killed or wounded, and 310 were captured.[12]
References
- [1]. Jafari, Mojtaba, Atlas-e Nabardha-ye Mandegar (Atlas of Enduring Battles), 50th ed., Tehran, Entesharat-e Soreh Sabz, 1398, p. 150.
- [2]. Izadi, Yadollah, Roozshomar-e Jang-e Iran va Araq - Ketab-e Panjah-o-Chaharom (Amalyat-e Valfajr 10) (Chronology of the Iran-Iraq War – Book 54: Operation Valfajr 10), Tehran, Markaz-e Motaleaat va Tahqiqat-e Deda Muqaddas, 1392, p. 25.
- [3]. Ibid., p. 25.
- [4]. Ibid., p. 796.
- [5]. Ibid., p. 797.
- [6]. Ibid., p. 821.
- [7]. Ibid., p. 845.
- [8]. Ibid., p. 25.
- [9]. Hashemi, Ali-Reza, Karnameh va Khaterat-e Hashemi Rafsanjani - Sal 1367 (Payan-e Defa, Aghaz-e Bazsazi) (Record and Memoirs of Hashemi Rafsanjani – Years 1988-1989: End of Defense, Beginning of Reconstruction), Tehran, Daftar-e Nashr-e Maaref-e Enqelab, 1390, p. 80.
- [10]. Izadi, Yadollah, Ibid., p. 845.
- [11]. Ardeshirzadeh, Karim, Hamaseha-ye Mandegar-e Havanirooz dar Defa Muqaddas (Enduring Epics of the Army Aviation in the Sacred Defense), Tehran, Navid Tarahan, 1388, Pp. 157– 158.
- [12]. Beitol-Muqaddas 5 va Razm-e Delavarane Artesh (Beit al-Muqaddas 5 and the Brave Combat of the Army), Khabargozari-e Jomhouri-e Eslami, 22 Farvardin 1397, www. irna. ir/news/82883630